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CONTRIBUTIONS 



THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE, DE, AIKIN'S ATHEN^UM, 

THE MONTHLY EEPOSLTOEY, AND THE 

CHEISTIAN EEEOEMEE. 



THE LATE REV. ELIEZER COGAN. 

k 



In ^fco $arts. 



PART I.— CLASSICAL. 
PART IL— THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND BIBLICAL. 



EXTRACTED AND COMPILED BY HIS SON, 

RICHARD COGAN. 



LONDON: 
PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER, 

ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET. 
1856. 



• 4 



1 205449 
'13 



V* <-> / 



TO THE READER 



Soon after the death' of my venerated father I looked over the 
periodicals mentioned in the title-page, to which I knew he had 
been a contributor, with a view of ascertaining what he had 
written upon classical and other subjects. I was somewhat ' 
surprised to find that he had written so much, and, thinking 
that many of the articles might be read with interest by, at 
1o ast, some of his surviving friends, I determined to collect and 
print them in a small volume. I was not at all aware until after 
his decease that he had written so much upon classical subjects 
at so early a period. The articles, it is true, are shorty but as 
he never published any large work, it was these fugitive pieces, 
and these alone, which in the first instance gained for him the 
reputation of a scholar. And when I find that they were 
thought worthy of consideration by such men as Carey, Dawes, 
and Wakefield, I trust I may be pardoned for having made this 
attempt to rescue them from e?itire oblivion. The reader will 
see that I have divided the volume into two parts. One or two 
observations in Part II. might with more propriety (not being 
Biblical) have been placed in Part I. ; but as they were contri- 
butions to the Monthly Bepository, I did not think it worth 
while to disturb the order in which they were written. There 
is, I am well aware, a vast difference of opinion upon the sub- 
jects treated of in the second part of the volume. Few, if any, 
of the denomination of Christians to which he belonged, will 
be found to agree with him on all points. They were, however, 
those in which he felt a deep interest, and upon which, espe- 
cially in early life, he had spent considerable time and thought. 
In theology as well as metaphysics he was a follower of the 
celebrated Priestley, of whose character, talent, and writings 



IV 



he had formed the highest estimate. He did not consider him- 
self by any means a profound theologian. This he has stated 
in a passage which will he found in pp. .208-9 of this 
volume. In what estimation he was held as a metaphysician 
by one of the most acute and able metaphysicians of modern 
times (the late Dr. Crombie) may be judged by the fact of his 
having placed in the hands of my father the manuscript of his 
" Natural Theology " before he sent it to press. I may add 
with truth, that what he wrote upon these subjects was not for 
the purpose of displaying either his theological learning or his 
metaphysical ingenuity, but because he deemed them of great 
importance, and with the hope, by throwing out a hint or two, 
of inducing others, who had "more leisure and more ability," 
to devote their powers to such inquiries. Should the following 
pages afford gratification to any of his former friends, my ob- 
ject will be gained, and I shall have the satisfaction of knowing 
that my labour has not been altogether in vain. 

R. 0. 

November, 1855. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 



CLASSICAL. 

Remarks upon a Passage in Virgil, iEneid, V. v. 373-4 

the Particle re . 

the Greek Accents 

the Article in the Writings of Homer, and upon 

line 78 of the first Book of the Iliad 
Mr. Cogan's reading of simularit for simularat in iEneid, VI 

v. 591 

Mr. Wakefield's Remarks on Mr. Cogan's reading of simularit 

for simularat ..... 

E. W. on the same ..... 

Remarks upon a line in Virgil, iEneid, VI. v. 242, and upon 

the Subjunctive Mood, in ^neid, VI. v. 591 
the Nominative Case before the Infinitive Mood 

in the Greek Language .... 

, Mr. Wakefield's " Noctes Carcerariae" . 

the use of such Words as amantes 

- a Hemistich of Virgil, iEneid, II. v. 619 



For 



Observations and Conjectures 

Remarks upon the Punctuation of Homer, II. T. v. 133 
i. in the text read T, or xix. 

Mr. Singleton's Inquiries respecting irefyavras 

in Homer, II. xvi. v. 207 . . . . 

the Punctuation of Virgil, iEneid, V. v. 372 

a Passage in Virgil, iEneid, IX. v. 438-9 

the omission of the Augment . 

■ ■ the Reading of simularit for simularat, iEneid 

VI. v. 591 

Communication of John Nic. Dawes 

Remarks upon the Punctuation of Homer, II. T. v. 133. For i 
in the text read T, or xix. 

the same Passage, also upon Mr. Dawes' Com- 
munication ....... 



PAGE 
1 

2 
3 



3, 4 
5 

6 

7 

8, 9 

9, 10 
10—12 

12, 13 

13, 14 

14, 15 

16 

16 
17 

18, 19 
20 

20—22 
22, 23 

23 

23—25 



VI 



Observations and Conjectures on certain Passages in the Greek 
and Roman Classics ..... 

Remarks upon an error in the Press in the preceding Com- 
munication, also upon an observation of Bentley's 

the omission of the Augment in the Word 



e8v err vx.r) cre 



the Pocula Acheloia in Virgil, Georg. I. v. 9 
a Peculiarity of Herodotus . . i 

the Hymns of Homer 
Tlpcorov and JJpcora 



Metrical remarks . . . 

Mr. Cogan's Estimate of the late Gilbert Wakefield's Abilities 
as a Scholar ..... 



25—27 

27 

28 

28, 29 

29, 30 
30—33 

33 
33—35 

36, 37 * 



PAET II. 



THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND BIBLICAL. 

Mr. Cogan's account of the late Mr. Dewhurst as a Scholar 
Remarks upon Dr. Williams's Essay. on the Divine Govern 

ment ; also illustration of Phil. ii. 6 . 

the Popular Theology . 

Mysteries .... 

the Mythology of Armageddon 

his Papers against Calvinism . 

Mr. Hume's Argument against Miracles 

the same .... 

Mr. Stodhart's Anathemas against Unitarians 

Strictures on some of the Arguments of " Apeleutherus, 

with regard to the Natural Evidences of a Future State 
Remarks upon the Eternity of Hell Torments 

the Moral System of Calvinism 

the aged and infirm Ministers' Society 

the question of Liberty and Necessity 



. 38- 


40 


. 40— 


43 


. 44— 46 


. 46— 50 


. 50— 


52 


. 52— 


54 


. 54— 


59 


. 59. 


60 


? 60— 


63 


e 63— 


71 


. 


71 


. 71— 


74 


. 74, 


75 


. 75— 


83 



Addendum to Paper on Necessity, and Remarks on a Maxim 

of the ancient Philosophers .... 83 — 89 
Remarks upon the Effects of the Unitarian and Calvinistic 

Systems ....... 89— 93 

the Calvinistic Doctrine of the Evil of Sin . ,93 — 99 

Summary of the Evidences of Christianity . . . 99 — 110 

Presumptions in favour of Christianity . . . 110 — 115 

Remarks on Miracles ...... 115 — 117 



Vll v 

PAGE 

Examination of Mr. Hume's Objection to the being of a God, 

P.S. on John xxi. 15 117—126 

Remarks upon Scriptures relating to the death of Christ . 126 — 128 

John xxi. 15 . . . . 128 

Scriptural and Calvinistic Phraseology . 129, 130 

Moderate Calvinism, P. S. on 1 John ii. 12 . 130—134 

■ Remission of Sins .... 135 

a Criticism of Porson's . . . 136 

— a Passage in Paley's " Natural Theology," on 

the Unity of the Deity ..... 136—139 

— the Necessity and Evidence of Revelation . 139 — 145 

Mr. Sturch on the Religion of Nature . . . 145—150 

Mr. CoganV Reply to Mr. Sturch .... 150—156 

Remarks upon an error of Mr. Locke . . . . 156, 157 

Mr. Sturch in reply to Mr. Cogan . . . - . 158—163 

Mr. Cogan in reply to Mr. Sturch .... 164—167 

Remarks upon Bishop Burgess's Uncharitableness . . 168 — 170 

a Canon of Criticism relating to the Greek 

Article ....... 170—172 

Dr. Channing's opinion of Dr. Priestley . 172 — 177 

a Canon of Criticism relating to the Greek 

Article ........ 178, 179 

Grotius's Interpretation of Heb. i. 2 . . • 179, 180 

the meaning of the Verb yiyveaOai . . 180 — 184 

Correction of a former communication . . • 185 
Remarks upon the meaning of the words yiyveadai and 

Mystery . . • 185—187 

: the Greek Article .... 187 

• Analogical Reasoning . . . . 188 — 192 

— the Doctrine of the Atonement . . 192 — 196 

the Trinitarian Controversy . . . 196 — 202 

: ■ Divine Justice . . . . 202 — 206 

— the Vice-Chancellor's Critique in a late Judg- 
ment on the Improved Version .... 206 — 211 



APPENDIX. 

A Letter from the late Gilbert Wakefield to Mr. Cogan . 213 

A Letter from the late Dr. Parr to Mr. Cogan . . 214 

Extract of a Letter from Dr. Parr to Dr. Abraham Rees . 214, 215 
Extract of Letters received by a Member of Mr. Cogan's 

Family, from the Rev. Thomas Johnstone, of Wakefield 216—218 



EXTRACTS 

FROM 

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE, AND 
DR. AIKIN'S ATHENAEUM. 



PAKT I.— CLASSICAL. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — The true solution of the question proposed by a cor- 
respondent on the passage in Virgil, Nihil iste nee ausus nee 
potuit, is to be found in the following well-known peculiarity 
of the Latin language ; that after a negative a distribution is 
generally made, not by aut or vel repeated, but by nee or 
neque. Corn. Nep. de Timoleon: Nihil unquam neque inso- 
lens neque gloriosum ex ore ejus exiit. Plaut. Trin. v. 97. 
Neque de illo quicquam neque emeres neque venderes. Schell. 
Prsecepta Stili bene Latini, vol. i. p. 291. ed. Sec. Prisci rots 
nee (neque) — nee (neque) prsemittunt ssepe vocabulum negans, 
v. c. nullns, nihil, non, &c. Cic. Mil. Non possum reliqua 
nee cogitare nee scribere. This peculiarity seems not to have 
been present to the mind of the great Bentley, when on the 
Andria of Terence, Act i. Sc. ii. v. ult. he wrote the following 
note : Vera sine dubio et vetusta ilia lectio est neque haud, 
non neque hoc: Sic Plautus ter quaterque, Noster iii. 3, 31. 
At ego non posse arbitror, neque ilium hanc perpetuo habere, 
7ieque me perpeti. 

Allow me to remind your correspondent, who proposes an 
ingenious interpretation of Virg. Ec. i. 54, of a passage in the 

B 



iEneid, i. 602, " magnum quae sparsa per orbem," which will 
show that the genius of the Latin language is not violated by 
the ellipsis of the verb est after depasta. 

While I have my pen in my hand, allow me to detain your 
classical readers another moment, to propose a correction of a 
passage in Homer : II. xxii. v. 346, for ai ya% Trcog read 
ui yap us. See Odyss. xv. 156, and in vindication of the 
metre, II. xiv. 521. By the critical scholar the emendation, 
whether approved or not, will be instantly understood on read- 
ing the passage. I am, Sir, yours, &c. 

E. Cogan. 

Cheshunt, Feb, 23, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — I have not at hand the observations of Mr. Wakefield 
referred to by a correspondent in your last number. Without 
knowing, therefore, whether I have been anticipated, I take the 
liberty to trouble you with the following remark. The particle 
re in the Latin language has in several compounds the force 
sought for in the verb recludo. Take for examples repono 
and recondo. 



Scientia condendi ac reponendi fructus. 

Cicero. 

Quasque recondiderat, Stygiisque admoverat undis, 
Effodiuntur opes, irritamenta malorum. 

Ovid. 

Hence the ordinary use of reconditus, and the English 
recondite. E. 0. 

May 5th, 1800. 

P.S. The force of particles in composition has not been 
sufficiently attended to in studying and teaching the Latin 
language. That treasure of critical learning, that *Tu^a st$ 
aiEi, Mr. Wakefield's Lucretius, casts much light on this 



subject. Of its importance allow me to give an instance 
Virg. An. iv. 230 :— 

genus alto a sanguine Teucri 



Proderet 



which Ruaeus, vir non indoctus, has thus interpreted, qui pro - 
baret originem suam esse e nobili sanguine Teucri! For an 
elegant use of the verb prodo, see Lucret. vi. 562. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — In consequence of Mr. Robinson's communication on 
the Greek accents, I take the liberty to acquaint those of your 
classical readers who may not be at present possessed of the 
information, that some very curious remarks on the subject are 
to be found in Hermannus's " Treatise on the Metres of the 
Greek and Roman Poets," a very ingenious work of a very 
acute and learned man, which it is to be hoped will speedily 
find a place in the library of every British scholar. E. C. 

June 7th, 1800. 



P.S. In reading the Medea of Seneca the other day, I could 
not help remarking that Gronovius, in his note on verse 335, 
affirms of the verb recludo that it signifies both to shut and 
to open. But he produces no examples. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — To the question proposed by N. K., in page 535, vol. 
ix., it may, perhaps satisfactorily, be replied, that the existence 
of the article in the writings, and of course in the age, of 

B 2 



Homer is sufficiently proved by the instances which your cor- 
respondent has himself produced; and that the unfrequency 
of its use is to he attributed to a peculiar licence of heroic 
poetry, as will appear from the consideration that it is very 
sparingly used by the later heroic poets. Apollonius Ehodius 
will suffice for an example. Nay, in the iambics of the tragic 
poets the article is frequently omitted when in a prose writer 
it would have been inserted. 

Allow me another moment to correct a false translation of 
line 78 of the first book of the Iliad ; 

which ought to be rendered, not, with Dr. Clarke, "For I 
think that a man will be angry," but, " I think that I shall 
provoke a man." The accusative case of the pronoun is 
omitted, because o'iofxai and xoAoxxe^ev respect the same person. 
This is a simple matter, but the greatest critics have not been 
sufficiently aware of it. That admirable scholar Mr. Mark- 
land, for instance, has several times violated this propriety of 
the Greek language in his conjectures, v. g. Iph. in Aul. v. 
475, where Scaliger and Aldus were mistaken before him; 
again, on the Supplices, v. 504, and on verse 1192. 

It may be curious to remark, that when the Greek poets use 
the formula kttu yaia, &c, for opvufxt yaiav and the like, they 
still omit the pronoun as though the other form had been 
adopted. Vide Moschus, Meg. v. 75 et sequent. Homer, 
Od. v. 184 et sequent. Apoll. Khod. iv. 95 et sequent. 

But in reality it is the nominative which is understood in 
this construction.* Vide Eur. Med. 751, and following, from 
opvu down to sfcoua-ia T^oTroj. Soph. Antig. 897, 898, Ed. 
Brunk. 910, 911, of the new edition of Musgrave. This 
peculiarity was misapprehended by Heath and Henry Stephens 
on Eur. Cyclops, v. 266, and has been offended against by 

* I mean, if a verb and an infinitive mood following respect the 
same person, a pronoun or adjective appertaining to that person will 
stand before the infinitive in the nominative case. V. Hoogv. ad Vige- 
rum, p. 207. 



Brunk, in a conjecture on Tbeoc. xxvii. 34. These hints may 
be of use to young proficients in the Greek language. 

E. C. 
Cheshunt, July 7, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Permit me to propose a correction of a trifling error 
in a passage of Virgil. iEneid vi. 591. 

Deinens ! qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmeii 
iEre et cornipeduni pulsu siuiularat equorum. 

Instead of simularat, it should probably be simularit. 
Compare a similar epiphonema in the second book, v. 345. 

Infelix ! qui non sponsss praecepta furentis 
Audierit.* 

It has often occurred to me, in the course of my classical 
reading, to remark that the elegancies of classical phraseology 
are not uncommonly preserved in the vulgarisms of the Eng- 
lish language. An instance or two may amuse your classical 
readers. 

The redundant pronoun is found in such expressions as the 
following : " That horse will trot you ten miles an hour." 
This is somewhere observed by Mr. Wakefield, in his very 
learned and valuable Commentary on Matthew. 

Virg. Georg. iii. 434 : — 

Ssevit agris, asperque siti, atque exterritus sestu. • 

In some parts of this kingdom, country people will say, 
that they have been much terrified with gnats, &c. 
Lucret. ii. 539 : — 

Tanta ferarum 
Vis est, quaruni nos perpauca exempla videmus. 

The good woman of whom I bought fruit when a child used 
often to talk of there being a power of apples this season. 

* How it is read in other editions I know not ; I have only those of 
Ituseus, Burmann, and Heyne. The manuscripts fluctuate between 
simularat, simulabat, and simidaret. 



" I '11 comb your locks," " I '11 give you a dressing," " I '11 
trim your jacket for you," are tlireatenings the full force of 
which is understood by those who know nothing of their 
origin. So the Greeks use, in the sense of chastising, ttkwsiv, 
vittteiv, a/wxsiv, &c. Terence, Heaut v. 1. 77: Adeo exornatum 
dabo, adeo depexum, ut, dum vivat, meminerit semper mei. 
To save trouble, I have borrowed these instances from Koen 
ad Gregor, p. 127. Vide etiam Harles. ad Theocrit. v. 119. 

E. C. 

Cheshunt, July 29, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Your correspondent E. Cogan, at p. 137 of your last 
Number, prefers the reading simulant in Virg. iEn. vi. 590, 
to that generally received. I venture to differ from this writer 
on any subject with diffidence and circumspection. In my 
notes, however, on Lucretius, v. 744, I propose simularet, as 
the genuine reading of the passage ; nor do I repent recom- 
mending that tense in preference to simularat commonly 
adopted, or even hesitate to undervalue simularit, approved by 
Mr. Cogan, in comparison with this authorised reading, for 
these reasons : 

The perfect tense simularit, equivalent to simulavit, and 
substituted for it in compliance with the relative, implies a 
complete action; namely, that Salmoneus imitated the thunder 
with efficiency and success ; a supposition wholly incompatible 
with the language and spirit of the passage: whereas the 
imperfect tense simularet conveys a signification of an in- 
adequate and incomplete performance, and exhibits, with 
grammatical exactness, in conformity with the obvious purpose 
of the poet, a bungling attempt of infatuated (demens) 
impiety to represent that criterion of the supreme Deity, which 
was inimitable (non imitabile) by any contrivances of human 
power. G. Wakefield. 

Dorchester Gaol, Sept. 3, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Having read, in p. 137 of your last Number, a con- 
jectural emendation, proposed by Mr. Oogan, of a passage in 
the sixth book of Virgil's iEneid, I send to you, as an accom- 
paniment for it, the following remarks on the same passage, 
extracted from the " Analysis of the Hexameter," in a recent 
publication by Mr. Carey, entitled " Latin Prosody made 
Easy," page 165. In doing this, I neither pretend to prefer 
Mr. Carey's idea to Mr. Cogan's, nor Mr. Cogan's to Mr. 
Carey's: my only object is, to give your readers an opportunity 
of comparing the reasons on both sides, and judging for them- 
selves. 

" Demens ! qui nimbos, et non imitabile fulmen, 
iEre et cornipedum pulsu simularet equorum." 

" Simularet, which appears to be the reading of some re- 
spectable MSS., is here restored to its station, as better agree- 
ing in tense with Ibat and Poscebat, whether we choose to 
understand those verbs as implying the constant habit of 
transgression, or as moreover describing the offender in the 
very act of transgressing at the moment when Jupiter checked 
him in the midst of his triumphant career by suddenly inflict- 
ing on him a public and exemplary punishment of his impiety. 
If Virgil had used the pluperfect at all on this occasion, he 
would have written Simuldsset, not simuldrat. Every scholar 
knows that the subjunctive is elegantly combined with the rela- 
tive to express the cause, reason, motive — as here, 'Infatuate 
wretch! to attempt mimicking ',' &c." E. W. 

Piccadilly, Sep. 6, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

The following is the concluding part of a communication 
upon another subject: — 



8 

As I was reading the following line of Virgil, a few weeks 
ago, with one of my pupils (2En. vi. 242), 

Unde locum Graii dixerant nomine Aornon, 
it occurred to me that it might perhaps be admitted as genuine 
if a little spirit were given to it by the following alteration : — 

Unde locum Graio dixerunt nomine Aornon. 
Vide Mn. vi. 440. 

Lugentes campi ; sic illoa nomine dicunt. 

And Mm iii. 210. 

Strophades Graio stant nomine dictse. 

E. 0. 

Cheshunt, Sept. 7, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

The following is the latter part of an article written on a 
metaphysical subject: — 

Sir, — Allow me to thank your correspondent J. 0. (page 311 
of your last Number) for his animadversions on my correction of 
Virgil's iEneid, vi. 242. I did not propose the emendation as 
necessary on the score of phraseology, but to try whether, by a 
slight alteration, a line might not be vindicated to Virgil 
which Burman and Heyne reject as spurious. Mr. Wakefield, 
I ought to observe, on the other hand, thinks that Lucretius, 
in book vi. v. 420, rather countenances its genuineness. In 
the second remark of your correspondent there is much force, 
but it applies only to Aornon, and not to Avernum, which 
some copies read. Should it be said that Avemus is only a 
corruption of a Greek name, and therefore that Graio nomine 
would be improper, I would refer the objector to the following 
lines of Ovid : — 

Sed Veneris mensem Graio sermone notatum 

Auguror : a spumis est dea dicta maris. 
Nee tibi sit mirum Graio rem nomine did, 

Itala nam tellus Greecia major erat. 

Fast. iv. 61. 



9 

Certainly Aprilis is no more a genuine Greek word than 
Avernus. Perhaps the following lines of Silius Italicus afford 
the best commentary on this controverted passage of the Man- 
tuan hard, if indeed the line be his : — 

Ille, olirci populis dictum Styga, nomine vero 

Stagna inter celebrem nunc mitia monstrat Avernum. 

Pun. xii. 120. 

In further confirmation of the subjunctive mood in Virg. 
iEn. vi. 591, which confirmation can only be needed, because 
Burman and Heyne, at qui viri ! have acquiesced in the indi- 
cative, let me add Mn. ix. 728-9 : — 

Demens ! qui Rutulum in medio non agmine regem 
Viderit irrumpentem, ultroque incluserit urbi. 

I have since observed, that in the Oxford edition (which I 
did not recollect that I had in my possession), simularet is 
given for simularat. E. 0. 

Cheshunt, Nov. 1, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — In your Magazine for August last, p. 33, I made an 
observation on the use of the nominative case before the infini- 
tive mood in the Greek language. I wish to suggest that the 
case there specified, namely, when the nominative, the infinitive, 
and the preceding verb, all respect the same person, appears to 
be the only case in which the ancient Greek writers used the 
nominative before the infinitive. Dr. Huntingford, under the 
following rule of his Greek syntax, "The infinitive mood is 
elegantly used with a nominative case either before or after it, 
particularly by the Attics," gives sixteen examples. The first 
is rather an instance of the avaxohovQov. All the rest, save one 
from Lucian (of which, not having the connection before me, 
I can say nothing), come under the predicament of my obser- 
vation. I will not answer for the fidelity of my memory, but 
I recollect no indubitable instance in the poets which contra- 
dicts my remark. I hesitate, however, when I find such critics 



10 

as Musgrave and Mr. Wakefield defending the nominative 
before the infinitive in the following passage of the Trach. of 
Sophocles, v. 585 : — 

00CTTE /JLYJTIV EKTlduV 

I.te^oci yuvaiH.cc. heivo$ ccvti (tov ttXeov. 

Musgrave, indeed, refers to a passage which comes under 
the above description, and upon that passage cites an instance 
from Philostratus. At any rate, this passage of Sophocles is 
not decisive, as Brunk's cte^ei is supported by manuscript 
authority. 

I do not know whether any writer on the English language 
has traced the resemblance between our auxiliary verb have 
and the use of the Greek £%w with the aorist participle. In a 
matter known to every Greek scholar I will be sparing of quo- 
tations. Vide Eur. Troad. 1150, svo$ fxsv ouv fxoxQou a^ a.7ra.\- 
xa^ag ex®, and Aristoph. Eccl. 355, Ed. Brunk. In Eurip. 
Troad. v. 1121, for Aocvaoi kteivovtes exovuiv read kteivoivtss 
f%owcnv, as the sense requires not interjiciunt but interfecerunt. 

E. 0. 

Cheshunt, Dec. 6, 1800. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Mr. Wakefield, in his Nodes Carcerarice, amidst 
other very curious matter, has favoured the world with an acute 
observation on Greek prosody, which he once did me the 
honour to communicate viva voce; namely, that an hiatus 
frequently occurs in the third foot of an hexameter, as in the 
following line of Homer : — 

A;\x' ctKEQuaa k<xQyi(to, e/xu cP ettitteiQeo /avQu. 

I was much gratified to find that the solution which Mr. 
Wakefield gives of this peculiarity coincides with the explana- 
tion which had previously suggested itself to my own mind. 



11 

This is, the frequency of the pause which the grammarians 
have called naia. rgnov Tgoxatov. 

The following line of Virgil is a specimen :— 

Ingeris : et simulacra modis pallentia miris. 

This is what Mr. Carey would ingeniously call the sesquiccesura 
in the third foot. 

I know not how this pause may affect others ; to my ear it 
is sweet beyond measure or comparison. I could almost say 
of every line that contains it what Mr. Wakefield says of the 
following exquisite verse of Lucretius : — 

Unum labundi conservans usque tenorem, 

that Achilles might have soothed his sorrow by the repetition 
of them as effectually as by the music of his lyre. Were I to 
endeavour to account for the ineffable sweetness of this pause, 
I should attribute it to its immediately succeeding the syllable 
where the ccesura is usually found ; or to adopt the convenient 
term of Mr. Carey, I should say, that for the same reason that 
the cmsura is peculiarly agreeable in the third foot, the sesqui- 
ccesura is so likewise ; which reason appeal's to be, that, in the 
words of Hermann, ita versum dividit, ut nee pulmonibus 
molestiam creet, et aures numeri varietate delectet. 

Mr. Carey observes, that whenever the sesquiccesura thus 
occurs in the third foot, harmony requires that there should be 
a ccBsura in the fourth, as in the following line : — 

Dumque sitim sedare cupit, sitis altera crevit. 

Mr. Wakefield remarks, that this pause sometimes makes a 
line tolerable where the ccssura is neglected. It will be 
curious to notice, that in two of the most exquisite fines that 
ever were penned, this pause is substituted for the ordinary 
ecesura. 

Aung E7TEITCC, tte^ov^e KvXivdsTo Xaag avails, 
Labitur et labetur in c-mne volubilis sevurn. 

Now I am on the subject of harmony, I am induced to 
notice a censure of Brunk's on Eur. Phoen. v. 852, in which he 



12 

attributes leaden ears to all those who prefer poi to £f^oi, where 
it is optional to write either. I cannot help pleading for an 
exception in favour of this pronoun, when used redundantly, 
as in the following line of Moschus, Meg. 88 : — 

vuv $e (tot oixerat, h. t. A. 

The sfxoi has, to my ear, an emphasis which is inconsistent 
with the sense, or rather the feeling ', which the redundant pro- 
noun is intended to convey. And my opinion is confirmed by 
this consideration, that I have met with no passage (except one 
somewhere in Aristophanes) where, from the measure of the 
line, it was necessary to write the redundant pronoun s^oi. 

Another word, and I have done. In Mr. Carey's " Analysis 
of the Hexameter," p. 1 74, it is observed, " that words of two 
or three syllables require no particular observation ; they may 
be placed anywhere, consistently with the proper attention to 
ccesura and sesquicmsura." Whether the following observation 
be new or not, I cannot tell : it is, that the Latin poets are not 
fond of using words of this measure " " ", as amdntes, except at 
the end of the hexameter ; and when they do occur elsewhere, 
it is perhaps generally in the fourth foot. That they constitute 
the favourite termination of the hexameter verse, every man's 
recollection will instantly inform him. And this renders the 
sesquiccesura in the fifth foot — what Mr. Carey observes it to 
be, highly pleasing and elegant, as — 

Me mea paupertas vi | tee tra | ducat inerti. 

E.C. 

Chcshunl, March 12, 1801. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHTY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — To the observations in my last, respecting the use of 
such words as amdntes in the Latin poets, I would add, that 
when they occur so as to form the termination of the fourth 
foot, which they very rarely do in Virgil— in Ovid pretty fre- 



13 

quently — they are generally found preceded by a short mono- 
syllable, as — 

Obstrepuere sonis et adunco tibia cornu. 

The Greeks, who close their hexameters with greater variety 
than the Latins, do not so generally reserve words of the above 
quantity for the termination of the verse, and use them without 
scruple after the sesquiccesura in the third foot, and even close 
the verse with another word of the same measure, which the 
Eoman poets, I think, avoid. Such lines as the following are 
not uncommon in Homer: — 

Aaoi&KYW Ugia/AOio SuyccTgav eidog a^iarriv. 

E.O. 

April 29, 1801. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — It may amuse those of your readers who are fond of 
critical learning to see what has been said, and may be said, 
upon a hemistich of Virgil, which the ordinary scholar passes 
over without embarrassment or observation — iEn. lib. ii. v. 
619:— 

Eripe, nate, fugam. 

The sense is clear, but the expression dubious. 

Heyne, a man in whom learning, judgment, taste, and can- 
dour are united in a very extraordinary degree, considers eripe 
as a poetical substitute for rape. Scioppius conjectures fug a, 
as did also your humble servant; and this may perhaps be 
defended by iEn. v. 741 : — 

iEneas, quo deinde ruis 1 quo proripis ? inquit. 

Heinsius on Val. Flac. 1. ii. 247, defends eripe fugam from 
iter eripere in Frontinus. Burmann reads arripe fugam, a 
phrase which, in the judgment of Heyne, requires confirmation 
as much as that for which it is substituted. This confirmation, 



14 

however, is at hand from Claud. Eutil. Itiner. lib. i. v. 
165 : — 

His dictis iter arripimus : comitantur amici. 

Oudendorp agrees with Burmann. Jo. Schrader, with his 
usual acuteness and elegance, reads i~ rape. Mr. Wakefield, 
the last, but not the least, in this honourable group, in one of 
his lectures on the second book of the iEneid which I had the 
felicity of attending, proposed, with the spirit which character- 
ised everything he did, En, rape, appealing to the well-known 
passage in the Georgics, En, age, segnes rumpe moras. 

Eligat Lector. Equidem cum Wakefieldio sentio. 

E. C. 
Cheshunt, Nov. 14, 1801. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — The following observations and conjectures are pro- 
posed, not as certainly just, but as lusus ingenii, which, if 
thev do no good, can do no harm, and may whet the wits of 
abler critics. 

Fungar vice cotis — exsors ipse secandi. 

Homer II. a. v. 597. 

AuTtxg b toi; aXKOKTi ®£o7g svdeZia, Tracriv 

X2v0%0fJj yXUHV VEXTCZg OiTTO XgYlTWgO$ a<pl/tT(TCQV. 

The comma after Qvoxoel should be removed, as a well- 
known elegance of the Greek language is thereby lost. To put 
the matter out of doubt, compare II. $. v. 3. vExrap ecovoxoei. 

II. y. v. 100, for Atei-avfyov hex' af%w, read «t>jj, as in other 
places. Vide II. a. v. 28. 
II. t. v. 133, 

00' eov (piKov ulov bguro 
Epyoi/ aEiKE$ £x,ovra, U7r' JLuguo-QYiog <xe8xcov, 



15 

Place a comma after Eufuo-Qnog, that asQxcov may be governed 
of sgyov. 

Virgil, Eel. i. v. 74 :— 

Insere nunc, Melibcee, piros, 

Forte, / sere nunc. In this formula, the i* and the nunc 
usually stand together; but this is not universal. Martial 
Epigr. L. x. Ep. 96, J cole nunc reges. If any one, however, 
should defend the common reading from the following he- 
mistich of Virgil, Insere Daphni, piros, verbum non amplius 
addam. 
Virgil, .En. v. 372 :— 

Victorem Buten immani corpore, qui se 
Bebrycia veniens Amyci de gente ferebat, 
Perculit, &c. 

Immani corpore will be properly connected with qui se ferebat, 

a comma being placed after Buten and gente, as — 

Mn. viii. 199:— 

Illius atros 
Ore vomens ignes, magna se mole ferebat. 

Mn. v. 541 :— 

Nee bonus Eurytion praelato invidit ho-nori. 

Heyne explains prcelato by jprcerejjto, but this makes the 
passage ambiguous even to a Koman ear. I have tried honore, 
honoris, and honor em. Honore is good for nothing ; honoris 
is also the conjecture of Markland; honor em appears the 
simplest and best. Vide Hor. Serm. 1. i. vi. v. 49 : — 

Quia non, ut forsit honorem 
Jure mihi invideat quivis, ita te quoque amicum. 

On the verb invideo, see that most judicious grammarian 
Perizonius, in his notes on Sanct. Minerva, lib. iii. cap. 3. 
n. 80. 

iEn. ix. v. 205 :— 

Est hie, est animus lucis contemtor. 
For hie read huic hinriKcag. E. C. 

Cheshunt, Dec. 24, 1801. 



16 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — In my little communication of the 24th of December 
last, I proposed pointing the following line of Homer, II. i. 
v. 133. 

Y,pyov asiftsg e^ovto. V7r' > JLupucQykx; ueOxuv, 

not as it stands in the editions of Barnes and Dr. Clarke, -who 
show that they have mistaken the construction by translating, 
sub Eurysthei laborious, but after EupuaOyos as well as Exovra, 
that aeQxcov may be governed of spyov. This correction is in- 
disputable. In confirmation of the force given to vtto 9 com- 
pare Moschus Megara, iv. 4, 5, where speaking of Hercules and 
Eurystheus he says : — 

H f or i aXyscc 7ra,<rx,si ctTTEipna <p<xih/A0<; ulo$ 
AvSjpOff "Til' ouTi^avoio, tecov coast 9' 'TIIO ve@pou. 

See also Professor Porson's note in v. 1011 of the Medea of 
Euripides. 

In defence of Epyov as8xuv, see Megara, v. 42, ttoxeuv yap ol 
EPrON sroifjLov MoxexiN. E. 0. 

Walthamstow, Jan. 4, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — In reply to the inquiries of Mr. Singleton, page 29 
of your last Number, it may be briefly observed, that Tretpavrai 
in Horn. II. xvi. v. 207, is the singular number; Trstpa^uai, 
7r£<pavcrai, TTEtpavrat. With respect to si/xEVog u/aouv vscpsXyv, the 
fact seems to be this; eo, as a verb of clothing, is construed 
with two accusatives ; but, after the passive voice, it admits the 
dative of the part, still retaining the accusative of the thing 
worn or put on. Thus Od. r. v. 72, nana fc xfi 1 zwcvra si/xai. 

Ut vineta egomet cmdam mea, I feel disposed to retract the 



17 

change of insere into i" sere, in Virgil, Ec. i. v. 74, as the 
irony implied in / nunc seems too severe for the occasion. 

I was somewhat gratified, a few days ago, in looking into 
Heyne's new edition of Virgil, to find the punctuation, which 
I proposed in your last, of Virg. Mn. v. 370, Victor em 
Buten, &c, confirmed by the judgment of this admirable 
scholar. E. C. 

Walthamstow, Feb. 3, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Justice to the memory of my much-lamented friend, 
Mr. Wakefield, obliges me to notice, that in his edition of 
Virgil (which is come into my possession within these ten 
days), he has anticipated me in reforming the punctuation of 
Virg. Mn. v. 372. To him, therefore, let the whole praise of 
the correction be given. Habeat secum servetque sepulcro, 
I am not ignorant that Aulus Gellius, lib. v. cap. 8, of his 
Noct. Attic, explains the passage as it has been generally un- 
derstood. But whoever reads through the whole chapter will 
not attribute much to his authority, and will be disposed to 
allow that, at least that night, the Grammarian took a nap. 

e. a 

Walthamstow, March 13, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — I thank Scioppius for his hint. Dr. Hunter's Horace 
I have, and esteem it. With his Virgil I am altogether unac- 
quainted. Till I have an opportunity of consulting it, I will 
venture to suppose that he has published — 

c 



18 

Bebrycid veniens, qui se, Amyci de gente ferebat, of the 
family of Amycus, which would he easy and natural. I could 
say more in "behalf of this conjecture, hut let the learned 
reader judge hetween the two. Ego rem in medio relinquo. 

E. C. 
Higham Hill, Walthamstoiv, May 3, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — I will thank you to correct a rather singular error of 
the press in page 417 of your last Number. The passage from 
Virgil should have stood thus : — 

qui se, 
Bebrycia veniens, Amyci de gente ferebat : 

i. e. Who, coming from Bebrycia, professed to be of the 
family of Amycus. And this I have since seen to he Dr. 
Hunter's emendation. More than enough has been said on 
the passage ; otherwise a still different mode of pointing and 
interpreting it might be suggested. I cannot conclude without 
expressing my surprise that the common clumsy method 
should have satisfied all the editors previous to Mr. Wakefield. 

E. 0. 
Righam Hill, Walthamstow, May 5, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — In compliance with the request of Dr. Baggs, page 
544 of your last Number, I take up my pen once more on a 
passage of Virgil, of which I thought I had taken leave for 
ever. 



19 

My reasons for rejecting the common punctuation were, that 
qui veniens se ferebat appeared awkward and redundant, and 
that the words qui se ferebat seemed to require something else 
to he connected with them in order to a good sense, and a 
legitimate construction, hoth which were supplied by connect- 
ing them with immani corpore. Vide Wakefield ad locum. 

I have now little doubt but that Dr. Hunter has been more 
perspicacious than either of us, and that his is the true punc- 
tuation of the passage. In confirmation of qui se Amyci de 
gente ferebat, it will be sufficient to cite a line of Silius 
Italicus : — 

Atque Antenorea sese de stirpe ferebat. 

I quote from memory, as I write this in the apartment of a 
friend. 

Dr. Baggs will now perceive that I acquit Aulus Gellius of 
blame in connecting immani corpore with victorem Buten ; 
but whoever observes the use he makes of the passage, will 
not hesitate to pronounce whether it was Mr. 0. or Aulus 
Gellius that was napping. I must again depend upon my 
memory, but I think that the reader will find my judgment of 
the chapter of Aulus Gellius confirmed by Heyne in his Var. 
Lee. in Virgil, iEn. vii. 187. However, no confirmation can 
be needed. 

Your correspondent L., p. 522, will find the following line 
somewhere in the Medea of Euripides : — 

Xl/AYIV 7TE<paVTai TCOV EjJLCOV @Ql)\EU/A<XTCOV. 

E. C. 

Hackney, July 2nd, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sm,— Your correspondent Mr. Marr (p. 26) will find the 
following remark in p. 1 7 of the Preface to the second edition 
of the Hecuba, by Mr. Porson : — " Quod ait Bruckius, quasdam 
/ c 2 



20 

esse verba, quibus solenne sit augmentum abjicere, verba ea, 
quae augmentum nunquam habuere, abjicere non possunt. 
Attici semper dicunt avuya, nunquam wcoya, sed augmentum 
plusquam perfecto tempori reservant." Brunck, who contends 
for the occasional omission of the augment, had observed on 
Eurip. Androm. v. 955, " Atticorum etiam proprium videtur 
preteritum medium verbi avcoya absque augmento proferre." 

Some ingenious matter in defence of the occasional omission 
of the augment will be found in the Preface to the Hecuba, 
published by Herman. 

That certain Ionic peculiarities were tolerated on the Attic 
Theatre is a point acknowledged. It will be sufficient to refer 
to Valckenaer, Commentary on the Hippolitus, p. 319, or 
Diatribe on the Fragments of Euripides, p. 167. Mr. Por- 
son's Hecuba has brought to my mind a question which is 
agitated with the Professor's usual learning and sagacity, in 
the note on verse 788, ed. sec, namely, whether vuyxavu is 
ever used simjpliciter for £i/*i. One passage seems to have 
been overlooked, in which the common reading is corroborated 
by the authority of Eustathius, and which does not appear to 
admit of correction, — Soph. Electra, v. 45 : — 

'O yag 

fXEyiarog avroig Tvyxavzi doguZsvcov. 



E. C. 



High am Hill, Aug. 3, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

g IRj — When I proposed my simularit for simularat on 
VirgilJEn. vi. 591, I was more anxious about the mood than 
the tense. A few clays after, as I was feasting my fancy on Mr. 
Wakefield's Lucretius, I cast my eyes on his simularet, and 
saw quasi per nehulam the reason of his preference of the im- 
perfect tense. I know nothing that can be replied to the re- 



21 

mark with which Mr. Wakefield has honoured me, unless it be 
that perhaps the verb simulo implies merely the act of imita- 
tion, without any reference to its success ; so that the action, 
with respect to Salmoneus, might be complete, while the imita- 
tion itself was awkward and inefficient. Might we not, with 
propriety, say in English, " Madman ! to have imitated the 
inimitable thunder" ? However, whatever becomes of the 
tense, I am glad to have agreed with Mr. Wakefield and Mr. 
Carey as to the subjunctive mood ; in favour of which let me 
add Stat. Theb. v. 172 :— 

Miseri, quos non aut horrida virtus 
Marte sub Odrysio, aut medii inclenientia ponti 
Hauserit ! 

Mr. Carey, as I learn from your correspondent E. W., page 
230 of your last Number, prefers simularet, partly on account 
of ibat and poscebat in the description preceding. I, on the 
contrary, should, I think, prefer the perfect tense, if admissible, 
as drawing a clearer line of distinction between the epiphonema 
and the tale ; and I should point with a colon at pdscebat 
honor em, which is not done, according to my copies by Burman 
or Heyne. I shall not wander far from the present subject, if 
I remark that the first aorist of the Greeks is sometimes used 
instead of the imperfect de conatit. On Eur. Orest., v. 906, 

V7T0 $' ETEIVE Tw&XfEO^ KOyOVS TOO <T(pO) XaTCUtTElVOVTl T010VT0U$ 

hsysiv, Mr. Porson's note is as follows : " KonouneivavTi Aid et 
MS 8. quidam. Varum refer t" This parum refert at first 
startled me, and my pencil spontaneously wrote on the margin, 
Immo permultum, ni fallor. But from a memorandum sub- 
joined, I learn that I have found the aorist of the very verb 
reiva twice in the Ion alone used of the attempt, not of the 
effect. One of the passages lies before me in Mr. Wakefield's 
edition, v. 1310 : ehteivoc d'ovra 7to\e(juov $of/.ot$ e/xoig. 

I wish to suggest a doubt, whether the ablative case in the 
Latin language be not sometimes used with a double reference. 
I do not love whims; but if I am whimsical in this, I err in 
good company. Doering on Catullus, 64, 251 — 

Multiplices auimo volvebat saucia curas, 



22 

has this note ; " Saucia percussa dolore, nisi quis animo tarn 
ad volvebat quam ad saucia referre malit. Exempla enim, 
ubi unum nomen ad plura trahendum est, haud rara sunt. 

E. C. 

Oct. 3, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — I agree with Mr. Cogan, that the passages of Euripides 
and Sophocles sufficiently defend one another, and prove, at 
least in poetry, the legitimate use of the verb ruyx^veiv without 
the participle cov. 

My friend, Mr. C. Falconer, jun., pointed out to me another 
mistake in Mr. Porson's note, which Mr. Cogan has omitted 
to correct, either through forbearance or oversight. If in Euri- 
pides, Anclrom. 1116, we read [Eugairo q>oiG<f\ etu%e $' ^ v & 
£iA7ru%oi$, there will be an hiatus valde deflendus, which Mr. 
Porson will, I dare say, retract, when it is mentioned to him. 
I draw this conclusion from two of his own notes, one upon 
the 571st verse of the Hecuba, where he quotes with approba- 
tion my namesake's (Dawes. Misc. Crit.,pp. 21 6, 217) censure 
of a similar mistake of King's ; the other on Orestes, v. 792, 
where Mr. Porson proposes a conjecture to remedy the same 
fault in a comic poet. 

While I am on this subject of the hiatus, it may not be im- 
proper to rescue another passage from the attacks of critics: 
Machon (Athenaeus xiii. p. 580, D.) tells us, that Gnathsena, 
seeing a young butcher, said to him, Meifamov 6 xaxhg, <pn<r), 
wag 'lo-TYis; (pfaaov; " My pretty lad, tell me how you sell (your 
meat)." Your readers, Sir, who recollect Shallow's questions, 
" How a good yoke of bullocks at Stamford fair? " "How a 
score of ewes now ? " will readily agree, that nag ta-rvig is at 
least good English. But Lennep, in a note upon Phalaris, 
p. 95, i., will not allow it to be good Greek, so corrects it to 
TToa-ov 'lo-TYig, and falls into the error I have just exposed. Mr. 



23 

Jacobs, in a note upon the Anthology, approves of Lennep's 
correction. Let us try to defend the vulgar reading by a quo- 
tation from Aristophanes, Eq. 478 : Ilwf ouv b rufog kv BoiaroTg 
coviog; but see what a general prejudice has taken place in be- 
half of ttoo-ov against poor nag ! Gerard Horreus would read, 
TToaov ¥ 6 rugog. This conjecture Pierson (on Moeris, p. 424) 
refutes by producing Acharn. 768 : Ti £' a*Ao, MsyagoT Troog b 
aTrog aviog ; to which, when your readers have added a fragment 
of Strattis (apud Polluc. iv. 169) — T« £' ax(piff u/mv vug 
s7ru>.ovv ; tettcc^cov A^ax/^oov (jbaXicna ibv no(pivov — they will con- 
sent to let Machon and Aristophanes enjoy their old reading. 

John Nic. Dawes. 
Oct. 11, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — If any of your classical readers recollect that, in your 
Magazine of February last, I proposed to alter the punctua- 
tion of a line in Homer, II. i. 133, I owe them and myself 
the following defence of the common reading. In Iliad, 0. v. 
393, we read — 

TEigOftEvov ctcoeitkov bit JLuguaQwog aeQhcov. 

Eurip. Her. Fier. v. 832 :— 

ettei $e [xox^oug diETTEpacr' Euguafocog* 

The correction proposed was strictly classical, and well 
enough defended by the passage of Moschus ; but my usual 
caution forsook me, when I pronounced it indisputable. 

E. 0. 

Higham Hill, Nov. 8, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Heyne's Homer having reached me within these few 
days, I turned with some impatience to the passage in the 19th 



24 

Book, on which I made a remark in your last. This admirable 
editor has observed that Epyov astKsg is used, miro modo, for 
Egya asiHYi, but that Epyov sometimes signifies labor, cerumnosus 
labor. He has not noticed the Epyov poxQuv of Moschus. He 
allows us to connect spyov asQhuv, but proposes that the words 
should be joined, as9xuv vtt Eupuo-Qyog. But if asQ^cov is to be 
joined with spyov, I should still prefer my old construction, as 
u7ro, TTgog, and ff, are frequently construed with neuter and 
active verbs. 

All your classical readers will thank Mr. Dawes for his com- 
munication. He handsomely suggests that it might not be 
from oversight that I did not take notice of the hiatus intro- 
duced into the line of Euripides by Mr. Porson's correction. 
I pointed it out in a letter sent to you, Sir, but for which you 
allowed me to substitute that which you published. To the 
suggestion of a friend, I am indebted for the knowledge of a 
fact which I was not aware of, namely, that Tuyxavu occurs 
again in the Electra of Sophocles, without the participle, v. 
313, vvv d'aypoiat ruyxav£i. Here, however, it might be read 
ayp 01$ cov Tuyxavsi, in which order the formula, I think, occurs 
elsewhere. The expression v. 993 is of a different kind. 

In Euripid. Hecuba, v. 1038 — 

»j yap xx&Eiteg Spyna, nai Hparsig %evqv ; 

I some years ago conjectured &vov. The correction was at that 
time approved by Mr. Wakefield, and Herman has since given 
it in the text. The cause of the depravation, allowing it to be 
such, is obvious. 

As the accusative appears to have been here supplanted by 
the genitive, I have sometimes suspected that it has been sup- 
planted by the dative in Sophocles (Edip. Col. v. 1096 : — 

TW (THOTTU /J.EV OUH, EPEig 

tog YEudo/xavTig ; 

tov G-H07rov would exhibit an elegant Greecism. Vide Eurip. 
Med. V. 250, teyouai d'y/uag, 'HS amv^uvov Qiov Za/xsv. Inf. v. 
453, Euripides might have written, if he did not write, XEyoua 



25 

laaov, u$ Hania-Tog ectt' avn%. The elision of the vowel, after 
a short syllable in the ccesura, is liable to no objection. Vide 
p. 24 of Professor Porson's Supplementary Preface to the 
Hecuba. E. 0. 

Iligham Hill, Dec. 6th, 1802. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — The following observations and conjectures on certain 
passages of the Greek and Roman Classics are very much at 
your service. 

A mag no Tragoedice patre auspicemur : Agam. v. 101, for 
<paivov<r' } we may not inelegantly read craivoucr'. Vide Piers. 
Verisim. p. 72. I should not, however, with this most elegant 
scholar, read Trgouayvs for y^oa-nys in Eur. Androm. v. 27. I 
can hardly abandon a conjecture into which Reiske also has 
fallen, namely, ng oyye. — Nisi me lactasses amantem, et falsa 
spe producer es. 

The mention of Pierson brings to my mind a conjecture on 
the Ion of Euripides, v. 617, where, for (pallidum avaatpuv, he 
proposes metri causa, avarYipoguv. But since the sagacious 
discovery of Professor Porson, respecting the anapaest in the 
fifth foot of the Iambic line, this alteration will scarcely be ad- 
mitted. Mr. Wakefield more happily reads pafpaxuv rs ava- 
criftcov. Forte melius, avacri/xcov rs (pag/Aaxuv, avacri/xog occupies 
this station of the verse, both in Euripides and Sophocles. 

I have wavered somewhat with respect to the following 
passage in the Hecuba of Euripides, v. 13, 6 kcci [xz yng 
v7r£^B7T£/x^£v, but I am at length inclined, with Brunck and Mr. 
Wakefield, to consider o as here used for h 1 6. Among other 
reasons, the following has weight with me, that when o has this 
meaning, nai frequently, perhaps generally, follows. Vide 
Phceniss. v. 270. Apollon. Rhod. i. 205, 767. 



26 

In this same first book of Apollonius, there is a passage 
which appears to be slightly corrupted : — 

*H, xcti o fxzv (pogftiyya <ruv anft^oaiy o~xeev #i>5y 
tou o afMorov hyZavTog eti tt^ouxovto Hoc^rwoc 
TTCCVTEg b /xco$' 

That o fxsv and tou fe should be used of the same person is 
hardly consistent with the genius of the Greek language, and 
aporov, which belongs to tt^ouxovto, stands oddly between tou 
h XnZavTog. I should propose reading — 

'Oj 3° a/J.0T0v } Xy%avT0$, eti «.t\X. 

The passage may have been depraved by some one who did 
not know the pronoun may be omitted in the genitive absolute. 
But we need not go further for an example of this peculiarity 
than back to verse 260 of the very book in hand. If an in- 
stance of ol h TravTig b /xu; is required, it will be found in 
verses 474, 475. 

In Sophocles (Edip. Tyr. 464— 

!"£VY]V E7TI 
a)CY\7TT^Cp TTgodElXVUS EfJLTTOgEUCTETat 

Villoison (Animadver. in Longus, p. 85,) condemns o-kyittt^w 
vrpofeiKvug, as not Greek, and proposes o-kyi7tt$ov. But the com- 
mon reading may be defended by Theocrit. Idyl. xxii. v. 102* 
ETcoaia x £ ? ai 7r^ob^EiHVug. 
In Virgil ^En. ii. 615— 

Nimbo effulgens, et Gorgone sseva, 

it is rather doubtful whether sceva is the nominative or ablative. 
Perhaps the doubt may be resolved by the Gorgone cruda 
virago of Statius. 

In the 8th book of the iEneid, v. 222, there is a passage on 
which the critics have entertained different opinions :■ — 

Turn primum uostri Cacum videre timentem, 
Turbatumque oculis, 

Mr. Wakefield reads oculi. In Livy we find oculisque simul 
et mente turbatum. 



27 

In the 12th book, v. 797, the sense of morta lis is considered 
as ambiguous — 

Mortaline decuit violari volnere divum ? 

The author of the Epitome of Homer's Iliad, in v. 469, 
has shown how he understood it. Speaking of Diomede, he 
says : — 

Celestemque mamim mortali vulnerat hasta. 

Horace Carm. lib. iii. Od. ii. v. 14 — 

Mors et fugacem persequitur virum. 

Bentley reads consequitur. Baxter objects suo more. 
Gesher observes, quern persequitur : i. e. cupide et constanter 
sequitur mors, ilium sine dubio consequitur etiam asse- 
quiturque. No one seems to have remembered that persequi 
fugie?ites is a military phrase, which at once defends the com- 
mon reading, and gives spirit and beauty to the passage. 

E. C. 

Higham Rill, Sept. 6, 1803. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — I scarcely know whether it is worth while to notice 
an error of the press in my last, as no Greek scholar can be 
perplexed thereby: but the letter 9 was omitted in the words 
Bavocaifxcov, SavaTvpopuv, and crx^sv. While I have my pen in 
my hand, I will detain you a moment longer. In perusing 
Huschke's Analecta Critica, I have just fallen upon an excel- 
lent observation of Bentley's, on the suolimis anhelitus of 
Horace. I wonder that no critic has compared this expression 
with the following passage in the Hercules Furens of Euri- 
pides, v. 1095, 1096:— 

KCt.1 TTVOag §Eg/AOL$ 7TVS00 
fAETagaf, 0V @£@<Xia } TTVEUfAOVCOV a7T0. 

E. 0. 

Higham Hill, Oct. 3, 1803, 



28 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — In opening your Magazine of this month, I have just 
cast my eyes upon an inquiry proposed by Mr. Marr, on v. 
270 (or, in Brunck, 262) of the CEdipus Tyrannus of Sophocles. 

The omission of the augment in eg^uo-tvxwe is no violation of 
Mr. Porson's canon, as this word is preceded by a long vowel. 
In this same play, v. 1504, we read, a '(pviEuaa^Ev. 

Professor Dalzel has fallen into a similar misapprehension 
of this matter. On v. 1523 of this same CEdipus, Kai ya$ a 
'h$c(.ty\<t<x$, he writes thus: « '*faT»jcraj, i. e. a ^aTncrag. Plane 
tamen persuasum habet Porsonus, non licuisse in Attico 
sermone augmentum abjicere. But here the augment coalesces 
with the relative. Vide v. 722, to foivov qu$o@eito. E, 0. 

Higham Hill, May 5, 1804. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. 

Sir, — Your magazine having this month come into my hand 
later than ordinary, I have now first seen the ingenious obser- 
vations of J. A. upon Heyne's Commentary on Virgil. How 
far, upon examination, I should agree with your correspondent, 
I do not know ; but I cannot give my assent to the remark 
upon the Pocula Acheloia, Georg. i. v. 9. The substitution 
of the water of Achelous, for water in general, was common 
with the ancients, no doubt for some particular reason, and 
probably because, according to Didymus — 

A%£?VW0J TTaVTUV TUV TTOTCifACOV TTgECrfiuTaTOg Y\V. 

In the Andromache of Euripides, v. 166, we read — 

TeuftEOV x,e§i crjEigoucrav A%eAwoz> fyoirov. 



29 

But let us further hear Hesychius : — 

A%£Aojo(7 ? irora/xog Agxad'tag, nai irav bdcop ovrog XEysrat. 

See Alberti, and the authors cited by him. The Scholiast 
on Homer, II. (p. v. 194, remarks — 

Koivag ds irav udcog Ax^coog JtaXEirat. 

With respect to the Achelous, I have nothing more to add, 
but that Dawes (vide Miscel. Critica, p. 176) was precipitate 
in affirming that the name of this river could not be written 
Ax^aiog. The evidence of Apollonius Ehodius on this point 
is satisfactory. L. iv. v. 293 : — 



,i eteov ys 



Tains vftETEgYis A%£Aoho£ E^avincriv. 

E. C, 

Bigham Hill, March 11, 1805. 



A PECULIAEITY IN HEEODOTUS. 
TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENiEUM. 

Sir, — Every reader of Herodotus has probably observed in 
him a peculiarity which has indeed been noticed by the critics, 
namely, that he frequently separates the preposition from the 
verb to which it belongs by the insertion of the particle <ov, 
vid. Wesselingad lib. iii. c. 60, et Schaefer ad Longum, p. 418, 
who produces from other writers similar instances of the tmesis 
with oh. Vide etiam Koen ad Gregor, p. 209. It has further 
been remarked, that in this tmesis, as employed by Herodotus, 
the uv has not its ordinary force, but is to a modern nearly 
redundant. I do not now inquire into the power of the par- 
ticle in these instances, but proceed to observe that Herodotus 
inserts it between the preposition and the verb in the use of it 
now alluded to, I believe, solely in the case of an aorist used 
for the present indefinite, as in the following example : — air 



30 

av e$qvtq, vendere solent or vendunt ; on which use of the 
aorist vid. Grgevii Lectiones Hesiodeae, p. 24 ; Krebsius ad 
Plutarch ; De audiendis Poetis, p. 149 ; Valkenaer's Diatribe, 
p. 163; Herman "De era endanda ration e Grsecee Grammaticse," 
p. 187, to which, that I may take an opportunity of recom- 
mending an excellent work to the lovers of Plato, I add Hein- 
dorf ad Platonis Phaedrum, p. 275. 

The passages in which I have noticed the tmesis under 
consideration will be found in lib. ii. c. 39, 40, 47, in which 
are two instances, 70, 86, 87, 96, 122, lib. iii. c. 82, lib. iv. 
c. 60, 196, lib. vii. c. 10. All these instances answer to the 
description above given ; I am not, therefore, disposed to admit 
the conjecture of Wesseling, £$ uv exQeiv, lib. iv. c. 146, 
which, as I learn from Borheyk's " Apparatus Oriticus ad Hero- 
dotum," is decidedly approved by Larcher. I have only to add 
that Herodotus, if I am not mistaken, never uses the aorist 
for the present in the case of a compound verb without this 
tmesis ; and in one instance he subjoins the cov to the aorist of 
a simple verb employed in this manner, lib. i. c. 132. If 
there are any who think such minutiae not worth observing, 
they may be told from high authority nihil contemnendum est, 
neque in hello, neque in re critica. Mr. Porson ad Eurip. 
Medeam, v. 140, si fts ys /xn 7teiQqvtixi, Xeittetczi $n teysiv ccutois 
tov Trahaiov Xoyov, 

Xoi fAEv Tdura donouvr e<ttco } e/aoi $£ rafts. 

Coray ad Hdiodorum, p. 200. 

E. 0. 

Higham Hill, April 3rd, 1807. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENE UM. 

Sir, — Some little time ago, in reading the Hymus of Homer 
in the edition of Herman, I was struck with a circumstance 



31 

which may be not altogether uninteresting to your classical 
readers. On verse 86 of the Hymn to Venus, a poem which 
Herman pronounces to be Homeri nomine dignissimnm, the 
learned editor remarks that this composition is purer with 
respect to the observance of the digamma than the remaining 
Hymns of the collection. He then proceeds — Ac sublatis 
vitiis, v. 148, 182, 195, 204, hi tan turn loci super sunt de 
quibus dubitari jtossit, si vera sunt quae de liter a JEolica 
disputari solent : v. 44, 54, 85, 86, 134, 170, 233, 257 {to 
which add v. 6), nam v. 136 et 279, interpolators esse equi- 
dem existimo. What I have to remark in addition to this is, 
that in almost all these passages the digamma may be restored 
by an easy remedy, and moreover a remedy which it is also 
necessary to apply to similar errors in the common text of the 
Iliad and Odyssey, and that in the remaining instances (one 
perhaps excepted) the difficulty is no greater than what is 
found in those writings which are acknowledged to be Homer's. 
And this, be it noticed, cannot be observed in general of the 
offences against the digamma in the Hymns to Apollo, 
Mercury, and Ceres. I shall leave the learned reader to draw 
what he pleases from these premises when I have examined the 
several passages above cited in their order. 

V* 6. Traaiv 3" Efyu ^e^xev. Here either the conjunction 
may be omitted, which I should prefer, or the ett 3 aurco 5"' eg yov 
etux,8y} of Homer's II. iv. v. 470, with the observation of 
Bentley, may be compared. 

V. 44. xefo' Eiduiav, read xefox idviav, and see II. i. 608, and 
Heyne ad lib. v. 128. 

V. 54. YIoXutti^cchou I3>j£. See Heyne's Excursus on the 
digamma, v. Ifa. 

V. 85. Eidog te (/,Ey£8o$ te nai Eifxwra aiyahoEVTa. Here it is 
easy to read ufog xat ^syEOog xai t which correction is also pro- 
posed by Matthsei. 

V. 86. UettXov (mev ya% ee<tto (pasivoTEgov Trugog auyng. For ee<tto } 
if any emendation is necessary, read ejto, a correction which 
even Ilgen allows to be admissible, though unacquainted with 
the digamma, who indeed has been hereby betrayed into false 



32 

opinions respecting metre. He errs, for extimple, when, in 
favour of the reading in question, he observes, nam yu$ ante 
spiritum asperum non raro producitur etiam extra casuram, 
v. c. II. ix. 377. But here he might plead a similar mistake of 
the great Ruhnkenius, who is equally unfortunate in a reference 
on v. 57 of the Hymn to Ceres, and has drawn Nitscherlich 
with him into error. See the note of the latter in the verse. 
With respect, however, to yap, lengthened in the caesura, see 
Herman on this same verse of the Hymn to Ceres. 

It is curious to observe how the opinions and conjectures of 
the ablest scholars have been sometimes refuted by subsequent 
metrical discoveries. I was forcibly impressed with this fact 
the other day, upon reading the notes of Markland on the two 
Iphigenias of Euripides. This admirable scholar has proposed 
several ingenious corrections which might have passed in his 
day for just emendations, but which are decisively repelled by 
Mr. Porson's acute observations on the use of a word forming 
a/><?s Creticus at the end of an iambic trimeter. SeePrasf. ad 
Hecub. pp. 30, 38. Schutz has offended in like manner in a 
conjecture on the Prometheus of iEschylus, v. 932. But to 
return to sa-ro ; Bentley proposes to substitute it for eeo-to, II. 
xii. 464. 

V. 134. ueh' Eiduiy. Vide supra, v. 44. 

V. 170. fiovg te xai ipia /xyKa. rs may be omitted. 

V. 232. crirco r a/x^^ocriri te nai EL/^ara Ka"Ka ^i^ouacx,. On 
this verse I cannot satisfy myself. Perhaps we might read 
a(jt,(2fC<riYi r ifo ei^cctcc xaXa, as in V. 165, ifo ei/acctcc aiyaXoEvroc. 
Herman, indeed, in his Orpheia, p. 812, observes: Apud Ho- 
merum et reliquos antiquos ids pier umque hiatum facit ita ut 
non dubitandum videatur quin digamma in hac voce fuerit. 
But I suspect that it leaves an hiatus only in the third foot, in 
which station of the verse I have little doubt but that an 
hiatus was admissible : v. Wakef. Noctes Carcerarias and Mr. 
Northmore's fifth Excursus on Tryphiodorus. The impartial 
reader will, I think, be disposed to adopt this opinion, when 
he sees the shifts to which even Bentley is driven to get rid of 
the hiatus in question. 



33 

V. 259. £7rw $£ TrfcoTov tty (paog tieMg). Read TrgcoTCL. In like 
manner in the Odyssey, lib. x. v. 423, for vrafAvrfioTov read 
TrocjuTTgcoTa. TTpcoTov and TTfcoTo, are frequently interchanged, as I 
have particularly observed within these few days, upon com- 
paring the readings of the Ravenna manuscript with Brunck's 
text of Aristophanes. In verse 275 of the Equites, perhaps 
Trpcora ought to be received from that manuscript. E. C. 

Higham Hill, Waltharastow, Jan. 5, 1807. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENE UM. 

Sir, — I wish to acknowledge an oversight in my communi- 
cation of last month. The conjunction ought not to be 
omitted in the sixth verse of the Hymn to Venus, but we may, 
if we please, read vrao-i h z$ya. When observing that sj-farov 
and TT^cora are frequently interchanged, I might have added 
that Markland, in v. 30 of the Supplices of Euripides, has 
published n^ura (paivsrai from manuscript for tt^cotoi, which 
latter reading the metre will not admit. And though not ac- 
quainted with the practice of the tragic poets, as at length 
ascertained by the sagacity of Mr. Porson, he probably pre- 
ferred Tr^cora partly from the judgment of the ear. This 
may be inferred from his note on v. 665 of the same play. 

E. 0. 
Feb. 3rd, 1807. 



METRICAL REMARKS. 

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENAEUM. 

Sir, — In reading Mr. Pickbourn's "Dissertation on Metrical 
Pauses," among other just observations I found the following, 

D 



34 

— that in the Latin Hexameter the second foot does not con- 
sist of a word constituting a spondee, except in the instance 
of the prepositions inter and intra, followed by their case, 
as — 

Maximus intra me Deus est, 

upon which Mr. P. properly remarks, that the preposition and 
its case may be considered as a kind of compound word. The 
reader will find some curious matter bearing upon this point in 
Mr. Porson's Preface to the Hecuba of Euripides, p. 31, to 
which be may add Herman's Annotations on the same play, 
p. 111. On the ground of this metrical law, I was disposed to 
reject a conjecture (by no means in itself inelegant) which Mr. 
B urges, in his new edition of the Troades of Euripides, has 
proposed on the following line of the Andromache : — 

XI vavTiXoidi xiifxaTog Ki[xy\v (p<xvEi$ 

where Mr. B urges would read — 

XI vauriXoig ek xei/aoitoi;, 

in which emendation I conceived that eh x,EiftaTo$ would be metri- 
cally one word, and that the line would therefore be deprived 
of its caesura. I had afterwards begun to look into the Greek 
Tragedians for satisfaction on this matter, when recollecting 
Mr. Porson's remark on the caesura of the Tragic Trochaic 
Tetrameter Catalectic, which he informs us can never fall upon 
an article or preposition, I thought I needed to proceed no 
further. However, fearing that my conclusion might be formed 
too hastily, I resumed the inquiry, and will now give your 
classical readers the result. Premising, then, that in such 
lines as these, which are numerous — 

@ov\£i wscreiv Trgog oudag, eXkcoctoci re aov 

iv' EMOTES TO HE^Og, EvQeV OtCTTEOV 

rcov TTgayfAccTcov ty,v yXcoaaav iax VBlv k^eov, 

the caesura may be considered as lying in the fourth foot, I 
have to remark, that in iEschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, 
there are very few lines in which the ccesura can be said to fall 



35 

on an article or preposition. Of those which I have met with, 
the following are specimens : — 

tcxyu yap bg rcc. c?£tv EtcagTEgouv tots 

El [MOUTOg EK TOOV CTCOV aTTOi^ETtXl (3 HZ 

o dovhog, ouh tits @ag@agou [XY\Tpog ysycog 
koctect^ov, y] tov auTa$Eh<pov ev tccQw. 

Of these, however, the first may be classed among the lines 
which have what Mr. Porson calls a quasi ccesura; and the 
second might be compared with — 

Meve^ue, [Mf] yvco/tag v7roo-TYiQ-a,; cro<pa$. 

In all the lines that I have yet observed (except one) which 
present the difficulty that appears in the third and fourth ex- 
amples, I have found a pause in the second foot, which at least 
prevents the only incision of the verse from falling on the 
article or preposition. The exception alluded to is the follow- 
ing, taken from the Electra of Sophocles : — 

syco y bgoocr y\ ovcrfAOgog xotTx crTEyag. 

The article here no doubt has its force, but it may also be 
omitted, and we might read tycoo-a. If, however, this line is 
not corrupt, Mr. Burges's conjecture can plead a good autho- 
rity. But the emendation is not necessary. See Abresch. on 
the Supplices of iEschylus, v. 487. I have only to add, that 
I did not observe in iEschylus any lines like the third and 
fourth, nor, if I recollect right, like the second of the above 
examples. E. C. 

Higham Hill, April 5th, 1808. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENE UM. 

The following is Mr. Cogan's estimate of the abilities of the 
late Gilbert Wakefield, as a scholar, which appeared in the 
" Monthly Magazine," Sept. 18, 1801, in a tribute to his 
memory by J. Aikin : — 

D % 



30 

As a classical editor he appeared in a selection from the 
Greek tragedians, in editions of Horace, Virgil, Bion, andMos- 
chns, and, finally, in his "Lucretius," a vast performance, 
which alone might seem the labour of many industrious years. 
Of his character, as a man of letters, I have been favoured 
with the following estimate by an able judge, the Eev. E. 
Cogan, of Cheshunt : — 

" In extent of erudition, particularly if an acquaintance with 
the Oriental languages be taken into the account, he was per- 
haps inferior to no man of the present age ; and they who have 
been cousiderecl as having had the advantage over him in some 
of the less important minutiae of Greek literature, have pro- 
bably limited their attention to fewer objects, and certainly 
commenced their literary course with a more advantageous pre- 
paration. In conjectural criticism he exhibits much of the 
character of Bentley and Markland: men whom he esteemed 
according to their high deserts in that species of learning to 
which his own mind was peculiarly directed. Like these illus- 
trious scholars, he is always learned, sometimes bold, and fre- 
quently happy. Like them, he had a mind which disdained to 
be held in a servile subjection to authority; and in defiance of 
established readings, which too often substitute the dreams of 
transcribers for the gems of antiquity, he followed, without 
fear, wherever reason and probability seemed to lead the way. 
In his earlier critical works, he exhibited, amidst some errors 
which his riper judgment discarded, the promise of his future 
greatness ; and even his faults were the infirmities of genius ; 
they flowed from that ardour and enthusiasm which cannot 
always wait for the slow decisions of cool inquiry. They were 
faults which, though they afforded a small consolation to dull 
malignity, did not diminish his praise in the estimation of one 
solid and impartial judge. His favourite study was poetry, 
and in an extensive acquaintance with the ancient poets, both 
Greek and Koman, few men, since the revival of letters, have 
equalled him, and no one ever surpassed him in the perception 
of their beauties. When he applies to them the hand of con- 
jecture, he rarely fails to give new spirit and animation by his 



37 

touch ; and where we are obliged to dissent from his corrections, 
we are sometimes sorry for the credit of the poet that he does 
not appear to have written what the critic has suggested. He 
was peculiarly fond of tracing an elegance of poetical expres- 
sion through the various modifications which it assumed in the 
hands of different writers, and in the illustration of ancient 
phraseology he did not overlook the poets of his own country, 
with many of which he was very familiar. His great work is 
undoubtedly his edition of "Lucretius," a work which igno- 
rance may despise, at which malice may carp, and hireling 
scribblers may rail, but which will rank with the labours of 
Heinsius, Gronovius, Burman, and Heyne, as long as literature 
itself shall live. It will share the prediction with which Ovid 
has graced the memory of the great poet himself : — 

Carmina sublimis tunc sunt peritura Lucreti, 
Exitio terras cum dabit una dies. 

Besides its critical merit, it exhibits the richest display of the 
flowers of poetry that ever was presented to the world, and will 
amply reward the perusal of every man who has sensibility to 
relish the finest touches of human genius. 

" Mr. Wakefield, even before this immortal specimen of his 
talents, was deservedly held in the highest estimation by the 
literati of Germany ; and if his honours at home have not 
equalled his reputation abroad, the candid mind will easily find 
the explanation of this phenomenon in the violence of political 
party, and the mean jealousy which has too often disgraced the 
scholars of Great Britain. The name of Bentley is connected 
with proof enough of the justice of this insinuation." 



EXTRACTS 

FROM 

THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY AND 
CHRISTIAN REFORMER, 



PAKT II.— THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, 
AND BIBLICAL. 

"Being requested to furnish some account of the late Mr. 
Dewhurst, as a classical scholar, I readily take up my pen to 
pay what I conceive to be a just tribute to the memory of my 
much lamented friend. His virtues, as a man and a Christian, 
much as it might gratify my feelings to bear my testimony to 
them, do not fall within my province ; ;tnd to estimate the vast 
stores of his information in the various departments of literature 
and science, were it required from me, would be far beyond my 
power. I shall therefore confine myself soluly to his acquire- 
ments in classical knowledge. 

"Mr. Dewhurst was truly an excellent scholar, a character 
which, through partiality or ignorance, is frequently given to 
those who have no pretensions to scholarship, and the sum of 
whose attainments consists in the ability to read Latin and 
Greek with tolerable ease. But Mr. Dewhurst had not only 
read the ancient authors to a great extent, and by favour of a 
most retentive memory retained much of them in mind, but 
was studiously attentive to the minutiae of philology and 
criticism, and was well versed in the writings of those illustrious 
scholars, to whose successive labours we are indebted for the 



39 

present state of Greek literature in particular. What class of 
authors were his favourites, it may not now he possible to de- 
termine, and indeed literature in every form had such charms 
for him, as almost to exclude a predilection for any particular 
object; but from his great acquaintance with ancient history, 
it may perhaps be safely inferred that he read the historians 
with peculiar interest. The poets, however, occupied a con- 
siderable share of his attention, and these he diligently perused 
in the best editions which have been published in England, and 
on the Continent, and with the aid of those critical works which 
have contributed to the illustration of them. The observations 
of Valckenser, Euhnken, Dames, Markland, Porson, Hermann, 
&c, were familiar to him ; nor was he inattentive to the pro- 
ductions of those living scholars in our own country, who have 
recently employed themselves, with such vigour and effort, in 
restoring the remains of the Attic Theatre to their primitive 
purity. But while no one knew better from what sources the 
most important information was to be derived, — while he well 
understood the qualifications of an accomplished critic, and 
viewed a Valckenser, a Euhnken, and a Porson, with just ad- 
miration, — he did not disdain the labours of any scholar from 
whom useful knowledge was to be gained, nor denied to any 
man the praise that was his due, because he might sometimes 
handle matters of which he was ignorant. Upon the temerity 
of an editor who should attempt to correct depraved passages 
of a poet, without knowing the principles of the metre in 
which he wrote, he would pass censure only with a good- 
humoured smile. 

" As our conversation, when I had the good fortune to meet 
him, frequently turned upon the Greek poets, I am able to state 
what may, in some measure, show the accuracy of his acquaint- 
ance with them. I scarcely recollect a single instance in which 
I spoke to him of a passage in any respect peculiar, or of a 
critical remark upon such passage, without finding it as dis- 
tinctly impressed upon his memory, as if it had been the last 
thing he had read. It ought not to be omitted that Mr. Porson 
frequently communicated to him his conjectures, in Mr. Dew- 



40 

hurst's estimation, not at all inferior to those which rendered 
the late Professor the wonder of the age. These he would not 
have heen eager to communicate to the public, lest he should 
appear forward to enrol himself among the literary friends of 
so great a man. 

" Whether he made much trial of his own strength in con- 
jectural criticism, I am not able to say ; but, perhaps, the habit 
of his mind rendered him more anxious to know what was to be 
Jc?iown, than desirous to do what, had he pleased, he might 
have done. Upon the conjectures of others, however, he de- 
cided with great justice, and nothing pleased him more than a 
happy emendation, which, when he had once read, he never 
forgot. But not to dwell longer upon particulars, I know no 
man in whose opinion of a classical work I should have been 
disposed to place a more implicit confidence. With a great 
fund of learning, he possessed a most exact judgment, and an 
eminent share of that candour, which is essential to a just esti- 
mate of literary productions. 

" In a few words, there were combined in him the most im- 
portant requisites for the critical scholar ; a mind capable of 
the nicest discrimination, a memory uncommonly retentive, a 
most patient spirit of investigation, an unwearied assiduity in 
study, and an anxious curiosity in examining editions and 
manuscripts ; so that, had he devoted himself as exclusively as 
many have done to classical studies, and had chosen to com- 
municate the result of his researches to the public, he could 
scarcely have failed to secure himself a place among those 
names winch the lovers of ancient literature will ever revere. 

E. C. 
Higham Hill, Walthamstow, Dec. 2, 1812. M. R. vol. vii . 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir,— Looking the other day into the " Evangelical Maga- 
zine," I was struck with the following passage in the Review of 
Dr. Williams's " Essay on the Equity of the Divine Government 



41 

and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace :" — "Interminable misery 
is the natural and spontaneous effect of sin, unless God should 
interfere by a sovereign act to cut off the entail; which he is 
in no respect whatever bound to do. If in any instance he do 
so interfere, he acts as a munificent sovereign : if he decline so 
to interfere, he acts in equity, he does no wrong to any." 

On this paragraph I immediately wrote the following obser- 
vations, which, if you conceive them to be worth inserting in 
your Repository, are very much at your service : — 

" Interminable misery is the natural and spontaneous effect 
of sin." As this is by no means a self-evident truth, I am at 
liberty to call it in question. I then deny that there are any 
data from which this conclusion can be drawn. It has, how- 
ever, been said that sin is an infinite evil, because it is com- 
mitted against an infinite Being, and therefore deserves a 
punishment infinite in duration. To this I reply, that it is at 
least as reasonable to measure the evil of sin by the attributes 
of the being who commits it, as by those of the being against 
whom it is committed. I will therefore venture to confront this 
axiom with another. Sin is not an infinite evil, because it is 
committed by a finite being, and therefore does not deserve 
interminable punishment. But leaving these axioms to their 
fate, I proceed to observe that as sin, according to the Oal- 
vinistic hypothesis, is the necessary result of a nature totally 
corrupt, with which corrupt nature we certainly did not endow 
ourselves, it does not deserve interminable misery; and were 
interminable misery to follow it, it must be by an arbitrary ap- 
pointment, the injustice and cruelty of which would be com- 
mensurate to the suffering inflicted. Nor would the wretch 
who should be doomed to sustain this eternity of woe be dis- 
posed to think his sentence a whit more equitable, when re- 
minded, that he "sinned in Adam and fell with him in his first 
transgression." But we are told that " if God in any instance 
remit the punishment, he acts as a munificent Sovereign : if he 
decline so to interpose, he acts in equity ; he does no wrong to 
any." No wrong ? Does he sustain no wrong who is brought 
into existence with a nature radically depraved, and then made 



42 

eternally miserable for being such ? It may not be out of place 
to state here, that according to Dr. Williams's system, as re- 
presented by the reviewer, all the divine dispensations are the 
results of two great moral faculties in the Supreme Governor, 
equity and sovereignty. With what propriety sovereignty can 
be represented as a moral faculty, I am altogether unable to 
comprehend. Goodness I can understand, and, unless my 
memory fails me, the "Assembly's Catechism" taught me when 
a child, that God possesses this attribute in an infinite degree. 
Premising that I mean no reflection either on the understanding 
or the sincerity of Dr. Williams, I must be permitted to re- 
mark, that infinite goodness will be wisely kept out of sight 
by those who contend that the greater part of mankind will 
suffer eternally for that which they could not help, and over 
which they possess no control. For it might unfortunately be 
asked, how comes it to pass that equity should so triumph over 
benevolence, how comes it to pass that a Being who is acknow- 
ledged to be infinitely good, should treat the majority of his 
human offspring as he would do were he infinitely malevolent, 
and doom them to as much misery as the grand enemy of the 
human race is supposed to wish them ? 

When I had read the paragraph on which I have been ani- 
madverting, I thought the Doctor had proceeded far enough, but 
the reviewer wishes that he had proceeded still further, and stated 
" the scriptural doctrine of the punishment of sin as not merely 
negative, but as including also positive infliction on the score 
of retributive justice." The reviewer, it seems, is not satisfied 
with interminable misery as the consequence of sin. W T hat 
further his imagination has destined for mankind, I am not 
able to divine, nor anxious to be informed. But that retribu- 
tive justice should demand the infiict ion alluded to, is a paradox 
which the human intellect must ever despair of being able to 
solve. Strange that system should so blind the understanding 
of men in other respects intelligent, that the very terms which 
they employ to express their dogmas should carry their refuta- 
tion with them ! It is certainly as impolitic to name justice in 
this matter, as it is wise not to say too much of the attribute of 



43 

goodness. What must be the definition of justice by which it 
can be shown to be just, that a creature, who, born with a cor- 
rupt nature, must inevitably fall into sin, should be rendered 
eternally miserable by the Being who made him what he is ; or 
by what definition of justice can it be proved, that God would 
have been unjust either to us or to himself, had the infinite 
satisfaction of Jesus Christ been accepted in behalf of all man- 
kind ? I know it has been said that the torments of the 
damned are to be an eternal monument of the immaculate holi- 
ness of the Divine Nature. This is changing the ground, but 
not, to my mind, changing it for the better. The Deity is thus 
represented as giving birth to a race of impure beings, that 
their eternal sufferings may be a demonstration of his purity. 
And a matchless demonstration it undoubtedly is. Who would 
have thought that infinite holiness should not be distin- 
guishable in its operation from infinite malevolence, or that 
the moral perfection of God should be the grand source of 
misery to his creatures ? 

If I have committed an error in wandering from verbal 
criticism to controversial theology, I will endeavour to make 
some amends by returning to my proper department. I am 
not aware that the following passages of Heliodorus have been 
yet produced in illustration of the well-known text in the epistle 
to the Philippians, ouu oc^ay/xov Y\yn?cx.To to eivcci ica. Sea. He- 
liodor. iEthiop. Ed. Cor. p. 274, h $n Ku@£\y, tw !yvTi/%iav 
a^7ray/j,a. . . . 7roiYio-a,a£vn. P. 321, apay/^a to ^v.9ev sTroiYio-aro 
y) Aqcra,KY\. P. 290, vsog ourco fcai huXo; koli ax/Aaiog yvuaiKa o/ucoiccv 
hoci TTgocrTETYixuiav a.7rco9EiTai , kcc.1 ovk a^Ttay/jia oub^s l^fxaiov yysirxi 
to w pay pa. On this last passage the learned editor, after ob- 
serving that some manuscripts, instead of vyEiTai read ttoieitoii, 
proceeds as follows : — Evfexsrai [aevtoi Hajo^oi/, ev axxoig 

ElTTOVTa Ag7T0Cy/J,a 7TQtElO~8<Xl } EVTCXu9oi Y) TTOlKl'ha.l @QU7\0[AEV0V to, Trig 

o-vvQeo-eus, yi > o xcu [xa'hXov Eiuog, ei; tyiv %g> jtrnavianv io^eclv tou Xoyou 
h£%n9oTcog v7ro$E()0[AEVov E17TEIV, ' ' A^7rccy[xa, r)y£LO-9cci } KlXTOt, TO 
(<$>LM7r7TYio- B, r) " ouk a$7ra.y[AQv y\yy\aaT0 to Eivai icra. §eu." 

E. C. 

Higham Hill, Walthamstow, Feb. 1, 1815. M. R. vol. x. 



44 

Sir, — The reason why I addressed you a little while ago 
[x. 76-78] was, that I wished for once to enter my protest as 
an individual against a doctrine which is as dishonourable to 
God as, were it true, it would be fatal to the happiness of man; 
and I did not think that a better opportunity would offer than 
that of which, through your indulgence, I availed myself. Nor 
do I know any evasion by which the force of the observations 
which I then made can be eluded, except the following, that 
man is incompetent to pronounce upon the plans of an infinite 
Being. This, as a general proposition, will be admitted. But 
let the character of this infinite Being be defined, and let a cer- 
tain conduct be attributed to him which I can distinctly 
comprehend, and I shall be able to judge whether there is or 
is not a consistency between the acknowledged attributes of this 
great Being, and the conduct ascribed to him. Let this ob- 
servation be applied to the Calvinistic system of theology. God 
is represented as a Being infinite in power, wisdom, goodness, 
holiness, and justice. But it is maintained that his human off- 
spring, in consequence of the transgression of their first 
parents, are brought into existence with a nature totally cor- 
rupt, and that, with the exception of a chosen few, who without 
any claim to such a distinction will be rendered eternally happy, 
they will suffer the pains of hell for ever. Unless, then, reason 
was given me in vain, I can confidently conclude that either 
the divine character is misrepresented, or that this doctrine 
must be false. And the justice of this conclusion will be easily 
established by the following mode of reasoning : — God is in- 
finitely powerful, therefore he can do whatever is the object of 
power. God is infinitely wise, therefore he will choose the 
best ends, and pursue them by the best means. God is in- 
finitely good, therefore he must have a satisfaction in the hap- 
piness of his creatures, and his measures must be calculated to 
promote it. Thus far our deductions are clear and certain. 
But let us proceed. God is infinitely just, therefore he has 
created a race of depraved beings, and will punish them 
eternally for that, which it was out of their power to avoid. 
God is infinitely holy, therefore he has decreed that his off- 



45 

spring should be unholy, that their eternal sufferings may bear 
testimony to his holiness. Were ever premises and conclusion 
so at variance ! Should it still be said that we know not what 
justice and holiness may demand in an infinite Being, not to 
reply that the infinity of an attribute cannot change its nature, 
this would only be saying that holiness and justice, when pre- 
dicated of God, may mean something different from what they 
mean in the common use of language; in other words, that God 
may have been improperly denominated just and holy. Upon 
the same principle, goodness in God may mean something very 
different from the usual import of the term, and for anything 
that we know to the contrary, it may be the very benevolence of 
his nature which has doomed the majority of his human off- 
spring to eternal misery ! 

Before I dismiss the subject from my pen, perhaps for ever, 
with your permission I should be glad to make one or two ob- 
servations more : — 

God is allowed to be infinitely good. But according to the 
system which I am opposing, no ray or trace of goodness ap- 
pears in the issue of his dispensations towards the majority of 
mankind. Their condition is the same under the best of beings 
as it would have been under the worst ! 

Much has been said respecting vindictive justice as demand- 
ing the eternal punishment of sin. It would be easy to prove 
that the expression vindictive justice is egregiously incorrect. 
Punishment, when inflicted for some object of utility, is not 
vindictive, and when it goes beyond this object, it is universally 
denominated cruelty. But, waving this, if any case can be 
imagined which excludes the exercise of vindictive justice, it is 
that of Adam's helpless offspring. Born with a nature totally 
depraved, they are no more the proper subjects of vindictive 
punishment, than those brute animals whose natural propen- 
sities are savage and ferocious. 

My last observation respects the infinite satisfaction which 
Jesus Christ is supposed to have made to vindictive justice for 
the sins of the elect. To say nothing of the other absurdities 
with which this notion abounds, if sin is an infinite evil in the 



46 

case of the individual, it might be objected that the death of 
Christ could only do away the guilt of one sinner, and the rest 
must be pardoned gratuitously. Should it, on the other hand, 
be said that the combined guilt of a multitude cannot add to 
that which is already infinite, it uu questionably follows that the 
death of Christ was, in itself considered, an equivalent for the 
sins of the whole world. Why, then, is it not accepted as 
such ? The debt is discharged, and yet the debtor not set free. 
What nameless attribute of the Divine Nature is it which re- 
mains thus inexorable, or how comes it to pass that a man 
should do more mischief than a God could repair? . E. C. 
Higham Hill, March 1, 1815. M. R. vol. x. 



TO THE EDITOR OE THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Being disengaged a few Sundays ago, I had an op- 
portunity of hearing a very good and useful sermon delivered 
by an orthodox dissenting minister. I did not indeed agree 
with the preacher in every point, and my ear was particularly 
struck with words to the following effect; — that there are two 
descriptions of men who are hostile to Christianity, they who 
reject revelation altogether, and they who will admit nothing as 
an article of revelation which they do not understand, who rush 
upon a mystery without any reverence for its awful retire- 
ment. As I have never been accustomed to feel much re- 
verence for the retirement of a mystery, I found myself com- 
pelled to take my station in this latter class, and there I was 
led into a train of reflections which I have since committed to 
paper, and which are now at your service. 

My first reflection, if such I may call it, was a feeling of as- 
tonishment that Christian divines should be so fond of contend- 
ing for mysteries in religion, after having read the fifth verse of 
the seventeenth chapter of the book of Kevelation. " And on 
her forehead was a name written, Mystery, Babylon the Great, 
the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth." But 



47 

my astonishment subsided a little when I recollected that 
theologians, as by a species of infatuation, have not unfre- 
quently sealed the condemnation of their favourite doctrines, by 
the very terms in which they have expressed them. 

I was next led to ask myself what is meant by the term mys- 
tery, as it has been generally applied to the doctrines of reve- 
lation. Is it simply a truth which surpasses the comprehension 
of the human mind, as the self- existence of the Deity, or is it a 
proposition which contradicts the most certain conclusions of 
the understanding, as the doctrine of transubstantiation ? Or, 
is it a term which they who employ it do not wish to have ac- 
curately defined, and which, as implying generally what is in- 
comprehensible, may denote either what is above reason, or 
w T hat is contrary to it ? Is it one of those ambiguous sounds 
which controversialists not unfrequently make use of as though 
to perplex the subject of inquiry, and by which they not only 
attempt to deceive others, but often impose upon themselves ? 
Certain it is that mystery is a word of very convenient applica- 
tion, and which theologians can employ or not, according as 
they w 7 ish to defend or refute a particular article of belief. 
Thus the Protestant tells the Catholic that his doctrine of tran- 
substantiation involves absurdity and contradiction; but when 
the same charge is brought against certain dogmas in his own 
creed, he finds in them nothing absurd or contradictory, but 
sees only certain sublime mysteries, into which, as they are not 
to be comprehended, it is impious to pry. Thus mystery, it 
seems, is a term which is conceived to afford a retreat from the 
persecution of argument, and is employed to soften that which 
ought to go by a different name into something which, with 
the appearance of falsehood, possesses the reality of truth. 

But are we not obliged, in many cases, to admit what is 
mysterious ? When I am informed what is meant by mys- 
terious in this question, I shall immediately be able to give an 
answer to it. If by mysterious is intended simply that which 
our understanding cannot grasp, I reply that we are often 
compelled to admit what is mysterious; for instance, that the 
great First Cause is self- existent ; but if by mysterious is meant 



48 

what is self- destructive and contradictory, as that a being who 
is infinitely benevolent should act the part of a cruel, arbitrary 
tyrant, we are not and we cannot be compelled to admit it. 
When, therefore, any proposition is set before us which seems 
to come under the general denomination of incomprehensible, 
we should carefully distinguish between that which surpasses 
our reason, and that which contradicts it. Great care should 
also be taken, lest we receive what is self- contradictory while 
misled by the vague and ambiguous use of language. Were 
these simple rules attended to, I conceive we should soon 
hear no more of what have usually been termed mysteries in re- 
ligion. 

But is it not an evidence of becoming diffidence and humility 
in fallible man to receive on the authority of revelation a truth 
by which the ordinary conclusions of the human mind are set 
at nought and confounded? If the authority of revelation 
were clearly made out on the one side, and on the other a pro- 
position were laid down to be admitted on this authority which 
should involve a contradiction, this would be a very perplexing 
case indeed ; but until God can contradict himself, this is a per- 
plexity to which we can never be reduced. We may indeed be 
called, on the authority of revelation, to admit truths which 
surpass the apprehension of our limited faculties ; and that this 
is perfectly reasonable may be shown by such a case as the 
following : — A child shall be informed by his father that the 
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Con- 
ceiving his father to be wiser than himself, and that he has no 
intention to deceive him, he will naturally give credit to this 
proposition, though he cannot comprehend the evidence on 
which it rests, and has no reason but authority for believing 
such to be the fact. But let the child be told that there is no 
angle, or only one angle in a figure which is affirmed to have 
three angles, and he would be no very promising child if he 
did not immediately perceive that there must be some error or 
equivocation in the use of the terms in which the proposition is 
conveyed. There is an important and obvious difference be- 
tween not seeing how a thing can be, and seeing why it cannot 



49 

be. I do not see how God should have existed from eternity, 
but I seem compelled to admit this, that I may not be obliged 
to admit what is more inexplicable. But I do see why God 
cannot be eternal and not eternal, self- existent and not self- 
existent, omnipotent and not omnipotent. Had this distinction, 
which it has sometimes been very convenient to overlook, been 
always attended to, certain religious controversies might have 
been brought to a speedier termination. It deserves also to be 
remembered, that there are certain propositions which, though 
they cannot perhaps be reduced in form to a contradiction, are 
so repugnant either to our reason or to our moral feelings, that 
nothing but the most irresistible evidence would lead the 
thoughtful inquirer to admit them. And yet propositions of 
this kind are thrust upon us on the faith of detached texts of 
scripture, which either imperiously demand or easily admit a 
more rational interpretation. 

I was next going to inquire into the practical utility of 
mysteries, but as this appeared clearly a non- entity, I proceeded 
to ask myself upon what evidence the doctrines which are 
usually termed mysteries are admitted. The evidence in favour 
of Christianity shall now be allowed to be as strong as it has 
at any time been represented by its most confident advocates. 
Is the evidence more satisfactory than those conclusions of the 
human mind which these mysterious doctrines would set aside ? 
Can I ever be more certain that Christianity is divine than I am 
that what I taste to be bread is bread and not flesh, and that 
what my senses inform me to be wine is wine, and not blood? 
How far the same mode of reasoning will apply to certain 
Protestant mysteries, it will become those who receive them to 
inquire. But it will be said, Does it not favour scepticism thus 
to balance the doctrines of revelation with its evidences, and to 
admit nothing that we do not conceive more likely to be true 
than that revelation itself should be false ? I answer, that the 
evidences of Christianity are, in my opinion, strong enough to 
support what I consider as the Christian doctrine, but not 
strong enough to support any mass of absurdity which the folly 
of man may choose to erect upon them. Experience indeed 

E 



50 

has shown, that that faith in Christianity which is the result of 
education and prejudice is strong enough to bear the most 
cumbrous load of error that the imagination of man has ever 
piled together ; but the intelligent inquirer who should come to 
the study of Christianity without any preposession in its favour, 
would certainly demand that, when from its external evidence 
he had seen reason to admit it to be divine, he should not be 
driven by its internal evidence to a contrary conclusion, — that 
when he had thought it morally impossible that this religion 
should be false, he should not find it absolutely impossible 
that it should be true. But whoever may charge the above 
mode of reasoning with being favourable to scepticism, it is to 
be hoped that this charge will not be brought by the advocate 
of mystery. Not to dwell on the consideration that the 
mysteries which have been annexed to religion have been the 
fruitful source of scepticism and infidelity, the admission of 
what has usually been termed a mystery shakes the very 
foundation of all human reasonings, and affords cause to sus- 
pect that those conclusions of the understanding which we 
should deem most clear and certain may nevertheless be false. 

E. C. 

Higham Hill, Aug. 9, 1815. M. R. vol. x. 

P.S. Allow me to thank your correspondent W. D. (p. 358) 
for his information respecting the passages from Heliodorus. 
Just before I read his communication, I had found, by looking 
into a number of the " Classical Journal," that I had been anti- 
cipated again and again. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, —Upon reading the extracts fromMr. Townsend's Arma- 
geddon in your last (pp. 649—652), I could not help conceiving 
a wish that its merit as a poem might recommend it to an ex- 
tensive circulation, as it seems under the guise of poetic 



51 

imagery to present a just view of the horrors and absurdities of 
a system, which is infinitely more absurd and horrible than any 
other extravagance which the human mind has yet conceived. 
The perusal of such a work may perhaps have the happy effect 
of terrifying into their senses some of those who have been 
terrified out of them, and by presenting their creed before them 
in its true colours, may lead them to seek a refuge from its 
terrors in a diligent examination of the scriptures, that they 
may learn " whether these things are so." It requires a mind 
of a certain temperament, such as that of Jonathan Edwards 
and Mr. Townsend, to dwell upon the views exhibited in "Ar- 
mageddon " with a conviction of their truth, and not to sicken 
into anguish and despair. Hence I suspect that the generality 
of those who in the main think with Mr. Townsend will wish 
that, however his own fancy was delighted with such contem- 
plations, he had not endeavoured to fix the fancy of his reader 
on descriptions at which, I do not say reason stands aghast 
(for that in theology is a trifle), but at which humanity shudders. 
How much more to be applauded is the caution of a writer in 
the "Evangelical Magazine," who observes that though the 
doctrine of predestination is beautiful in its place (in what 
place, he has omitted to mention), it is not desirable that it 
should be dwelt upon too frequently. But leaving Mr. T., with 
whom, in truth, after the excellent remarks of your reviewer, I 
have very little to do, I proceed once more, with your permis- 
sion, to make one or two remarks on that system of Theology 
which is usually termed Calvinistic. It is then a system which, 
to say the least, is nowhere laid down in form in the New 
Testament, but is collected by inference from detached passages 
of scripture, and is a mere hypothesis to account for a certain 
phraseology which is infinitely better accounted for without it. 
It is a system which no good man can wish to be true, and 
which no man can believe to be true, who suffers his mind to 
be impressed with the general representation of the divine 
character and government which are given from Genesis to Re- 
velation. It is a system which gives a hideous picture of the 
Deity, transforming love into blind partiality, and justice into 

E % 



52 

insatiable vengeance. It is a system which, were it true, would 
render it a happiness for the human race, and, by probable in- 
ference, for the universe at large, could the theory of the 
Atheist be realised! It is a system which, by representing 
human nature as radically depraved, and sin in itself an infinite 
evil, leaves no room for degrees of criminality in human 
actions. It is a system which, consistently enough with itself, 
but in direct defiance of the scripture doctrine of retribution, 
makes something altogether independent of moral rectitude the 
ground of salvation, and which can send one man triumphing 
to glory from the scaffold, and calmly leave another who has 
endeavoured to exemplify every Christian virtue (unless a 
change not of character, gentle reader, but of views and 
reliance should take place) to be 

" whelm'd in stormy gulphs of rolling fire ! "* 

E. 0. 

Higham Hill, Nov. 13, 1815. M. R. vol. x. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — I am aware that when I said in my last, that the Cal- 
vinistic system can send a man triumphing to glory from the 
scaffold, I brought forward a case which the more intelligent 
and moderate of Calvinistic divines will consider as an enthu- 
siastic abuse, not a just consequence of their doctrine. But 
the system itself does not positively exclude such a case, as it 
admits conversion to be wrought at the very close of a vicious 
life. I think my memory is strictly correct with respect to an 
instance recorded in the obituary of a work published under 
the sanction of respectable names, the " Evangelical Maga- 

* 'Abov Ttves avoiyovrat 7rv\ai (3adeiai, Kai irorapoi nvpos opov Kai arvyos 
anoppcayes avaneTavvvvrai, Kai (tkotos €<fir)7rkoc>Tai 7ToKv(pavTa(7Tov, Kai 
XatrpLara Kai pvx oi > KaKaiV p-vpiav yepovres. — Plutarch de Super stitione. 



58 

zine." The writer visits a prostitute on her death-bed. He 
awakens her to a sense of her sad condition, goes through the 
usual process, and concludes his account with expressing a full 
conviction that he shall meet that poor creature in glory. 

To the observations of my last perhaps you will allow me to 
add the following : 

It will strike most minds with the force of an axiom, that it 
must be a general blessing to any species of beings to be under 
the government of an infinitely wise, just, and benevolent 
Creator. This axiom, Calvinism, if admitted, proves to be 
false. 

The first and great commandment is, " Thou shalt love thy 
God with all thy heart;" this commandment Calvinism sets 
aside by rendering the observance of it impracticable. On the 
other hand, the command refutes the doctrine. 

Calvinists with other Christians admit, on the evidence of 
Scripture, that God is infinitely good ; but Calvinism reduces 
this infinite goodness to mere theory which fact most woefully 
contradicts. And, strange to tell, the causes which prevent the 
exercise of this attribute are found in the Divine Nature itself ! 

Scripture assures us in various ways that mercy is what God 
delights to exercise ; but Calvinism sets up in its stead an infi- 
nite indignation at a supposed infinite evil, which reigns in the 
divine dispensations, triumphs over wisdom, equity, and good- 
ness, and which nothing can satisfy but the eternal sufferings of 
myriads of creatures, whose grand crime (as they were born 
with a nature radically corrupt) has been, that they were 
destined to exist ! 

And now, sir, as it is not probable that I shall trouble you 
again on this subject, I should like to take my leave of it with 
saying a word on the tone in which my observations have been 
written. Conceiving Calvinism to be a most gross corruption 
of the best gift of God to man, I have exhibited its inconsis- 
tencies and its horrors as they have struck my own mind with 
unrestrained freedom, but without even an evanescent feeling of 
ill-will towards those from whom I differ thus widely. Strong as 
is my conviction of the absurdity and impiety of the system it- 



54 



self, I shall ever lose sight of the theoretical Oalvinist when 
found in the person of the practical Christian. E. 0. 

Higham Hill, Bee. 8th, 1815. M. R vol. x. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — To some of your younger readers who may be dis- 
posed to inquire into the evidences of Christianity, the follow- 
ing remarks on Mr. Hume's objection to miracles may not be 
useless. I have considered this celebrated objection, and I 
think impartially, at different times for more than thirty years, 
and I have had but one opinion concerning it, which is, that it 
has no force whatever. 

The objection, indeed, has been ably answered again and 
again, and by some more elaborately than it required. To meet 
the conceptions of the multitude it may indeed be desirable that 
error should be exposed in many words ; but it is a maxim 
with me, that false reasoning always admits a short refutation, 
when it is once clearly discerned in what the fallacy consists. 

Mr. Hume's objection amounts to this, that a miracle being a 
violation of the order of nature, can never be rendered credible 
by testimony, as the falsehood of testimony can in no case be 
deemed miraculous. It would perhaps have been more correct 
to define a miracle to be a deviation from the order of nature ; 
but let this pass. It is to be observed that Mr. Hume does 
not object to the evidence which is produced in favour of the 
Christian miracles as being deficient in quantity, but denies 
in toto that this species of evidence can confirm a miracle. 
This makes it necessary to inquire a little into the force of this 
evidence. It will suit Mr. Hume's purpose that we should 
consider testimony in the gross, in which view of it, it must be 
confessed that it not unfrequently deceives. But testimony 
differs from testimony as much as error does from truth, and it 



55 

may be so circumstanced and so accumulated in force that its 
falsehood will be deemed impossible. Let the actions and the 
fate of the late Emperor of France be for a moment called to 
mind. These are admitted by thousands, upon the evidence 
of testimony alone, and admitted with as jull conviction as 
can be produced by mathematical or ocular demonstration. 
And will any one presume to sny that this evidence may be 
false ? Is it not to suppose a violation of the order of nature to 
suppose it false ?* It has just been intimated that testimony of a 
certain kind produces a conviction equal to what is produced by 
ocular demonstration. And whence does this arise ? It is the 
spontaneous and necessary result of experience. That kind and 
degree of testimony which we have never known to deceive us, 
we rest assured cannot deceive us ; and such is the confidence 
which we place in it, that the supposed improbability of the 
fact to which it bears witness, usually detracts nothing from 
the strength of the conviction which is effected by it. It is 
true enough that, according to Mr. Humes observation, we can- 
not rationally admit any fact till we conceive it to be more 
improbable that the evidence should be false than that the fact 
should be true. But in order to a just judgment, it is neces- 
sary that we consider on what ground we pronounce any fact 
to be antecedently improbable ; and it is certain that when our 
notions of its improbability arise, as they often do, from a 
mere defect of knowledge, they instantly yield to certain 
testimony. 

Such being the force of testimony, and such the nature of 
the faith which we place in it, I ask what fact cannot be sup- 
ported by testimony, the falsehood of which would be deemed 



* How far the evidence which is produced in favour of the Christian 
miracles falls short of the strongest possible testimony, is a question 
with which I have nothing to do. Mr. Hume's is an abstract position, 
that no testimony can prove the reality of a miracle. When this has 
been shown to be false, it remains with every one to consider for him- 
self whether the antecedent improbability of the Christian miracles 
appear to him to be surmounted by the testimony which is brought 
forward in their behalf. 



56 

impossible, except that which should itself appear to involve an 
impossibility ? But the Christian miracles do not come under 
this predicament, nor does Mr. Hume's argument proceed upon 
such a supposition. What, then, is it which renders them in- 
capable of being supported by testimony ? Their antecedent 
improbability \ And of this improbability how are we to 
judge ? Were they not referred to a superior power ? Were 
they supposed to be effected by some hidden law of nature 
which was never in action before nor since ; were it necessary 
to maintain that they took place without any assignable cause, 
and to acknowledge that they produced no important effect, 
their antecedent improbability would certainly be great. But 
from what data are we to conclude that God would never 
interfere miraculously in the government of the world, or, in 
other words, would never communicate to mankind such a 
revelation as the Christian ? And this improbability is the 
precise improbability which, if Mr. Hume is to be believed, no 
testimony can overcome. But such an interposition is contrary 
to experience. It has been observed that this expression is not 
quite accurate ; but waving this, I ask, may it not with equal 
truth be affirmed that the falsehood of testimony in certain 
circumstances is contrary to experience ? But to what expe- 
rience is the interposition in question contrary ? To say that 
it is contrary to universal experience is to beg the question. 
When, therefore, it is said that such an interposition is con- 
trary to experience, the meaning must be that it is contrary 
either to our experience or to general experience. To urge 
that it is contrary to our experience would be to lay it down as 
an axiom, that if God should ever interfere miraculously in the 
affairs of men, he must interfere also in our age and for our 
particular satisfaction. To press the objection that such an 
interposition is contrary to general experience, would subject 
the objector to a very perplexing question. What reason 
is there to suppose that if God should interfere miraculously in 
the administration of the world, such interpositions would be so 
frequent as to be matters of general experience ? In the case 
of events which must take place, if they take place at all, by 



57 

the operation of the laws of nature, general experience will 
reasonably influence our belief, and the want of similar 
instances will render us slow in admitting facts which seem to 
set the ordinary course of nature at defiance. But to bring a 
miraculous interposition of Providence, which is recorded to 
have taken place at a certain time and for a certain purpose, to 
the test of general experience, is palpably absurd, unless 
it could be proved that if miracles were ever wrought they must 
be wrought frequently, which is a proposition that no one 
would choose to defend.. But to show how little experience has 
to do with the credibility of a Divine revelation, let us suppose 
that God had never interposed miraculously in the government 
of the world to the present hour, and that the question were 
now put, whether he ever would so interpose. The only 
rational reply would be, Who can tell but he who sees the end 
from the beginning ? Allowing the improbability of such an 
interposition from the want of past experience, would this 
improbability amount to anything like a proof that the future 
would in this respect correspond to the past ? And shall that 
become incredible, when attested, which it was by no means 
certain would not take place ? In a word, that anything short 
of the absolute incredibility of a fact in itself considered 
should render it incapable of being proved by testimony, is a 
paradox which it may require some ingenuity to defend, but 
which it is truly wonderful that any human being should be 
found seriously to believe. I affirm, then, without fear of 
refutation, that the evidence of testimony may be so circum- 
stanced as to render a miracle wrought for a certain purpose the 
object of rational belief. And I have no hesitation to affirm, 
also, that whoever would not believe such miracle upon the 
strongest possible testimony, would not believe it on the 
evidence of ocular demonstration. But in fact, a being so 
incredulous does not exist. I once, indeed, heard an unbe- 
liever say, that he would not believe a miracle if he saw it. I 
approved his consistency, though I did not give credit to his 
declaration. Man, however reluctant, may be compelled to 
believe his eyes, and he may also be compelled to put faith 



58 

in testimony, in spite of all the refined and subtle reasonings in 
the world. In many cases, he cannot wait to calculate between 
the strength of the evidence and the improbability of the fact; 
and in some cases, could he wait for ever, he would not know 
how to manage the calculation. And conscious of his infirmity, 
he chooses in such cases rather to examine the validity of the 
testimony, of which he can judge with tolerable exactness, 
than to fatigue his faculties with endeavouring to balance the 
evidence which is laid before him against improbabilities, the 
force of which he cannot estimate. And in the case of Chris- 
tianity, if he conceives himself to be an incompetent judge of 
the antecedent credibility of a Divine Kevelation, his business 
is to inquire into the evidence with as much impartiality as he 
can, and to abide by the result of such inquiry. If any 
Christian has precisely calculated the preponderance of this 
evidence above the a priori improbability of the facts, I should 
be glad to be acquainted with the balance. And if any 
disciple of Mr. Hume will point out the measure in which the 
antecedent improbability of the facts surmounts the strength 
of the testimony, added to the improbability of the prevalence 
of Christianity, had the miracles been false, he may call upon 
me to abjure the Christian faith. 

One word more on the subject of miracles, and I have done. 
Though we could not judge a priori whether God would inter- 
fere miraculously in the government of the world, yet when 
such an interposition has taken place, its credibility may be 
heightened by the end which was proposed by it, and the con- 
sequences by which it has been followed. Thus the Christian 
dispensation, among other objects, was avowedly intended to 
overthrow the idolatry of the heathen world, and to establish 
the worship of the One living and true God. And this 
purpose it has most fully and gloriously accomplished. The 
miracles, then, recorded in the Christian Scriptures, are not 
events which have left no trace behind them, but are events 
of which the effects have been experienced from the season of 
their occurrence to the present hour, and which will continue to 
be experienced till time shall be no more. 



59 

It has, I think, been made to appear that Mr. Hume, while 
he threatens destruction to Christianity at a blow, has in fact 
effected nothing, and that the Christian does not set aside every 
principle of rational belief, when he acknowledges Jesus of 
Nazareth to have been a man approved of God by MIEACLES 
and signs which God did by him. E. C. 

Higham Hill, Nov. llth, 1816. M. K. vol. xi. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — When a man has been handsomely invited to speak, it 
might appear disrespectful to be silent. This is my apology 
for saying a few words more on the subject of miracles, while I 
am not conscious that I have anything to advance which is 
worthy the notice of your readers. I am happy that your 
ingenious Correspondent, A. B. C, agrees with me in the main 
point, that Mr. Hume's reasoning is inconclusive. The only 
remaining question, then, is, whether the testimony in favour 
of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is sufficient to 
establish facts confessedly so extraordinary : and of this question 
every man must judge for himself. There is no scale of im- 
probability on the one hand, or of the strength of testimony on 
the other, to which such an appeal can be made as to force con- 
viction on every mind. I agree with your Correspondent, that 
no event which has taken place according to the laws of nature, 
could in reality have been antecedently improbable. But I at 
the same time conceive that we can form no judgment of the 
improbability of a miracle, by a miracle being understood an 
evidence of a Divine interposition for a certain object. Your 
Correspondent observes that I should require stronger testimony 
to prove that a man had risen from the dead, than that a man 
had died. Undoubtedly. And if this supposed resurrection 
of a dead man were not referred to a Divine Power, and were 



60 

not intended to answer some useful purpose, though I might 
perhaps be compelled to admit it (as no violation of the laws 
of nature can he more wanton and inexplicable than the false- 
hood of the strongest testimony), I should scarcely know how 
to defend the belief of it on the ground of reason. But the 
credibility of this fact is altogether changed when I see that it 
is calculated to answer an important end, and moreover see this 
end effected by it. The event now supposed is not, properly 
speaking, a violation of the laws of nature, which, I take for 
granted, will continue to operate as before. It is necessary for 
the benefit of man that the laws of nature should be steady in 
their operation; but it may, however, also be necessary that 
God should for a certain purpose interpose and act without 
them. Your Correspondent observes, that we are not much 
disposed to admit the miracles of the second and third centuries, 
and asks, if we make thus free with testimony removed from 
us by the lapse of time, where are we to stop ? I reply, when 
we arrive at miracles which were calculated to answer an im- 
portant object, and which are supported by testimony which 
appears unexceptionable and satisfactory. And I cannot help 
remarking here, that the progress and present existence of 
Christianity, afford such a proof of the credit which was given 
to the miracles of the New Testament history in the earliest 
ages, as compensates for the distance to which the testimony 
is thrown by the intervention of time, and which, though it 
does not actually diminish the force of the testimony in itself 
considered, causes it to press with less force upon our minds, 
and leaves us at liberty to neglect it if we please. E. C. 

Higham Hill, Jan. \5th, 1817. M. E. vol. xii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir,— In p. 56 of your " Repository " for January, I find this 
alarming declaration, sealed by the authority of Mr. Stodhart, 



61 

of Pell Street, Ratcliff Highway, that " they who deny the 
co-equal and co-essential godhead of Jesus Christ, will, with 
Unitarians, he damned to all eternity." I read this denun- 
ciation with a mingled feeling of astonishment, contempt, and 
pity. My astonishment, indeed, was not called forth "by any 
novelty in the thing, as the temper which dictates these ana- 
themas is, unhappily, prevalent enough. But were the sen- 
tence rung in my ears every hour of every day, I should never 
cease to he astonished at the presumption of a poor fallible 
mortal, who should dare to seat himself on the throne of God, 
and shut the gates of mercy on all who do not think as he 
does. — Unitarians are to be damned to all eternity ! — Not 
surely because they differ in their religious creed from Mr. 
Stodhart. And yet I defy him, in conjunction with all who 
hold the same opinion, to assign a better reason why they 
should be damned than this would be. Theologians are not 
always with caution bold, but he must be a bold man indeed, 
who should have the hardihood to deny that Unitarianism has 
ranked amongst its professors, men who have been eminently 
adorned with every Christian virtue. Nor would he be less 
audacious, who should venture to affirm, that Unitarianism 
does not embrace every practical 'principle of Christianity. 
Virtue, indeed, is to a Unitarian the acknowledged end of his 
faith, and every article in his creed enforces the practice of 
virtue. But he does not believe the co-equal and co- essential 
Godhead of Jesus Christ ; and, therefore, he is to be damned 
to all eternity. Mr. Stodhart, I am afraid, would not hear him, 
or he might plead, if not in arrest of judgment, at least in 
extenuation of his crime, that amidst the various and contra- 
dictory explanations which have been given of the Trinitarian 
doctrine, he was altogether at a loss to understand what it was 
that he was called upon to believe. Mr. Stodhart, however, 
(whose knowledge, no doubt, is equal to his zeal,) may perhaps 
be able to throw some new light on this perplexing subject, 
and may condescend to inform us how three false* deities 

* The Father alone, saith Mr. Stodhart, is a false Deity. " To us there 
is but one God even the Father," says the Apostle Paul. And in in- 



62 

make one true God ; unless, indeed, he should determine, in 
his anger, to leave us to find out the secret for ourselves. But 
Mr. Stodhart would say, mine is the doctrine of Scripture, 
and if the Unitarians would read the New Testament with im- 
partiality, they would find it there expressed in every page. 
No doubt if they would take Mr. Stodhart for their guide, and 
obligingly accept his interpretation of Scripture phraseology, 
they would find not only this doctrine, but every other article 
of his delectable system. But with Mr. Stodhart's good leave, 
they would rather see with their own eyes than with his ; 
especially as, were they to borrow his optics, they might per- 
chance, imbibe his spirit ; from which, at present, every feeling 
of their heart revolts. But Mr. S. would add, or if he did not, 
somebody would for him, the Unitarians perversely and wil- 
fully shut their eyes against the truth. It is no wonder that 
they who usurp one prerogative of the Almighty, should, 
upon occasion, exercise another. And, in truth, many 
of our orthodox brethren have a marvellous faculty of diving 
into the hearts of their opponents. In the twinkliug of an 
eye they can unlock the breast of a poor Unitarian, and there, 
amidst other dire and dreadful things, they can clearly behold 
original depravity, in the shape of carnal reason, arming itself 
in proud rebellion against the truth of God. Some of this 
perspicacious fraternity have ascertained that Unitarians are 
neither more nor less than unbelievers in disguise. Others, I 

terpreting this declaration according to its literal meaning, I am sup- 
ported by a good authority. A recent convert to Orthodoxy, in order to 
guard against the dire effects of interpreting Scripture upon the princi- 
ples of rational criticism, has laid down a rule of interpretation, in terms 
to the following effect : that Scripture language is always to be explained 
according to the natural and obvious meaning of the words. Were this 
canon applied to the greater part of the New Testament, what woeful 
work would it make with the popular theology ! It was kind, however, 
to endeavour to furnish a principle, which would at once clear up every 
difficulty. Mr. Stodhart, it is to be feared, would not have been thus 
indulgent ; he would have contented himself with proclaiming, This is 
the truth, and if you will not believe it, you will be damned to all 
eternity ! 



63 



am told, have discovered that, in the heart of a Unitarian, 
piety at best never rises above the level of infidel devotion. 
As we have been accustomed to pay some respect to the in- 
junction of our Master, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," 
we confess ourselves not qualified to carry on our theological 
warfare by this method of attack. We, therefore, leave it in 
the exclusive possession of our opponents ; and much good 
may it do them. — But enough and more than enough on this 
ungracious topic. I will therefore, only add, that it is high 
time that this damning spirit of bigotry should hide its head 
and blush. Blush, indeed, it cannot, for bigotry, as it has no 
feeling, knows no shame. Let it, then, if it must be so, pour 
forth its fury while it may. The time cannot fail to come, 
when the wretched system which ministers fuel to this unholy 
flame, shall have been swept from the face of the earth by the 
progressive operation of that spirit of inquiry, which weak 
men may lament and bigots may execrate, but which no threats 
of damnation can intimidate, nor any mortal power repress. 

e: o. 

Higham Hill, March 4th, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — My attention having been lately directed to the subject 
of natural religion, I send you a few reflections upon it, to make 
such use of as you shall please. 

By natural religion, as distinguished from revealed, might 
seem to be meant that system of faith and worship which has 
prevailed in the world where revelation has been unknown. 
But this appellation is rather given to certain principles which, 
while they have been admitted by some, have been rejected by 
others, and which have been very indistinctly apprehended by 
the majority of mankind. But whatever may be the principles 
of natural religion, and however clear may be their evidence, I 
ask, what has this religion effected ? Has it ever saved man- 



64 

kind from the grossest idolatry and the most debasing super- 
stition ? Has it at at any period led the great mass of the 
human race to the worship or the knowledge of One all-wise, 
all-powerful, all-benevolent Creator ? 

The fundamental principle of religion is the being of a God ; 
and it is generally admitted, that there is no truth in the whole 
circle of moral inquiry, which rests upon such satisfactory and 
conclusive evidence. We also, as Christians, believe that this 
God is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness; and this glo- 
rious truth we pronounce to be not more the doctrine of reve- 
lation than the dictate of sound philosophy. But let us hear 
the voice of an enlightened Heathen. Cicero begins his work 
on the " Nature of the Gods" with this memorable declaration, 
that the question respecting the nature of the gods is very diffi- 
cult and very obscure. And whoever reads the Treatise 
through, may see reason to congratulate himself that he did 
not live in an age when such a disputation could be held on 
such a subject. I pass over the providential government of 
God, to the doctrine of a future life ; and on this important 
doctrine I shall quote a few observations from a work recently 
published, and entitled " Apeleutherus," premising that though 
I differ from the Author most materially, this difference does 
not diminish my respect for his talents, or my admiration of 
his sincerity. But I shall first make a remark on a position of 
our Author's, respecting the evidence of what he terms super- 
natural revelation. 

" The history of a miracle cannot, without absurdity, be ad- 
mitted as evidence of the truth of any doctrine, since it cannot 
communicate that certainty which it does not itself possess." 
What it does not possess it undoubtedly cannot communicate. 
But suppose it to possess some degree of probability , which 
indeed the Author virtually admits, there will certainly be no 
absurdity in taking its evidence as far as it will go ; but there 
would be a great absurdity in rejecting this evidence alto- 
gether, because it does not amount to certainty ; unless, indeed, 
the doctrine for which it pleads " is already supported by more 
than sufficient evidence of an indisputable kind." " In all 



C5 

oases in which human nature can feel an interest, would it not 
be much more easy to learn the truth, independently of the 
miracle, than to arrive at absolute certainty concerning the 
miracle, in order to prove the doctrine ? I say absolute cer- 
tainty, because nothing short of this can be of any use in the 
case we are considering." Do the principles of natural religion, 
then, rest upon absolute certainty ? * If not, they can be of 
no use whatever, and we shall be in danger, for want of cer- 
tainty, of having no religion at all. But why is this absolute 
certainty required ? Human belief and human conduct in 
general are governed by probability, and by probability alone. 
The conviction, however, which is produced by historical testi- 
mony, and that with respect to facts of great antiquity, is 
scarcely to be distinguished from the confidence of certain 
knowledge. And though " human testimony," according to our 
Author, " however credible, may or may not be true," when 
upon sufficient inquiry we have satisfied ourselves that it is true, 
we feel persuaded that in this particular case it cannot be false. 
" But if any man could persuade me that my eternal salvation 
were depending upon its truth, he would, at the same moment, 
fill my mind with doubt and anxiety." Let me feel the same 
conviction of the reality of any fact, as I do of the reality of 
many facts, even of ancient date, and my mind would be filled 
with no doubt or anxiety, whatever were depending upon its 
truth. 

But to proceed to the subject of a future life; "what I 
principally rely on/' says our Author, ' ' is the obvious suitable- 
ness and propriety of a sequel to our present existence, and the 
manifest absurdity of supposing the wise and benevolent 
Creator to have produced so noble a work as man, for the mere 
purpose of destroying him; and I rely principally on this, 
because, from its simplicity and force, it appears emi- 

* That they do not, our Author himself acknowledges when he says, 
with respect to a future life, p. 234, that " certainty is entirely out of 
the question." This concession, indeed, I did not expect, after having 
read in p. 219, that it is impossible that human life should terminate in 
the silence and darkness of the grave. 

F 



66 

nently calculated to affect, and is, in fact, that consideration 
which has always affected, the mass of mankind, and produced 
that universal expectation of a future life which we find to pre- 
vail in the world ; " * and which he tells us elsewhere has pre- 
vailed among the generality of the human race, " with scarcely 
the intervention of a doubt." What has been thus confidently 
received by the generality of the human race, I am not able to 
say ; but there are many passages in the ancient authors which 
satisfactorily demonstrate that the wisest philosophers of Greece 
and Kome could not advance beyond this alternative — that 
death would either prove the extinction of being, or be an in- 
troduction to a better state of existence than the present. And 
much as this argument has always affected the mass of man- 
kind, Plato seems to have felt its force but feebly, when he wrote 
his Phsedon, or he would not have taken so much pains to estab- 
lish the natural immortality of the soul ; which he conceived, 
and, I think, justly in his circumstances, to be essential to the 
proof of a life to come. As it is not, I presume, an article of 
natural religion that a time will come when the whole human 

* But our Author proceeds : — " Not indeed that this argument 
necessarily presents itself to the unassisted understanding of every 
individual of mankind ; or even that a majority of the human race has 
in any age possessed powers and information to reason correctly in this 
way ; but that in every age it has pleased the sovereign Creator and 
Governor of the universe to raise up men of superior discernment and 
penetration, who, after having explored the paths of science for them- 
selves, have delighted in communicating their discoveries to others." 
This does not appear very consistent with what we read in p. 128, that 
" the religion of reason and nature is intelligible to every human being, 
who is willing to open his eyes, and to fix them attentively upon its 
luminous and instructive lessons." But if, as we are informed, there is 
a manifest absurdity in supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to 
have produced so noble a work as man for the mere purpose of destroy- 
ing him, I cannot help inquiring how it came to pass that superior 
discernment and penetration should be necessary for discovering this 
absurdity 1 Did the difficulty lie in ascertaining the premises, or in 
drawing the conclusion 1 As for the multitude who were too dull to 
discern this absurdity themselves, there is reason to suspect that they 
took the matter upon trust, and never distinctly apprehended the force 
of the argument by which they were so much affected. 



07 

race will at once be raised from their graves, and restored to 
life and action, he who shall attempt, without the light of reve- 
lation, to establish the future existence of the human species, 
will fail in a material point if he omits to show that there is 
something in man which must or may survive the stroke of 
death. It would not have satisfied Plato, nor would it satisfy 
me to say, " It is in vain for me to inquire how I am to exist 
hereafter, since I am utterly unable to comprehend how I exist 
at present!' 

But to return to the argument under consideration. It rests 
upon the position that the phenomena of human life, without 
a future being, imply a. defect of wisdom and goodness in the 
Creator. Thus far, then, the perfection of the Divine charac- 
ter is an hypothesis unsupported by fact. And unless it can 
be established by certain abstract reasonings (and these, while 
they may appear satisfactory to some, will seem nugatory to 
others), it will be precipitate to draw from it an inference so 
contrary to present appearances, as the future existence of the 
human race. But, says our Author, admit a future state, " and 
we at once obtain a view of the scheme of Divine Providence, 
comprehensive, luminous, and delightful." This I am by no 
means disposed to deny. But unless this view of it be con- 
firmed by the authority of that God who alone knows his own 
counsels, it is only an hypothesis, and an hypothesis which, in 
many minds, would not prevail against that universal analogy, 
which seems to forbid the hope that life, when once extinct, will 
ever be restored. Setting revelation entirely out of the ques- 
tion, we might say, that, as a matter of fact, God seems to 
consult not so much for the individuals of mankind as for the 
species, and that it would be difficult to prove that the conti- 
nuation and progressive improvement of the species would not 
answer all the ends which the Creator had in view in their 
formation. Man, it might be said, is a noble work, but not so 
noble, perhaps, in the eyes of the Creator as in his own ; and 
as for the waste of intellectual and moral attainment, which is 
implied in the destruction of the individuals of the species, it 
may be no great object amidst the immensity of creation, and 

F 2 



68 

in the estimation of a Being whose power, no doubt, is perpe- 
tually employed in producing life, intellect, and happiness 
throughout his vast dominions. And were the whole human 
race what the great majority have thus far been, their extinc- 
tion might not seem to form a much stronger objection 
to the plan of Providence than that of the beasts that 
perish. 

But our Author's argument, as stated above, seems to resolve 
itself into this simple proposition, that a perfectly wise and 
good Being could not form a rational agent without making 
him immortal. The fact, however, that man dies and is heard 
of no more, seems to negative the proposition ; and that reason- 
ing must be powerful which shall overcome this stubborn 
objection.* I am by no means prepared to prove that the pro- 

* Even granting the perfections of the Deity, it would be difficult to 
show that such a being as man, even though the individuals of the 
species should perish, would not be a desirable link in the chain of 
animated existence ; and it has always appeared to me something like 
presumption to affirm that God cannot be wise and good, unless A., 
B., and C, should be immortal. My view of the subject is well expressed 
in p. 18 of Mr. J. Kenrick's admirable Sermon "On the Necessity of 
Revelation to teach the Doctrine of a Future Life." In a word, the 
constitution of the world differs, in various respects, from what our 
limited understandings would have led us to expect from the combina- 
tion of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence ; and being thus, as it 
should seem, convicted of ignorance (if these are in truth the attri- 
butes of the Deity), we go beyond our province, when we confidently 
pronounce that the future existence of the human race is necessary 
to make the scheme of Providence complete. 

Our Author's error (for if I had not thought him in an error I should 
not have troubled myself to write what I have written) consists in 
magnifying presumptions into proofs, and attributing an undue force to 
certain considerations which render revelation credible, in order to show 
that it was not necessary. But as long as man should appear to be lost 
for ever in the grave, it would be at least a thing ardently to be desired, 
that we could be distinctly informed by Him who made us, what he 
has yet in view respecting us. Setting aside the history of revelation, 
nothing like the restoration of a man once dead, that is, nothing which, 
as a matter of fact, could give any assurance of a life to come, has ever 
been heard of since the world began. As Mr. Belsham somewhere 



69 

position is false, but were my hope of a future life to rest solely 
or principally upon it, I should wish to see it confirmed by 
something like logical demonstration. 

In pp. 218, 219, of " Apeleutherus," there is a fine passage 
on the painful moral discipline to which man is rendered sub- 
ject, and which gives a more persuasive force to the argument. 
But I am afraid that the sufferings of which our Author treats 
so eloquently, would more generally excite a doubt of the per- 
fection of the Divine attributes, than suggest a confident ex- 
pectation of a life to come. Our Author rejects with disdain 
the argument for a future life, which has been drawn from the 
inequality of the Divine dispensations, asking, with the poet, 
What can we reason but from what we know ? and quoting the 
well-known observation of Mr. Hume, " that you have no 
ground to ascribe to the author of Nature any qualities but 
what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his pro- 
ductions." I am surprised that he did not perceive that there 
is opportunity to apply this reasoning against himself. 1 take 
human life as I find it, checkered with suffering, deformed by 
moral evil, and terminating in death ; and I ask, whether the 
plan of Providence, as far as we have any certain knowledge 
of it, corresponds to the character of an infinitely wise, power- 
ful, and benevolent Creator ? The ground on which our au- 
thor's argument is founded will oblige him to answer, no. 
How, then, am I to be assured that God is infinite in wisdom, 
power, and goodness ? The hypothesis of a future life, indeed, 
will settle everything ; but on what certain foundation is the 
hypothesis to rest, until the perfection of the Divine character 
shall have been established ? It will not satisfy to say, that 
there must be a future state, and therefore that God may be 
infinitely powerful, wise, and good ; nor, on the other hand, that 

eloquently expresses himself, on the natural probability of a resurrec- 
tion, " Experience is silent ; philosophy is confounded ; revelation 
alone darts a beam of light through the solid gloom ; the messenger 
of heavenly truth announces, that all who are in their graves shall hear 
his voice, and shall come forth." 



70 

God is all perfection, and therefore there must be a life to 
come. Here Christianity comes admirably to our assistance, 
and declares what otherwise, however plausible, would be 
assumption only, that " this mortal will put on immortality." 
But, it is said, the grand miracle on which Christians have 
usually laid so great a stress, namely, the resurrection of 
Christ, neither proves the immortality of the soul nor the 
general resurrection of human bodies. Granting the reality 
of the fact, and, what I think will not be denied, that the 
apostles understood its meaning, it is a divine attestation to the 
future existence of the human race ; and an attestation which I 
would not exchange for all the arguments which have been 
advanced in favour of the doctrine, from the days of Plato to 
the present hour. 

Upon the whole, I feel a decided conviction, that, without 
revelation, the question respecting a future life is involved in 
deep obscurity. And I think it worthy of remark, that, with 
the exception of one or two individuals of a sanguine east of 
mind, I have met with no one who doubted of the truth of 
Christianity, who did not doubt in an equal degree of a life to 
come. At the same time, the uncertainty in which nature 
leaves the subject is no objection to the reality of a future 
being, when it is confirmed by the voice of revelation. We 
are told, indeed, that " if Christianity be not built upon the 
solid rock of natural religion, it can have no foundation at 
all." If by this observation were meant that revelation cannot 
contradict the clear and certain deductions of reason, I should 
subscribe to the proposition with all my heart and soul. But 
if thereby be intended that revelation cannot disclose what 
reason might never have discovered, I cannot help regarding 
it as manifestly false ; since it is only saying, in other words, 
that God must reveal all that he chooses to make known of 
his purposes by one medium, which is what few men would 
choose to affirm. Or if it is to be understood as intimating, 
that no historical and external evidence can confirm the truth 
of revelation, I should reply, that this is a proposition which 



71 

cannot be maintained without setting aside our faith in testi- 
mony, and undermining the principal foundation of human 
knowledge. E. 0. 

April, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — I am sorry that your correspondent Homo (p. 293), 
who attributes to me a great deal more than I dare take to 
myself, should look to me for that satisfaction which he has 
not, it seems, been able to obtain from the liberal divines of the 
present day. He must, however, I think, have been convinced 
that the doctrine of the eternity of hell torments is not the 
doctrine of Scripture ; and when this is set aside, I do not 
know what compels us to affix an interpretation to the ex- 
pressions in which the future punishment of sin is denounced, 
which would be inconsistent with that infinite goodness which 
we ascribe to the Creator. 

I take this opportunity to suggest, that I have long doubted 
whether the description in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, 
from the 31st verse to the end, has any reference to a future 
life. Certainly the reason which is assigned for the acceptance 
of those on the King's right hand, and the rejection of those 
on his left, is altogether inapplicable to myriads of the human 
race, and therefore does not naturally direct the mind to what 
is called the day of judgment. I propose this doubt with 
diffidence, and should be glad to see the question discussed by 
some abler person who should think that there is ground for 
my suspicion. E. C. 

June, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Upon perusing Mr. Hutton's excellent sermon lately 
delivered at Bradford (see "Mon. Repos." p. 400), I was led to 



72 

ask myself upon what principle our Oalvinistic brethren can 
refuse to yield to the force of his reasonings ; and the answer 
was, that it can only be by persisting to view morality through 
a medium of their own ; a medium which, it may be observed, 
annihilates the moral agency of man. Their system is founded 
on the position that the human heart is altogether depraved, 
and that man, in an unregenerate state, can do nothing which 
will be of any avail towards acceptance with God. If this be 
so, man is not a moral agent according to any imaginable de- 
finition by which the notion of moral agency can be conveyed. 
Not only the knowledge of what is good, but the power to do 
what is good enters into the very essence of moral action ; and 
this power is by the Oalvinistic hypothesis excluded. 

But the freedom of the will may constitute man a moral 
agent. Let the will be as free as freedom can make it, as long 
as the humau heart remains totally corrupt, it can only choose 
between different forms of evil; and since every sin is an infi- 
nite evil, it can signify nothing, as to the moral quality of the 
action, in what form the offence is committed. But does not 
the moral evil which abounds in the world countenance the 
doctrine of the original depravity of man ? Does not this 
hypothesis well explain the wickedness which deforms the 
moral creation, and afford the solution of a phenomenon which 
no one, whatever be his views of theology, can refuse to admit? 
No doubt, the hypothesis that the human heart is totally and 
radically corrupt, will account for all the sin (if sin it ought to 
be called) which man does or can commit; but there is an- 
other phenomenon for which it does not account, and with 
which it can never be reconciled, and that is, the quantum of 
good which is found in the actions of men together with the 
evil, and which, whatever this quantum may be, completely sets 
aside the hypothesis. Will the Calvinists say that there is 
nothing morally good in those acts which mankind have deno- 
minated virtuous, when performed by the unregenerate man ? 
Would the chastity of a Joseph and the benevolence of the 
good Samaritan have no quality of moral excellence in an Uni- 
tarian Christian ? Then will I in my turn deny that there is 



73 

any moral turpitude in the deeds which are ascribed to an 
Heliogabalus and a Nero. To what sad extremities are men 
driven in reasoning, when they oppose hypothesis to fact ! 

But let us pass from the unregenerate to the regenerate man. 
Were anything surprising in the business of theology, it would 
be surprising that intelligent Oalvinists should not see that the 
effects which they ascribe to the operation of the Holy Spirit' 
may easily be accounted for without having recourse to super- 
natural interposition. Let a man who sincerely admits the 
principles of Calvinism be also disposed to reflect much upon 
these principles (and this he surely may be, without a divine 
influence), and his conversion seems to follow of course. 
When he is once convinced that, without flying to the right- 
eousness of Christ he is undone for ever, nothing is more 
natural than that he should ardently embrace what he is taught 
to consider as the gospel method of salvation ; and in the con- 
templation of what he regards as the scheme of redemption, 
his religious feelings will be wrought up to a tone which the 
undiscerning mind may easily be led to ascribe to the agency of 
the Spirit of God, especially when possessed of an opinion that 
the human heart is naturally incapable of raising its affections 
to things above. And hence it is not to be wondered at, that 
men of a sanguine temperament should at length attain an un- 
doubting conviction that they have experienced that operation 
of divine grace, which alone can save them from the wrath to 
come. 

But what is it ; after all, that is effected by regeneration ? 
Does it purify the heart altogether from the corruption of sin ? 
This will hardly be affirmed. There is then an infinite evil 
still lurking within, and which must occasionally burst forth 
into actual transgression ; so that it would be difficult to prove 
that the regenerated soul is better fitted for heaven after regene- 
ration than before. And though the moral disposition and 
conduct may be in the main consistent with the pure precepts 
of Christianity, this is no more than what is found in many 
whom Calvinism dooms to everlasting perdition. So that, 
judging from fact, the human heart, which is by hypothesis 



74 

radically and totally corrupt, is capable of as much moral ex- 
cellence in its natural and depraved state, as when it has been 
wrought upon and purified by the Spirit of God ! 

E. C. 

Higham Hill, June 25, 1819. M. K. vol. xiv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Allow me to join Mr. Howe (p. 661), in recommend- 
ing to the attention of our Unitarian friends the Society for 
the Belief of Aged and Infirm Dissenting Ministers. For 
what reasons they have hitherto been backward upon this occa- 
sion, I have no right to inquire. But if there are any who 
think that it will wound the feelings of ministers in distress to 
be relieved by this Society, I can only say, that to me this ap- 
prehension appears altogether groundless. It will not, I con- 
ceive, wound any man's feelings to receive assistance from a 
fund which was not raised in consideration of his individual 
case, but with a prospective view to the case of all who should 
be circumstanced as he is ; nor will any man be ashamed to ac- 
knowledge himself poor, whose profession has been known to 
exclude the means of rising above poverty. The situation of 
Dissenting Ministers, who are solely or chiefly dependent upon 
the emoluments of their profession, does not appear to me to 
have been sufficiently considered. Their sensibilities are com- 
monly somewhat refined by education ; their office introduces 
them to the intimacy of men comparatively rich, and thus they 
contract a familiarity with the comforts and accommodations of 
what are called easy circumstances ; the whole of their active 
life is not unfrequently one continued struggle with difficulties; 
and, at length, when overtaken by age and infirmity, they may, 
without any fault of their own, be thrown upon the support of 
precarious charity. Surely to men thus circumstanced it will 
be cheering and consolatory to find that, while they are labour- 
ing to promote the best interests of mankind, the peculiarities 



75 

of their condition are not overlooked, but that the more wealthy 
part of the Dissenting community are cheerfully contributing 
to a society, which has for its object the support and comfort of 
their declining years. It will be to them a delightful argu- 
ment that they have not laboured in vain in inculcating the 
lessons of that Master, who left it as his last injunction to his 
followers, that they should love one another. What objections 
of any weight can be urged against the institution in question, 
I am unable to conceive. But I shall, I trust, be excused if I 
remark, that those reasonings ought to be founded on clear 
and certain principles, which are allowed to stop the hand of 
charity. Benevolence may, indeed, be exercised indiscreetly; 
but it is better for a man's self that it should be indiscreetly 
exercised, than that it should be checked by scrupulous and, 
perhaps, mistaken calculations of the good or evil by which its 
exercise might be followed. But no imaginable evil, that I can 
see, can possibly result from any support which is likely to be 
given to the Society for which Mr. Howe is pleading, and for 
which I sincerely hope that he may not plead in vain. 

E. 0. 

Higham Hill, Dec. 4, 1819. M. K. vol. xiv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Having repeatedly heard intelligent persons express an 
opinion, that the question concerning Liberty and Necessity 
involves difficulties from which the human mind cannot easily 
extricate itself, I conceived that it might not be useless to show, 
that as a philosophical question it is as simple as need be, and 
admits a most clear and certain solution. The controversy has 
been embarrassed by the use of the term motive, which is not 
essential to it, and which, being capable of different interpre- 
tations, has left room for misapprehension and subterfuge. 

The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this, that 
every volition or determination of the mind is the necessary 



76 

result of the state of the mind at the time when the determi- 
nation is formed.* Of the truth of this proposition, in regard 
to myself, I am conscious; and presuming that the general 
constitution of all human minds is the same, I suspect that, 
were the question closely urged, the consciousness of every 
other man would coincide in this respect with my own. And 
were it not for certain consequences, which are supposed to 
follow the admission of this doctrine, I am persuaded that no 
human being would have been found to doubt its truth. 

But in opposition to this statement the advocate of Liberty 
maintains, that there is in the human mind a self- determining 
power, to which, as their proper cause, all the volitions or 
determinations of the mind are to be referred. 

What, then, is the operation of this self- determining power ? 
By the very definition, it is not governed in its exercise by the 
state or disposition of the mind. Does it, then, itself determine 
the state of mind in which a certain volition shall be formed ? 
Then, as no mental act can be performed except in some certain 
state of mind, it may be asked, How came the mind to be in 
that state in which the self- determining power was called upon 
to act ? Did this power of its sovereign pleasure decree this 
state of the mind also, and before this a former state, and so 
on to the first moment of conscious existence, always acting 
in a certain state of mind, and always determining that state ? 
But in reality, the determining the state of the mind, in which 
a given volition shall take place, would not differ from deter- 
mining the volition itself. In a given state of mind, then, does 

* Though I have avoided the use of the term motive, I do not mean 
to intimate, that motives have nothing to do with volition. By motive, 
indeed, the Necessitarian means not only the inducement which is pre- 
sented to the mind, but the mental disposition in which a given volition 
is formed. But to use the term in its ordinary acceptation, it may be 
remarked, that every state of mind in which a volition takes place, 
results partly from a former state, and partly from the influence of 
certain motives or considerations which are suggested to the mind. 
And no truth in the whole circle of intellectual inquiry seems more 
self-evident than this, that from a definite state of mind, nothing but 
a definite volition can proceed. 



77 

it determine the volition ? If so, can it determine in opposition 
to the state of the mind at the time when the volition is 
formed? If not, it can do nothing that is worth contending 
for. If it can, whenever this case is realised the will inclines 
one way, and the mind another. But as the will in its exercise 
cannot, even in imagination, he distinguished from the mind in 
the act of willing, the mind wills against itself, or wills and 
does not will the same thing, at the same time. That this 
reasoning may not be confronted by classical authority, I just 
remark, that Homer's well-known oxymoron shcov czshovti ye 
Sy^w, stands at an immeasurable distance from the case which 
is here supposed. 

But let this self- determining power be examined a little more 
closely. And as it is stated to be the faculty of the mind 
which determines the volitions, and, therefore, the actions of 
men, it is reasonable to ask, whether it possesses the properties 
of judgment, reflection, and other qualities which have always 
been supposed to have some influence upon the determinations 
of the will ? If so, it is no longer a faculty of the mind, but 
the mind itself; and when we are told that it is the efficient 
cause of volition, all that is meant is, that our volitions are the 
volitions of the mind. If it does not possess these properties, 
it is nothing but the simple power of volition, which, as it will 
not submit to be governed by the state or habit of the mind, 
but insists upon the privilege of determining itself, is not dis- 
tinguishable from blind caprice, or what we usually term 
chance. 

Shall it be said that the mind determines its volitions by 
means of a self- determining power, which is inherent in it, and 
essential to it ? Can the mind, then, form either of two oppo- 
site volitions at the same time, and in the same frame and dis- 
position ? If not, it does not possess a self- determining power, 
and everything is conceded which the Necessitarian contends 
for. If, when the mind is said to possess a self- determining 
power, it were meant that the volitions of the mind originate in 
itself, and are not forced upon it by extraneous compulsion, 
nothing would be said but what is true, and nothing but what 



78 

the Necessitarian admits and maintains. But this will not 
serve the cause for which this power has been devised. In 
order to set aside the position of the Necessitarian, this faculty 
must be supposed to be altogether independent of the feelings 
and dispositions of the mind, and must, in the strictest sense, 
determine itself, and govern its own decisions. The advocate 
of Liberty may say, that this is not what he means, but he 
will hear in reply, that if he does not mean this, he means 
nothing. But if the mind can form either of two opposite 
volitions at the same time, then the true and proper cause of 
definite volitions is the abstract power of willing ; a fit prin- 
ciple, in good truth, to which the government of life should be 
committed. 

Will the advocate of Liberty lay down his proposition in 
terms to the following effect : that though the state of the mind 
has a certain influence upon the self- determining power, yet 
that it does not, strictly speaking, cause the volition, which is 
the free act of the power for which he contends ? What, then, 
is the nature of the influence supposed ? Does it in any way 
effect that the volition should be what it is ? If so, all that 
the Necessitarian will be solicitous to maintain is granted. If 
not, we must look somewhere else, that is, to the self-deter- 
mining power, for the reason why one volition takes place 
rather than another : that is, a power which bears the same 
relation to all imaginable volitions, contains in itself the sole 
cause of every definite and specific volition. And on this 
faculty depends the moral agency of man! But does the 
self-determining power, in fact, obey the influence which the 
mind exerts upon it ? Why, then, does it obey it ? Because 
it chooses. Does it, then, reflect and judge, and thus determine 
on the propriety of yielding this obedience ? No such thing. 
Reflection and judgment are properties not of a self- determin- 
ing power, but of intellect and reason. They are not attributes 
of the will, but of the mind. 

But what, after all, can we understand by a self determining 
power, considered as the efficient cause of volition ? It is an 
incontrovertible truth, that the act of volition implies a certain 



79 

inclination or disposition of the mind. Does, then, the self- 
determining power cause this disposition, or is it acted upon 
and governed by it ? If the latter, it is not a self -determining 
power, and the controversy is at an end. If it he said to de- 
termine this disposition, the question arises, whether it must be 
considered as acting independently of every mental feeling 1 
If so, it is a manifest nonentity, since a volition cannot take 
place except in some state and disposition of the mind. If it 
does not act independently of mental feeling, it will again be 
asked, does it determine that state of feeling in which it acts ? 
To what conclusion this question would lead, it must be need- 
less to remark. 

But let the advocate of Liberty plead for himself in the 
language of that able metaphysician, Dr. Clarke : *' The 
true, proper, immediate, physical efficient cause of action," 
says he, "is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts 
itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the un- 
derstanding." If this power always obeys the last judgment 
of the understanding, the Necessitarian will ask no more. But 
can this power, at the very time when it exerts itself freely, in 
consequence of the last judgment of the understanding, deter- 
mine without any inducement whatever to set this last judgment 
at defiance, and to act in direct opposition to it ? This Dr. 
Clarke would not have affirmed. If it cannot, what is gained 
by maintaining, with an appearance at least of contradiction, 
that it exerts itself freely 9 in consequence of this judgment? 
If it can, then it is in very deed a power of self-motion, a 
power which, without any reason, can act against the very 
reason in consequence of which it acts.* 

* Dr. Clarke is disposed to consider the last judgment of the under- 
standing as the same with the act of volition. Then, as in this case 
the power of self-motion has nothing to do with volition, but only acts 
in consequence of the determination of the will or the understanding, 
it may be dismissed from the controversy, as having no relation to the 
matter in dispute. " But," says he, " if the act of volition be distin- 
guished from the last judgment of the understanding, then the act of 
volition, or rather the beginyiing of action, consequent upon the last 



80 

In a word, if definite volitions have not their causes in 
definite states of mind, they can be attributed to no cause 
distinct from the mere power of willing. But to say that the 
mere faculty of the will, or what would here be the same thing, 
the self- determining power, is the sole cause of specific voli- 
tions, does not in reality differ from saying that a definite vo- 
lition is the cause of itself. The self-determining power, in 
itself considered, is equally indifferent to all volitions ; but by 
a determinate act, it is supposed to cause a specific volition; 
but this act is the volition itself, nor can even for a moment 
be conceived of as distinct from it. The self- determining power, 
in other words, wills this or that, because it wills it ; that is, 
the only reason for the volition is the volition itself. 

Were it necessary to reason any further against this same 
self- determining power, this independent faculty, which will 
submit to no control, and acknowledge no principle of action 
but the imperious maxim sit pro ratione voluntas, it might 
be objected in the first place, that its existence is a mere as- 
sumption; secondly, that the assumption is unnecessary, as 
the phenomena of volition are satisfactorily accounted for 
without it ; thirdly, that the assumption is unwarrantable, as 
we are acquainted with nothing in the whole compass of nature 
which bears any analogy to such a faculty ; and fourthly, that 
the supposed operation of this faculty contradicts the only 
notions which mankind have ever formed of the connection 
between cause and effect. We are, indeed, ignorant of the 
operation of what we term causes, but this ignorance does not 
diminish the force of the objection. For a definite effect, we, 
in fact, look for a definite cause ; and every variation in the 
effect is always supposed to imply a proportionable variation 

judgment of the understanding, is not determined or caused by that 
last judgment as the physical efficient, but only as the moral motive" 
If the last judgment of the understanding causes the volition, that is 
sufficient. By what name its operation shall be called, the Neces- 
sitarian will not be very anxious to determine. For what avails the 
distinction between the physical efficient, and the moral motive, if the 
volition in given circumstances could not be different from what it is ? 



HI 

in the cause. Let it, then, be remembered, that the subject of 
controversy is not the cause of volition in general, but of 
definite and specific volitions. Now a self- determining power, 
if it means anything, must mean a power which, at the same 
time and in the same circumstances, can form either of two 
different or opposite volitions. But to refer a definite volition 
to the act of such a faculty, is, according to the only idea 
which ice have of causation, to say that a specific volition 
can be formed without a cause. The sic volo of the self-de- 
termining power will not be a satisfactory answer to the ques- 
tion, how it came to be the pleasure of the will to determine 
as it did. The prevalence of one inclination at the very 
moment when it was possible by the hypothesis that another 
inclination should have prevailed, requires a defiuite cause as 
much as any effect in nature ; or rather the supposition in- 
volves an impossibility, unless mankind have been thus far 
mistaken in requiring a definite cause for a definite effect. And 
if they have been herein mistaken, they may also have~ been 
mistaken in requiring any cause at all for that which they 
have denominated an effect ; since the same reasoning which 
has led them to the notion of a cause, has led them to con- 
ceive of it as a definite energy, from which a definite result 
proceeds. To deny, then, that a definite cause is necessary to 
a definite effect, or what is the same thing, to deny that a dif- 
ference in the effect implies a difference in the cause, is to call 
in question the very existence of a cause. The term, indeed, 
may be retained, but the only idea which we have of the 
thing is gone. And when the advocate of Liberty imagines a 
power which can at the same time cause either of two different 
volitions, he deceives himself by a mere abuse of language. A 
self- determining power, then, is not only gratuitously assumed, 
but involves another assumption, which sets at defiance what 
have hitherto been thought the most certain conclusions of the 
human mind. 

I will now say one word respecting the moral consequences 
which are supposed to follow from the doctrine of Necessity. 



82 

The most formidable of these is, that it annihilates the accoun- 
tableness of man, and renders him an unfit subject of reward 
and punishment. T shall consider the difficulty as pressing 
entirely on the side of punishment, and shall observe, that as, 
according to the Necessitarian system, punishment can operate 
on the state of the mind, it may with the greatest propriety 
be applied. But if man had within him such a capricious 
principle as a self- determining power, the application of 
punishment would be improper, because it would be useless. 
What, indeed, has been called vindictive punishment t the doc- 
trine of Necessity does exclude ; but this, instead of being an 
objection to the doctrine, is one of its recommendations. Vin- 
dictive punishment, it is true, cannot be defended upon any 
system ; but upon the principles of the Necessitarian it is 
manifestly and palpably absurd. 

It will easily be perceived that I have not written for those 
who are altogether strangers to the controversy, nor for those 
who thoroughly understand the subject; but, as I intimated 
above, for those who have conceived that it cannot be tho- 
roughly understood. And if the light in which it has now 
been placed shall render it more intelligible to any who 
have hitherto thought it obscure and intricate, my end will 
answered. E. 0. 

P. S. I am aware that I have written much more than was 
necessary; but the supposed difficulty of the subject seemed to 
require that it should be treated somewhat at length. Other- 
wise the argument (like most other arguments) lies in a small 
compass. The Necessitarian maintains, that every volition 
necessarily results from the state of mind in which the volition 
takes place. His opponent, to set aside this proposition, con- 
tends for a self- determining power as the efficient cause of voli- 
tion. Here a simple question presents itself. Can the mind 
will this or that without a certain feeling or disposition that 
prompts the volition ? Fact, to which even a self- determining 
power must bow, will answer, Certainly not. Consequently it 



83 

cannot will against the state or disposition in which it is at 
any given time. And here, were impartial reason to decide, 
the controversy must end. 
Jan. 1820. M. E. vol. xv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — By way of an addendum to my paper on the doc- 
trine of Necessity, (pp. 7 — 11,) I should wish briefly to state 
the objections which are brought against this doctrine, and 
briefly to reply to them. 

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity annihilates the dis- 
tinction between virtue and vice. 

Answer. The objection is not true. A benevolent deed 
will retain its character, though the doctrine of Necessity be 
admitted. But if the actions of men proceeded from a self- 
determining power of the will, then, indeed, as they * would 
indicate no disposition of the heart, they would have no moral 
quality, and the distinctions of morality would be set aside. 

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity subverts the founda- 
tion of praise and blame. 

Answer. Then praise and blame, according to the obser- 
vation just now made, can have no foundation at all. The 
truth is, we view moral beauty with complacency, and moral 
deformity with disgust ; and praise and blame are the expres- 
sions of these sentiments. Hence may be explained the origin 
of what is termed remorse. 

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity, if true, renders man 
an unfit subject of reward and punishment. 

Answer. The objection is false, unless it can be shown 
that, upon Necessitarian principles, reward and punishment 
cannot operate to the formation of virtuous affections, which, 
were man really constituted upon the principles of Philoso- 
phical Liberty, they certainly could not. But as the objection 
chiefly respects future punishment, it may be observed that, if 
this punishment is considered as corrective, the difficulty 

g 2 



84 

vanishes. The case of the wicked, indeed, compared with that 
of the righteous, may seem to reflect upon the goodness of the 
Universal Parent. But that there should be gradations of 
happiness seems to be the favourite law of Providence ; nor is 
it more incumbent upon the Necessitarian than upon any other 
man to vindicate this appointment. But let it be supposed 
that future punishment will not be corrective.* Let the Liber- 
tarian reconcile this supposition to the Divine benevolence, and 
the same solution of the difficulty which will serve for him will 
do for his opponent. 

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity makes God the author 
of sin. 

Answer. If the moral evil which exists in the creation is 
conducive to good, no difficulty arises from its introduction ; 
if it is not, when the advocate of Liberty shall have vindicated 
the Divine perfections, the Necessitarian may avail himself of 
his vindication. 

Objection. The doctrine of Necessity leads to moral in- 
activity. 

Answer. There is nothing which human folly cannot abuse. 
But he would deserve the palm for folly who should refuse to 
exert himself for the promotion of his own happiness because 
the series of human actions is predetermined, while experience 
and observation concur to convince him that what a man 
soweth that he also reaps. Suppose a man to be afflicted with 
a disorder for which he believed that a particular medicine was 
a certain cure. What should we think of him if he refused 
to apply the remedy from a persuasion that it was predeter- 
mined whether he should or should not recover ? 

* Dr. Paley speaking of human punishments properly considers 
them as founded on utility, and observes that the retribution of so much 
pain for so much guilt, which we expect at the hand of God, does not 
obtain here. Query. Do we see any reason why pain should follow 
guilt if it could be of no advantage either to the sufferer or to others ? 
The experience of life has caused guilt and suffering to be associated 
in our minds ; but do we not deceive ourselves if we fancy that we 
perceive a connection between them which, independent of all con- 
siderations of utility, rests on the abstract principle of justice ? 



85 

Objection. According to the doctrine of Necessity, our 
actions are not properly our own, and there is but one will in 
the universe. 

Answer. Our actions are in a sufficiently proper sense our 
own, as they are the result of human powers. With respect 
to the latter part of the objection, that there is but one will in 
the universe, this in a sense is true, and to the Christian 
Necessitarian a glorious truth it is. Believing in the infinite 
wisdom, power, and goodness of the Great First Cause, he will 
see reason to consider all events, whether pleasurable or pain- 
ful, and all actions, whether morally good or morally evil, as 
equally essential to the harmony of the creation, and equally 
conducive to the ultimate happiness of mankind. Thus, in his 
view, as in that of his Maker, all real evil is exterminated from 
the universe. Hence, if he properly reflects upon his prin- 
ciples, he will find in them the most powerful aids to devotion 
and benevolence. 

As I have not trespassed long on the time of your readers, I 
will, with your permission, detain them a few moments by 
turning to another subject. The other day, upon reading 
Plutarch's Consolatio ad Apollonium, I was led to reflect a 
little upon a favourite maxim of the ancient philosophers, that, 
in grief occasioned by afflictive bereavements, it is the part of 
a wise man temporis medicinam ratione prmcipere. I will 
not bring forward quotations in evidence that such was their 
maxim, but will simply state to the English reader that, accord- 
ing to the opinion of these philosophers, it is the part of wis- 
dom to remedy grief by reason, and not to wait for the alleT 
viation which time would otherwise bring with it. This senti- 
ment affords a striking, but not the only proof, that the ancients 
attributed to reason much more than it can justly claim. It 
seems also to show that they were but little acquainted with 
the constitution of the human mind. A little just reflection 
would have taught them that the effect of time in mitigating 
sorrow is not to be anticipated by any act of the understand- 
ing It is almost needless to remark that time diminishes 



86 

grief, by causing new impressions to succeed to old ones, and 
that, by engaging the mind in interests which arise out of new 
occurrences, it gradually weakens the recollections by which 
the painful events of a former period had been succeeded. 
But by what effort of reason is this progressive operation of 
time to be superseded ? Experience, indeed, sufficiently proves 
that no mental energy can effect, without the aid of time, what 
time, without the aid of reason, seldom fails to accomplish. 
But what topics of consolation had reason to offer which could 
render the lenient hand of time unnecessary to the mitigation 
of human sorrow ? That it is wise to bear with patience what 
it is impossible to avoid; that whatever sufferings visit the 
individual, he is not the only sufferer; that if we lose our 
friends by death, they escape the evils which might have 
awaited them in a longer life, and at the worst are only as 
though they had never been.* Such, and no better than such, 
were the considerations which philosophy could suggest to 
soothe the anguish of an afflicted heart. How inferior to the 
assurances of Christianity, that "this mortal must put on im- 
mortality," and that suffering is a part of a wise and benevolent 
discipline which may assist to prepare us for everlasting hap- 
piness in the life to come ! Not, indeed, that these assurances 
will immediately calm the agitated spirit, or produce the effect 
for which philosophy in vain invoked the aid of reason. Time 
still supplies the only certain cure for the agony of poignant 
grief. And if affliction has a beneficial influence on the 
human heart, it is right that the remedy should not be instantly 
at our command. But while the philosophers of old demanded 
of reason to perform the work of time, they not only demanded 
what the law of nature forbids, but showed that, while they 
felt grief to be an evil, they were strangers to the considerations 
which are best calculated to soften its severity, and had no 
proper conception of the present state as a scene of moral 

* When the ancient philosophers speak of a future life in circum- 
stances which put their faith to the proof, they generally state the 
hypothesis of annihilation, together with that of a future being, and in 
such a manner as to render it dubious to which their minds inclined. 



87 

discipline. Whence, indeed, should they have had this con- 
ception, when, as Cicero expressly informs us, there was no- 
thing on which both the learned and the unlearned differed 
so much as on this, whether the gods pay any regard to the 
concerns of men ? 

I shall he believed when I say that I am not disposed to 
despise or undervalue the ancients ; but truth compels me to 
confess that their philosophy falls lamentably below the dis- 
coveries of revelation ; discoveries which he will value most 
who endeavours to ascertain what unassisted reason can do by 
carefully examining what it has done. 

E. C. 

Jan. 1820. M. R. vol. xv. 






TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — It was not my intention to say anything more on the 
doctrine of Necessity, but I seem called upon to add' a few 
words upon the subject : and they shall be as few as possible. 
Your ingenious correspondent Homo (p. 93) is of opinion 
that the question is to be resolved into consciousness. But I 
conceive that, without an appeal to consciousness, we may pro- 
nounce upon the truth of the following proposition, that a 
definite effect must have a definite cause. But your Corre- 
spondent further observes, that the doctrine of Necessity seems 
to exclude accountability altogether. To this I reply, that the 
doctrine of Necessity appears to me demonstrably true; and 
fact proves that man is an accountable being. In his journey 
through life he takes the consequences of his own conduct, and 
is in an important sense the author of his own happiness or 
misery. And what more than this need be understood by 
accountableness ? The following observation of Dr. Jebb 
seems to be rational, and, if just, is much to the purpose here : 
" Punishment (the Doctor means in the common sense of the 
term) is the annexing of something over and above the natural 
consequence of an action. But this addition, let divines say 
what they please, obtains not in a future state." But granting 



88 

that this observatioD is not just, does aeeountableness, in any 
sense of the term, imply that the actions of men proceed from 
a self-determining power of the will ? 

With respect to the objection of my friend Dr. Morell, 
(p. 86,) for the convenience of replying to it, I shall state it 
in the following terms : The moral feelings of mankind teach 
them that it is just that punishment should follow guilt, and 
therefore that man cannot be what the Necessitarian represents 
him. But do the moral feelings of mankind teach them that 
justice would demand the punishment of guilt, if the punish- 
ment could produce no beneficial effect ? Then their feelings, 
I conceive, reason faster than their understanding. See note 
in p. 70 of your last number. But do their feelings teach 
them that punishment would be more justly inflicted on a being 
constituted upon the principles of philosophical liberty, than 
on what is termed a necessary agent? Then their feelings 
teach them what is not true. The fact seems to be, that obser- 
vation and experience have caused the ideas of guilt and punish- 
ment to be so closely associated in our minds that we may 
imagine that we see or feel a connection between them which 
does not rest on the basis of utility, and which cannot be 
proved to exist. — Is the moral consciousness of which Dr. 
Morell speaks an innate feeling ? Is there reason to think 
that, if man had never seen punishment follow guilt, he would 
have inferred from his moral constitution that it ought to follow 
it ? If so, we need not, I think, object altogether to the doc- 
trine of innate principles. But is this feeling the result of 
experience ? Then it cannot teach us what experience does 
not teach ; and if we feel convinced that justice calls for the 
punishment of sin, though the punishment would be in every 
sense useless, it must be reason and not feeling which has 
taught us this lesson. Where, then, is the evidence of this 
proposition to be found ? But after all, is this feeling, if care- 
fully considered, anything more than an acquiescence in a law. 
of nature which is presumed to be wise and right ? Perhaps, 
indeed, there may be blended with this feeling a secret con- 
viction that the suffering which is the consequence of guilt is, 



89 

in a general view of it, beneficial ; a conviction which expe- 
rience can scarcely have failed to generate. At all events, it 
may be observed, that feelings are sometimes difficult things to 
analyse, and cannot be successfully opposed to what appear to 
be the clear and certain deductions of reason. I submit these 
hasty remarks to the consideration of my friend, and if they 
should appear satisfactory to his reflecting mind, I shall feel 
persuaded that they are just. E. 0. 

P. S. Does our moral consciousness teach us that there is a 
connection between guilt and punishment which is not founded 
on utility, but on the immutable fitness of things ? This, I 
think, my friend will hardly allow. 

Is there not reason to think that we sometimes lose sight of 
the origin of our moral notions, and overlook the medium by 
which ideas have been associated in our minds ? Is not this 
the case with those who imagine that they perceive virtue to" be 
intrinsically excellent, and vice intrinsically odious, all regard 
to their respective tendencies and effects being set aside ? 

March, 1820. M. R. vol. xv. 






TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — It has sometimes been objected to Unitarianism that 
it is a cold and philosophical system, which by no means lays 
the same hold on the feelings with those views of religion 
which are denominated Calvinistic. This objection I wish 
briefly to consider. And in reply to it, I should say, that the 
true test of religious feeling, I mean that feeling which alone 
is valuable, is a good and holy life. Now, if Unitarians, as a 
body, fall below their fellow-professors in the practice of 
Christian virtue, some presumption may be derived hence 
against their doctrine. But this, I trust, is not the fact; nor 
is this, I believe, alleged against them. Having premised thus 
much, I do not wish to deny, that the Calvinistic system is 
calculated to make a stronger impression on the feelings than 



90 

the simpler doctrine of the Unitarian. And fiction, in like 
manner, often has the advantage over truth in the power of 
impressing the imagination and the heart. But what are the 
feelings which this system addresses, and which it so power- 
fully affects ? Chiefly and peculiarly the feelings of appre- 
hension and terror. And certainly it is not less calculated to 
overwhelm the soul with horror than to confound wad prostrate 
the understanding. But it will be said, that by the economy 
of Kedemption it calls forth in the sincere believer the liveliest 
emotions of gratitude and joy. Be it so. But does it follow 
hence that the views on which these affections are founded are 
correct? Then we must establish a new test of truth; and 
those opinions must be considered as most likely to be theo- 
retically just by which the feelings are most deeply interested. 
But is there, then, nothing in the Unitarian doctrine upon 
which the human heart can fix with a warmth of religious 
affection ? I trust that the experience of many of its pro- 
fessors can bear witness, that, by the views which it gives of 
the Divine Being, it lays a foundation for that sacred admira- 
tion of his character which cannot be long cherished without 
terminating in love to him ; and that, by the representations 
which it exhibits of the Divine government, it encourages the 
most cheerful trust in Providence, and an unqualified sub- 
mission to the will of God. And though it directs every sen- 
timent that can properly be termed devotional to the Universal 
Parent alone, it leaves room for that affectionate regard to Jesus 
Christ which will constrain the sincere believer to keep his 
commandments. 

I now propose to inquire, whether the mere ardent feelings 
which are inspired by the Calvinistic doctrine can justly be 
considered as a moral benefit ? And in this inquiry I would 
first ask, Are the feelings in question excited by practical 
principles ? If not, it is fair to conclude, that they are prac- 
tically useless. Calvinism, indeed, by the instrumentality of 
terror, may sometimes secure a greater degree of attention to 
religion than the milder doctrine of the Unitarian will usually 
direct to it. And this appears to be the only imaginable ad- 



91 

vantage to which the system can lay claim. But it may bear a 
question, whether what is gained in point of strong impression 
will make any compensation for what is lost by encumbering a 
system of plain practical truths with dark and inexplicable 
mysteries. But in relation to the present inquiry it is worthy 
of remark, that feelings which elevate the mind much above 
its ordinary tone cannot be long sustained, and consequently 
that the sum of devotional feeling in the serious-minded Uni- 
tarian may not be less than in the serious Calvinist, though the 
former may not experience the occasional fervours of the 
latter. And it may also be observed, without any imputation 
on the sincerity of our Galvinistic "brethren, that the appear- 
ance of religious feeling, which is exhibited in their religious 
exercises, may sometimes go beyond what is actually expe- 
rienced. A certain language founded on their system may be, 
and probably often is, employed, when the feelings of which it 
seems to be the natural expression are not in fact excited. 
But granting that these feelings are awakened whenever the 
language which is appropriate to them issues from the lips, yet 
when they have subsided, the mind may be left less sensible to 
the influence of those practical considerations which address 
themselves chiefly to the understanding. In connection with 
this remark I would observe, and the observation is by no 
means unimportant, that when strong religious feelings are 
excited by mysterious doctrines that have no necessary relation 
to practice, there is danger lest the concerns of morality should 
be regarded as uninteresting and of small comparative value. 
And that this is not an imaginary danger seems sufficiently 
proved by fact. To the great majority of Calvinistic professors 
the moral part of religion does not appear to present a subject 
of interesting reflection. And the preacher, who should make 
it his primary business to illustrate and enforce that bright 
assemblage of virtues which constitutes the Christian character, 
would be soon suspected of not being sound in the faith, and 
would probably be left in a short time to deliver his lectures on 
dry morality to empty pews. A Calvinist, I cheerfully con- 
fess, may love virtue, as a man, and may practise it, as a 



92 

Christian ; but as a Calvinist, he cannot regard it with the 
interest with which it will be regarded by the consistent Uni- 
tarian. He holds it, indeed, to be essential to the favour of 
God ; but his notions of original depravity and the regenera- 
ting influence of the Spirit place it out of the sphere of human 
exertion ; not to say that the atoning sacrifice and imputed 
righteousness of Christ seem to do away the necessity of 
labouring to attain that for the want of which so extraordinary 
a compensation has been made. In the estimation of the Uni- 
tarian, on the other hand, virtue is, strictly speaking, a human 
attainment, resulting naturally and necessarily from the proper 
exercise of the human powers, and, in itself considered, the 
object of Divine approbation and complacency. 

But to return from this digression, I observe, once more, 
that where great stress is laid upon fervours of religious affec- 
tion, there is no small danger lest the character should be 
estimated by them; than which no error can be more preju- 
dicial to the interests of Christian virtue. In the opinion of 
the Calvinist, the most upright and holy life is but an equivocal 
evidence that the work of grace has been carried on in the 
heart. Certain feelings must be experienced before this evi- 
dence can be pronounced to possess any value. But it is easy 
to see that a man who is not enamoured of moral rectitude 
may not unnaturally fall into the error of laying more stress 
on the requisite feelings than on the practice which ought to 
accompany them ; and I am greatly mistaken if it is not much 
easier to obtain the one than to observe the other. But after 
all, it will be said that Calvinism, by means of the powerful 
impression which it makes on the imagination and feelings, 
has a great effect upon the lower orders of society, and has 
been the happy means of reclaiming many from vicious irre- 
gularities to sobriety and decency of conduct. This I believe 
to be true ; and it seems to furnish something like an expla- 
nation of a phenomenon, which to the Unitarian might appear 
extraordinary and perplexing; namely, that what he regards 
as a gross corruption of Christianity should have spread so 
widely and prevailed so long. To this system, however, he 



93 

believes that the progress of mental improvement must one 
day be fatal ; and he is at liberty to believe, that by that time 
the Christian world in general may have attained sufficient 
refinement to allow its full efficacy to the simple doctrine of 
the gospel, when stripped of the awful mysteries and adven- 
titious terrors with which it has been encompassed by the mis- 
apprehension of man. E. 0. 

Walthamstotv, May 20, 1820. M. K. vol. xv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — The Calvinist has sometimes urged against the Uni- 
nitarian, that he thinks and speaks too lightly of the evil of 
sin. Does not the fundamental error of Calvinism lie in at- 
tributing to sin a degree of malignity which does not appertain 
to it ? * 

Sin, says the Calvinist, is an infinite evil, because it is com- 
mitted against an infinite Being. Hence he infers that it 
deserves an infinite punishment, and that this punishment 
must be suffered unless an infinite satisfaction be made to the 
justice of God, which satisfaction can only be made by an 
infinite Being. 

Now, as there is not one word of all this in Scripture, but 
the doctrine which is here presented is a merely human expla- 
nation of what Scripture is supposed to teach, if upon inquiry 
it should appear altogether destitute of reason, no impartial 
man will doubt what is the just and necessary inference. I 
mean to examine these propositions in their order, and I sin- 
cerely wish that our Calvinistic brethren would fairly and can- 
didly discuss the subject with us. If I am wrong, it does not 
indeed follow that their interpretation of the language of Scrip- 
ture must be accepted ; but if I am right, the whole of their 
system necessarily falls to the ground. 

* On the malignity of sin, see Dr. Cogan's " Theological Disquisition 
on the Characteristic Excellencies of Christianity," pp. 543-549. 



94 

Sin is an infinite evil, because it is committed against an 
infinite Being. But by whom is it committed ? The propo- 
sition, to be fairly stated, ought to stand thus : sin, which is 
committed by a finite against an infinite Being, is an infinite 
evil. It would then be just as reasonable to say that sin is a 
finite evil because it is committed by a finite being, as to say 
that it is an infinite evil because the Being against whom it is 
committed is infinite. In fact, the only intelligible rule by 
which the evil of sin can be estimated, is the mischief which 
it does, or the misery which it produces. Does it then, neces- 
sarily, and from its own nature, produce infinite misery,* or is 
infinite misery judicially annexed to it by the Creator ? The 
former will not be maintained, and to assume the latter, is to 
beg the question. But the criminality of an offence, in rela- 
tion to the offender, is universally estimated by the powers of 
his understanding, and the means of knowledge and improve- 
ment which he has enjoyed. And if it is deemed impossible 
for him to have had any just conception of the moral turpitude 
of the offence, his guilt is justly considered as proportionably 
extenuated. But is it possible for the finite mind of man to 
comprehend the enormity of an infinite offence ? If not, the 
guilt of such an offence can never be charged upon him. But 
what is sin in itself considered ? A deviation from rectitude 
and virtue. And if the slightest neglect of the perfect law of 
God (whether intentional or otherwise) is an infinite offence, 
and that it must be according to the axiom, what shall we say 
to the bold and daring act of iniquity ? Is this more than an 

* The Calvioistic argument is, not that sin is an infinite evil because 
it produces infinite misery, but that infinite misery will follow it 
because it is an infinite evil. Should it be said that sin, considered in 
the abstract, is an infinite evil as it is committed against an infinite Being, 
I should reply, that it will be time enough to consider this position 
when sin shall be committed in the abstract. Sin is necessarily 
relative, and, to be justly considered, must be considered in connec- 
tion with the offending party as well as with the Being against whom 
the offence is committed. On the question whether sin is an infinite 
evil, see Keasons for rejecting the Calvinistic Theology, in the Monthly 
Bepository, vol. x., pp. 23, 24. 



95 

infinite offence, or are we, with the Stoics of old, to maintain 
that all sins are equal ? 

" Sensus moresque repugnant ; 
Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et cequi." 

But I would further ask, whether it be possible for man to 
avoid sin in every form ? If not, sin is so far the inevitable 
result of his imperfect nature ; which nature, according to the 
Calvinistic reasoning, must itself be infinitely evil. But shall 
this be predicated of anything of which God is the author ? 
I have not, indeed, forgotten what is said concerning Adam as 
the federal head of his offspring. But did Adam proceed from 
the hands of his Creator a being morally perfect ? If so, how 
came he to fall ? If not, and he had in his constitution the 
seeds and stamina of sin, he had in him an infinite evil. With 
regard to what is said respecting the abuse of free-will, in the 
first parent of our race, I must be excused discussing that 
question here. 

But sin, because it is an infinite evil, deserves an infinite 
punishment. That is, an infinite punishment is due to even 
the slightest transgression of the perfect law of God in a frail 
and imperfect creature, and this punishment is to be awarded 
by the Creator ! I shall only observe on this proposition, that 
if the premises are false, the conclusion cannot stand. 

But let us proceed to consider the next proposition, that the 
sinner must suffer an infinite punishment unless an infinite 
satisfaction be made to the justice of God. — In this proposition. 
it is intimated that something distinct from the punishment of 
the offender may satisfy the claims of justice. But does jus- 
tice demand, or does it not demand, that sin, being an infinite 
evil, should be followed by an infinite suffering; and does it 
demand, or does it not, that where the guilt has been incurred, 
there the punishment should fall? And if it does demand 
this, and such demand is consistent with the justice of God, 
which, in common with his other attributes, must be infinite, 
the demand itself must be infinitely just. And to what prin- 
ciple can such a demand give place ? If it be said that justice 



96 

sometimes yields to mercy, I answer, that were justice what the 
present argument supposes it to be, it never would yield to it, 
and that when it does so yield, it does not demand an equiva- 
lent satisfaction. But what is the nature of the satisfaction 
required ? It is even that the suffering due to sin should be 
transferred to one by whom the guilt could not be contracted, 
in order that by this exchange the guilty should escape. Thus 
this stem and unrelenting principle, which will have nothing- 
short of an infinite punishment for the offences of a finite 
being, and which infinite benevolence cannot prevail upon to 
relinquish one iota of its claims, can suffer its demands to be 
altogether set aside as far as concerns the offender, and, pro- 
vided the sin be punished, can permit the sinner to go free ! 
The present proposition may be dismissed when two questions 
have been asked: What is justice but a modification of bene- 
volence ? What are the only intelligible ends of punishment ? 
But the required satisfaction can only be made by an infinite 
Being. Then we might have pronounced the case to be hope- 
less, since, except the Deity, an infinite being does not exist. 
Against this objection, however, the Calvinistic system provides 
by a wonderful expedient. The second person * of that mys- 
terious Trinity into which the Divine nature is distributed, 
undertakes to make the demanded satisfaction. And to whom 
does he make this satisfaction ? Doubtless to the other two 
and to himself. And how is this satisfaction made ? By his 
union with a mortal man who expired upon a cross. Did the 
divine nature of Christ, then, suffer in the stead of sinners, 
or of the elect, all that they would have suffered to all eternity? 

* What is the meaning of the term person in this use of it ? Is 
there not reason to think that this term, used confessedly without a 
definite signification, is retained as convenient, because when the 
Father and the Son are represented as doing what nothing but in- 
telligent agents could do, the term person allows them to be con- 
sidered as such ; but when, on the other hand, the doctrine itself is 
the subject of inquiry, it is conceived that the charge of Tritheism 
may be eluded by pleading that the term person is not intended to 
denote an intelligent being or agent ? 



97 

If not, the full demands of justice have not been satisfied, and 
sin consequently cannot he forgiven. Did the Divinity suffer 
at all ? If not, where is the value of the sacrifice which has 
been offered? Could the death of a human, finite being, 
make a satisfaction for that which is pronounced to be an 
infinite offence, and for which it is affirmed that none but an 
infinite being could atone ? 

If the primary proposition that sin is an infinite evil is 
shown to be false, every conclusion which is drawn from it 
necessarily falls to the ground. In like manner, if it appears 
that an infinite satisfaction has not been made for the sins of 
mankind, those reasonings which are advanced to prove such a 
satisfaction necessary, must be fallacious. Now, unless the 
Deity himself suffered (which few, I trust, in the present day 
will choose to affirm), such a satisfaction has not been and 
could not be made. Whatever was the nature of the union 
between the second person of the Trinity and the man Christ 
Jesus, it did not extend to the grand object for which Kuman 
nature was assumed, and while the man suffered, the divinity 
remained untouched. — But the man was ennobled by being 
the residence of the Deity. Was his nature thereby changed 
from finite to infinite ? If not, his death was the death of a 
finite being, and could no more make an infinite satisfaction 
for sin than the death of any other man. And to say that it 
was accepted as a sacrifice of infinite value, would only be to 
say that it was accepted for that which it was not. — But it 
teaches in a striking manner the evil of sin, and the abhor- 
rence in which it is held by an infinitely holy God. These do 
not appear to be natural inferences from the sufferings of one 
who knew no sin, and I confess that my mind would be 
directed to some very different conclusion. — But it vindicated 
the honour of the Divine government, and rendered it compa- 
tible with justice, that sin should be forgiven. In the first 
place, it has never been proved to be inconsistent with justice, 
that the punishment of sin should upon repentance be remitted. 
In the next place, it can never be shown that the honour of the 
Divine government would not be sufficiently maintained by 



98 

withholding pardon from the impenitent ; and, finally, there 
is no intelligible connection between the expedient which is 
supposed to have been employed, and the end which is said to 
have been effected. But in order to show more clearly that 
the sufferings of Christ were not a satisfaction to Divine jus- 
tice for the sins of mankind, I observe, that in order that 
justice should be satisfied, the end answered by the death of 
Christ must be the same, as far as justice is concerned, as would 
have been answered if justice had taken its natural course, and 
the supposed satisfaction had not been made. Thus, if the ob- 
ject of justice had been to promote the moral improvement and 
happiness of mankind, and the same end was answered equally 
well by the death of Christ, it might with some propriety have 
been said, that justice was satisfied by his sufferings. But jus- 
tice, in the case supposed, demanded that the sinner should be 
consigned to everlasting punishment, and the end proposed by 
the sufferings of Christ was, that he should not suffer at all. 
If justice can accept such a satisfaction as this, it is not the 
inexorable principle which at first it appeared to be. — But as 
Christ suffered in his own person what was due to sinners, jus- 
tice has no further demand upon them. Is it, then, indifferent 
to justice who suffers, provided the due quantum of suffering be 
endured, and also indifferent with what view the suffering be 
inflicted, whether to punish the guilty or to exempt them from 
punishment ? — But justice may so far yield to mercy as to ac- 
cept the sufferings of the innocent for the punishment of the 
guilty. Suppose the contrary were affirmed, who could refute 
the affirmation ? But if justice is not a branch of benevolence, 
and its demand of an infinite punishment for an infinite offence 
is founded, as the Calvinistic argument supposes, on the immu- 
table fitness of things, mercy, if by mercy be meant a disposi- 
tion to pardon the guilty, cannot exist in a Being infinitely 
wise and infinitely just. And if it did exist, what would it 
have to plead against the demands of eternal and unchange- 
able rectitude? — But the death of Christ displayed the evil of 
sin in a manner not less awful than if the sinner had suffered 
in his own person. But the demand of justice was, not that 



99 

the sinner should witness the evil of sin, but that he should 
suffer the evil of it in everlasting punishment. But why was 
the evil of sin thus awfully displayed ? The answer must he 
to promote the moral improvement and happiness of mankind. 
Justice, then, has a view to utility, and the ground of the ar- 
gument is withdrawn. But is not the evil of sin sufficiently 
displayed in the everlasting sufferings of myriads of the human 
race ? And as these remain under the curse, justice has ob- 
tained an everlasting triumph over mercy. Justice has had its 
satisfaction for the salvation of the redeemed, and mercy has 
gratuitously consented that the great majority of mankind 
should be doomed to perdition. And are we called upon to 
believe that both these attributes are infinite ? In a word, ac- 
cording to the Calvinistic reasoning, an attribute which is deno- 
minated justice, is the grand moral perfection of the Deity, 
to which the essential benevolence of his nature is compelled 
to yield. What could be intended when it was said that 
"God is Love"? E.'C. 

October, 1820. M. K vol. xv. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — In the year 1796, I printed a small pamphlet on the 
" Evidences of Christianity." It was thought of favourably at 
the time by persons of whose judgment I had a good opinion. 
I have since been asked, whether it would not be desirable that 
I should reprint it. To this I should for several reasons object. 
The suh stance of it, however, will be found in the following 
observations, which, if they appear to you to be useful, you will 
not, perhaps, think out of place in your Bepository. 

The Christian religion has existed for about 1800 years; 
and previous to this period it did not exist. It derives its 
origin from a person called Jesus Christ, who lived in Judea, 
and was crucified by Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor. A 
short time after the death of its founder, it was preached in 

H 2 



100 

the Roman Empire by a few of his followers, and gained 
increasing credit and establishment, till at length it attained a 
decided pre-eminence above the Pagan religion and worship 
which had prevailed there for many ages, and which it finally 
overthrew. This conversion of the Pagans to Christianity 
must be considered as one of the most signal revolutions 
which ever took place upon earth, and is an event of which 
every philosophical mind must wish to know the real and 
proper causes. The only history which appears to account 
for this singular phenomenon is that of the New Testament; 
and this history consists of a clear and distinct narrative of 
facts, which, if admitted, will readily explain this extraor- 
dinary revolution. Hence arises a claim which this history 
lays to our attention, and likewise a strong presumption in its 
favour ; as it must be allowed to stand in a very different pre- 
dicament from a narrative of facts which will account for no 
existing phenomenon, and of which no monument, except the 
historical testimony, is extant. This presumption is corro- 
borated by the consideration, that, as far as appears from the 
evidence of history, it was the credit that was actually given 
to the facts in question which caused the gradually-increasing 
diffusion and establishment of Christianity.* 

Dr. Priestley, in his " Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever " 
(a work truly inestimable), has the following paragraph : 
" With respect to hypotheses, to explain appearances of any 
kind, the philosophical Christian considers himself as bound 
to admit that which (according to the received rules of phi- 
losophising or reasoning) is the most probable; so that the 

* Let us suppose that we knew nothing of the early history of 
Christianity, but merely understood that it commenced at the time at 
which its origin is dated, that it gradually subverted the idolatry of the 
Heathen world, and that wherever it came it carried with it a pure 
system of morality, and inspired a confident assurance of a life to come. 
Let the Christian Scriptures be put into our hands with proper evi- 
dence of their authenticity. Should we not think that we had found 
the true cause of an extraordinary phenomenon ? Or should we think 
that the volume ought to be rejected because it professed to give the 
narrative of a divine interposition ? 



10.1 

question between him and other philosophers is, whether his 
hypothesis or theirs will best explain the known facts, such as 
are the present belief of Judaism and Christianity, and also 
the belief of them in the earliest ages to which they can be 
traced." With deference to an authority which I so highly 
respect, I should rather say, that until the New Testament his- 
tory has been shown to be unworthy of credit, every hypothesis 
to explain the origin and progress of Christianity is unneces- 
sary, and consequently undeserving of attention. 

Let it then be considered by what methods, and by what 
alone, the credit of this history can be subverted. First, by 
proving the testimony in favour of the facts to be defective 
and equivocal. Secondly, by showing the facts themselves to 
be incredible. Thirdly, by demonstrating, that, if the facts 
had taken place, different consequences must have followed. 
Fourthly, by proving that the existence and progress of Chris- 
tianity are to be attributed to causes altogether independent of 
the truth of the facts recorded in the history under consider- 
ation. 

In order to prove the testimony to be false or deficient, it 
must be shown, that there is not the same reason to believe 
the genuineness of the books of the New Testament as of 
other books of equal antiquity ; or that the facts which are re- 
corded in them are of such a nature as to exclude certainty of 
information; or that the historians had no proper opportunity of 
ascertaining their reality ; or that, from certain rules of decision 
admitted in other cases, there is reason to conclude that the 
veracity of these historians may justly be called in question. 
But if it appear that the gospel-history will abide the test of 
this inquiry, it must be concluded that no objection can be 
urged against the testimony, in itself conside?*ed. And let it 
be remarked, that this testimony, which is now supposed to 
have borne a fair and strict examination, is strongly corro- 
borated by the original presumption in favour of the facts 
which has already been stated. And that there should be this 
concurrence of presumption and testimony in favour of a mere 
imposture, must be considered as very extraordinary and im- 



102 

probable. Thus allowing, what has never been disproved, that 
the testimony, in itself considered, is not objectionable, the 
general evidence in favour of Christianity may be stated as fol- 
lows : — The New-Testament history possesses all the requisite 
marks of credibility. It contains the narrative of facts, the 
belief of which prevailed and extended itself in defiance of pre- 
j udice and opposition, and finally produced the most signal and 
important consequences; consequences which are experienced 
at the present hour. 

But in opposition to this historical and presumptive evidence, 
it may be alleged, that the facts recorded in the history under 
consideration are in themselves so incredible, as to be inad- 
missible upon testimony which in itself considered appears to 
be clear and unequivocal. It will be urged, that miracles are in 
their nature so very extraordinary, as to carry in themselves a 
refutation of any evidence by which they may appear to be 
attended. In reply to this objection, it is to be remarked, that 
a revelation is in itself a deviation from the order of nature, or, 
in other words, a miracle, and that it must be confirmed by 
other miracles in order to establish its truth. The question, 
then, respecting the credibility of the facts recorded in the gos- 
pel-history, resolves itself into the previous question, Is it credi- 
ble that God should communicate his will to mankind in an 
extraordinary and supernatural manner ? Now, let it be con- 
sidered on what grounds (I mean on the principles of Theism) 
it is possible to affirm the incredibility of such an interposition ; 
and these must be the three that follow : — that such an interpo- 
sition is contrary to experience ; to the Divine perfections as 
discoverable by the light of nature ; or to the conduct of the 
Divine Government, which acts not by special interposition, but 
by general laws. To say that a divine revelation is contrary to 
experience, unless general experience be intended, is evidently 
to beg the question ; and to maintain that it contradicts the 
attributes of the Deity, is to affirm much more than it would 
be possible to prove. And though God has appointed general 
laws for the government of his creatures, it by no means admits 
of demonstration that he will never interfere in an extraordinary 



103 

manner to effect purposes which could not be so well accom- 
plished by the operation of general appointments. Thus, in- 
stead of its being affirmed that miracles, or a divine revelation, 
are incredible, it ought rather to be said, that, judging from 
general experience and what we know of the Divine conduct, 
they are attended with that kind of improbability which it re- 
quires clear and unequivocal testimony to counterbalance. To 
pronounce them incredible is simply to affirm, what can never 
be proved, that the Author of nature had from the first deter- 
mined never to effect a deviation from the general course of na- 
ture. With respect, then, to the improbability of miracles, it 
may be observed, that it is an improbability of which we are 
incompetent judges, and which may, therefore, be surmounted 
by a certain force of testimony. And we find, in fact, that the 
highest degree of supposed improbability, arising merely from 
a want of experience, is perpetually overcome by such evidence 
as is supposed to possess the proper recommendations to enforce 
belief. And it is further to be observed, that an improbability 
arising from the want of analogy, may be more or less credible 
according to the magnitude of the phenomena which are to be 
explained by the admission of it, A miracle which, if believed, 
accounts for no existing phenomenon, and a miracle, or set of 
miracles, which will explain a great and important effect for 
which a sufficient cause is wanting, must be allowed to be very 
differently circumstanced in point of credibility ; and it might 
be added, that a less degree of positive testimony will suffice to 
confirm the latter than what would be necessary to establish the 
former. Let me now ask, whether what appears to be an 
authentic record of miracles may not be admitted as containing 
the cause of a most extraordinary phenomenon, of which history 
offers no other explanation? As a further presumption in 
favour of miracles, it may be observed, that there are only two 
religions existing upon earth which profess to be established on 
miracles that were public and notorious ; namely, the Jewish 
and the Christian ; and there appertain to both these religions 
circumstances which are best explained upon the supposition 
that they are really divine. The Jews, it is acknowledged, 



104 

were inferior to other nations in every species of polite litera- 
ture and in general science. And yet, though surrounded by 
idolaters, they maintained, as a community, the Unity of God, 
and entertained more exalted views of the Divine perfections 
than even the wisest philosophers of the most polished nations. 
The Christian religion is confessedly the most pure and philo- 
sophical that ever appeared upon earth ; containing principles 
most highly beneficial to the general interests of mankind, and 
presenting a standard of morality to which no objection can be 
made. And it may safely be observed, that these extraordinary 
facts are best accounted for by admitting the miracles of the 
Old and New Testament, and that they are striking confirma- 
tions of their truth. But before I quit the subject of miracles, 
I ought to notice the objection of Mr. Hume, that no testimony 
can justify the belief of a miracle, since the falsehood of human 
testimony can never be more miraculous than the truth of the 
fact which it professes to establish. But the fallacy of this ob- 
jection will be apparent if we consider that the falsehood of 
testimony in certain circumstances would be impossible, with- 
out a violation of the order of nature. But such a violation 
of this order, a violation which could be referred to no cause, 
and could answer no beneficial end, would be far more inex- 
plicable, and therefore far more incredible than a set of miracles 
which are expressly attributed to God as their author, and from 
which a great and important effect has followed. 

But it may be objected, that, allowing the validity of the 
testimony, and admitting likewise the credibility of the facts, 
the New-Testament history cannot be received by the philo- 
sophical inquirer, since, if the facts there recorded had really 
taken place, different consequences must have followed, and all 
Judea and the Boman Empire must have been immediately con- 
verted to the Christian faith. This objection it seems, does not 
deny that the truth of the gospel-history is a sufficient cause of 
the revolution which was effected by Christianity, but simply 
affirms, that the progress of this revolution must have been 
more rapid had the facts been real. But as the sufficiency of 
the cause to which the Christian ascribes the origin and diffu- 



105 

sion of Christianity is by the very objection acknowledged, 
those reasonings must be very clear and forcible which will 
oblige him to reject it. But that the objection is by no means 
decisive will appear from the following observations. Few 
comparatively could have been eye-witnesses of the miracles 
in question. Prejudices of the strongest kind against Chris- 
tianity existed among both Jews and Gentiles. Now that 
these prejudices will not account for the slow and partial pro- 
gress of Christianity, allowing it to have been as slow and as 
partial as any unbeliever will maintain it to have been, can 
never be proved, unless it can be demonstrated that no preju- 
dice can resist the credible report of miracles. But on what 
data this demonstration is to proceed, it will be difficult to say. 
The mind is certainly indisposed to receive any fact in propor- 
tion as it is averse to the conclusion which is to be admitted 
upon the belief of the fact; and with certain prejudices, and 
in certain circumstances, it is probable that no evidence of testi- 
mony would be attended to. Paine, I think, somewhere^ says, 
that he would not have believed the resurrection of Jesus with- 
out ocular and manual demonstration ; and yet he too urges the 
unbelief of the Jews, as a proof that the event never took place. 
It may here be further observed, that they who were not con- 
verted to Christianity in the earlier ages of the Christian his- 
tory, must have remained unbelievers, either because their pre- 
judices did not allow them to pay any proper attention to the 
subject, or because they knew the falsehood of the pretended 
miracles on which Christianity depends. If the latter alterna- 
tive be adopted, how comes it to pass that it should not appear 
upon the slightest evidence, that the truth of these miracles 
had ever been disproved ? If these observations do not remove 
the objection, it may be asked, How can the belief of those 
who did receive Christianity be accounted for, upon supposition 
that the facts on which it professes to depend, are false ? It 
may perhaps be replied, that this fact may be explained by the 
natural credulity of the human mind, and that love of the mar- 
vellous, which has shown itself in every age and nation. But 
will not the force of prejudice, equally natural to the human 



106 

mind, just as well account for the non- conversion of the 
remainder who were not converted ? 

I now proceed to the consideration of the fourth method by 
which the evidences of the Christian religion may he opposed ; 
by proving that the truth of the facts contained in the gospel- 
history, was not the real cause of the existence and progress of 
Christianity. And here it must be observed, that if the evidence 
in favour of this history had not been already invalidated, the 
contrary evidence must be very clear and convincing before it 
can with justice be rejected. Nothing, in fact, will avail but 
evidence, which shall be clearer and more authentic than can 
be produced in favour of the history, the credit of which is to 
be subverted. When the Christian is asked, how the great 
revolution which was effected by Christianity is to be accounted 
for, he immediately replies, by the evidence of the facts on 
which it professes to rest ; and he produces a history of these 
facts, which he maintains to be attended with all the requisite 
marks of genuineness and truth ; and if the unbeliever, with- 
out previously subverting the credit of this history, attempts 
to prove its falsehood, by unfolding the origin and explaining 
the progress of Christianity, it is obvious that this attempt must 
be made on the evidence of the clearest and most decisive testi- 
mony ; and that the causes to which the rise and establishment 
of Christianity shall be thus ascribed, must have no connection, 
even of the remotest kind, with the truth of the controverted 
facts. But it may now be proper to consider the causes to 
which the unbeliever, in the absence of historical testimony 
which might set aside the Christian records, must ascribe the 
origin and progress of Christianity ; and these must be the fol- 
lowing, imposture and credulity. On this hypothesis it may be 
observed, that it is gratuitous, and erected in opposition to his- 
torical testimony ; and that the exigence of the case does not 
require it. Moreover, the operation which is assigned to im- 
posture and credulity by the unbeliever, can never be proved to 
be conformable to analogy; though it might reasonably be 
expected that an hypothesis which should be assumed for no 
other purpose than to avoid admitting what contradicts analogy, 



107 

should possess the advantage of heing itself analogous to the 
ordinary course of events, and free from the difficulty which it 
was invented to avoid. But was it ever heard of since the 
world began, that an imposture, appealing to public facts, 
produced a total change in the religious associations of a large 
community ? And with respect to what imposture can effect, 
we must be allowed to judge by what it has effected. Upon the 
whole, the difference between the argument of the Christian 
and the hypothesis of the Unbeliever stands as follows : The 
Christian attributes the rise, progress and establishment of 
Christianity, to a cause which indeed contradicts analogy, but 
which is affirmed upon proper evidence to have existed. The 
Unbeliever erects, in opposition, an hypothesis not supported by 
testimony, and which can never be proved to be more conform- 
able to analogy than the very facts which it is invented to over- 
throw. Upon a review of the whole it must surely be con- 
cluded, that if Christianity is an imposture, it was the most 
happy in its contrivance, the most dexterous in its management, 
and the most magnificent in its effects that ever wrought upon 
the credulity of mankind. 

But before I quit the subject, it will be right to notice one or 
two objections to Christianity drawn not from a defect of testi- 
mony, or the incredibility of the facts, but from circumstances 
connected with this religion, and conclusions to be admitted 
by those who receive it. Of this kind are the following : The 
partial diffusion of this religion supposed to be divine; the 
incapacity of mankind in general to judge of its evidence ; and 
the little good which has followed its promulgation. 

Before I consider these objections separately, I shall premise 
an observation which will apply to them all, and which does not 
appear to have been sufficiently attended to ; which is this : that 
as the legitimate and proper method of attack is now relin- 
quished, and objections urged against Christianity which do not, 
strictly speaking, apply to it as a question of history, those 
principles must be clear and certain from which these objec- 
tions are derived. For in no case can this method of oppos- 
ing historical evidence be properly employed, except the axioms 



108 

which are thus brought in opposition to the testimony, are of 
such a nature that to reject them would be to bid defiance to 
the plainest conclusions of the human mind. Let the objec- 
tions above-mentioned be now separately considered. It is then 
said, that a religion which really proceeded from God, could 
never have been limited to a small number of the human race, 
but must, like the benevolence of its Author, have been 
extended to them all. To this it may be replied, that a grada- 
tion of privilege is the favourite law of nature, and that moral 
advantages are, in fact, allotted to mankind in very different 
degrees: so that the objection, if it has any force, must be 
urged not against Christianity, but against the whole economy 
of the Divine government. 

But it is further affirmed, that the generality of mankind are 
not qualified to determine upon the evidences of the Christian 
religion, and that it cannot be supposed that a religion should 
proceed from God, of which the proof should not be equally 
clear and intelligible to all. This objection, like the preceding, 
has the misfortune to contradict a general principle of the 
Divine administration. It is a fact, that the lower classes of 
mankind, who have not leisure and ability to inquire into the 
evidence of important truth, depend for information upon those 
superior classes who possess the opportunities which are denied 
to them. And whatever had been the evidence of the Christian 
religion, multitudes in the lowest station of society, must have 
still remained incompetent judges of its truth, unless a per- 
petual miracle had been wrought to remedy the inconvenience. 
But it may be further observed, that the most ignorant, as well 
as the best-informed of men, are capable of feeling the prac- 
tical influence of Christianity, which is far more important than 
deciding upon its evidence. 

But we are now to encounter an objection apparently more 
formidable and alarming, that Christianity has been the cause 
of great and public evils, and that it is altogether problem- 
atical whether it has done more good or harm to the cause 
which it professes to promote — that of virtue and happiness. 
Admitting the objection for a moment in all its force, it may be 



109 

replied, that the evil which has resulted from Christianity has 
been purely adventitious, and that it is some argument of its 
excellence if it has done any good at all, amidst the general 
perversion of its principles, and the enormous load of absurdity 
with which it has been encumbered. And it will be allowed by 
judicious inquirers, that Christianity is now better understood 
than it has been for many ages, and that by the aid of learning 
and criticism its genuine principles have been unfolded, and 
their unadulterated excellence displayed; so that it must be 
admitted to be probable, that the evil complained of will be 
gradually diminished ; and should the time arrive when Christi- 
anity shall be professed in its primitive purity, consisting 
simply of the doctrines of a perfect Deity, an overruling Provi- 
dence, a future retribution, and the immortality of man,* it is 

* On the doctrine of a future life, which is the great discovery of 
the gospel, I have one or two queries to propose : Does the evidence of 
nature disprove the doctrine 1 This will not, I think, be pretended. 
Does nature clearly reveal this doctrine % This has been affirmed (but 
I must be excused if I add that it has been only affirmed) by men 
whose talents and character demand respect. Did nature fully disclose 
this doctrine to the wise men of antiquity 1 Let the learned Valcke- 
naer answer the question : " Quidquid optimi philosophorum, Socrates 
et Cicero, de immortalitate animae loquuntur, merse tantum sunt fluc- 
tuationes. Christiani demum de hoc dogmate certo fuerunt persuasi. 
Hinc sestimari poterit," adds this great man, "quam exiguam vim 
habuerint eximia Gentilium prsecepta ethica, quippe hanc ferme vitam 
tantum spectantia." Does nature by the constitution of the human 
mind, and the phenomena of the moral world, suggest the hope of a 
life to come ] This hope Christianity is designed and admirably cal- 
culated to confirm. And, after having reflected upon the subject much 
and seriously through the greater part of my life, I venture to give my 
decided opinion, that, unless the doctrine of future existence can be 
proved to be false or incredible, the Christian religion, supported as it 
is by the strongest direct and presumptive evidence, cannot rationally 
be rejected. That the subject is not without its difficulties, I do not 
wish to dissemble. It seems, indeed, to be the general fate of moral 
truths, that when they appear to be satisfactorily established, some 
difficulty should remain which may form the ground of objection. 
This observation applies (as, I think, Bishop Watson has also remarked) 
even to that truth which of all truths seems to rest on the surest 
foundation, the being of a God. And it will sometimes happen, that 



110 

difficult to see what evil could arise, directly or indirectly, from 
such a religion. Indeed, if this is not religion, there is no such 
thing. And if these doctrines are admitted at all, it is difficult 
to conceive that their influence should be more injurious in con- 
sequence of their being received upon the evidence of fact. It 
may further be remarked in reply to the objection before us, 
that before it can be urged with effect against Christianity, two 
difficult questions must be decided. First, as evil must be sup- 
posed to attend everything which passes through the hands of 
such an imperfect creature as man, what balance of good may 
reasonably be expected from a divine revelation ? Secondly, 
What is the precise balance between the good which has 
resulted from Christianity and the evil to which it has incident- 
ally given rise ? 

I submit these reflections to your readers, trusting that they 
are just in the main, and that they may be of some service to 
the impartial inquirer in enabling him to decide upon the evi- 
dences of a religion which has been justly characterized as the 
best gift of God to man. E. C. 

Jan., Feb., 1821. M. R. vol. xvi. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — In addition to the remarks on the External Evi- 
dences of Christianity, which you did me the favour to publish 
(pp. 1-3 and 84-87), I am induced to transmit to you a few 
observations on certain circumstances appertaining to this 
religion which may be regarded as presumptions of its truth. 
But I would first remark, that if God should think fit to 

an objection which has but little weight when contrasted with the 
evidence to which it is opposed, will be more intelligible to general 
apprehension than the answer, and will supply a topic of plausible 
declamation to those who find it easier to declaim than to reason. But 
in all cases the preponderance of evidence ought to be allowed to turn 
the scale. Have unbelievers, in general, appeared solicitous to hold the 
balance with an impartial hand ? 



Ill 

interfere in an extraordinary manner in the government of the 
world, it is reasonable to believe that such interference would 
be directed to some great and important object. Whether any 
such object has been proposed or effected by the Christian 
revelation, will speedily appear. 

I observe, then, that one grand and avowed object of Chris- 
tianity was to deliver mankind from the idolatry that prevailed 
in the world at the time of its promulgation, and to establish in 
its stead the knowledge and worship of the one living and 
true God. And this object has been gloriously accomplished. 
That this was one of the great purposes which Christianity 
was intended to answer, is explicitly stated by the Apostle 
Paul, in his manly address to his auditors at Athens, an 
address which may almost be considered as prophetic of the 
extensive diffusion of Christianity, and of the effects by which 
its propagation would be followed. It may, perhaps, be said, 
that nature so clearly teaches the being, unity, and perfections 
of God, that, without the aid of revelation, mankind must in 
time have emancipated themselves from idolatry and supersti- 
tion, and have attained to all necessary and useful knowledge 
of the Creator. What they could have done for themselves is 
by no means certain ; what has been done for them is manifest 
and unquestionable. And it is also indisputable, that, where 
the light of revelation was withheld, they had made but very 
small advances towards the attainment of the knowledge in 
question. On such a point it would be folly to speak with 
confidence; but I doubt exceedingly, whether, without the 
assistance of revelation, the bulk of mankind would at any 
period have arrived at the conception that there is one God 
only, and that God a being of infinite perfection. This con- 
ception seems to us easy and simple, and the evidence on 
which it rests 'to be irresistible. But the arguments by which 
it is supported, exclusive of revelation, are not adapted to the 
level of every mind. The fundamental proposition that con- 
trivance implies a contriver, is indeed a proposition of which 
every man can perceive the force ; but much more than this 
must have been apprehended before we could have reached the 



112 

sublime view of the Deity which is conveyed in the volume of 
revelation. Perhaps it will be objected, that the great majority 
of Christians do not, properly speaking, believe the unity of 
God, and that their views of his character are far from being 
consistent and honourable. This is unhappily too true. But 
the Christian Scriptures contain the remedy for the evil ; and 
the time cannot fail to come when the evil will be remedied. 
Nor can it reasonably be doubted but that the time will also 
come when idolatry in every form will be banished from the 
face of the earth, and that by the sole influence of the Chris- 
tian revelation. 

But another avowed object of Christianity was to teach the 
doctrine of future life and retribution; and this object it has 
most fully accomplished. Wherever its light has been diffused, 
it has shed its beams over the darkness of the grave, and has 
inspired not only the hope, but the assurance of immortality. 
And this may be regarded as some presumption of its truth, if 
we reflect, that were we now, for the first time, informed that 
God had given a revelation of Iris will to men, our first inquiry 
would probably be, whether this revelation professed to solve 
the grand problem, Is man intended to survive the grave ? 
And if he is in truth born for immortality, it surely were not 
unworthy of the Deity to interfere in an extraordinary manner 
to acquaint him with his high destination. It is indeed some- 
times said, that a revelation was not wanted to teach the 
doctrine of a future life, since this is taught with sufficient 
clearness in the volume of nature, and was confidently main- 
tained by the philosophers of old. On this subject I have 
given my opinion very explicitly on several occasions, and 
shall, therefore, not enlarge upon it now. I shall only remark, 
in relation to the ancient philosophers, that we have their 
arguments in our hands, and can therefore judge for ourselves 
of the conviction which they were likely to produce. I cannot, 
however, help adding an observation, in which I am confirmed 
by that great master of reasoning, Dr. Priestley, that the 
ancients did not employ the hope of immortality either as a 
motive to duty, or as a topic of consolation in those cases 



113 

where its influence would have been most seasonable and use- 
ful.* The inference from this fact (and a fact it is) is obvious 
and certain. 

But again, Christianity has established a pure and perfect 
system of morality. This, I trust, I may consider as granted. 
And it deserves observation, that the moral precepts which are 
laid down in the Christian Scriptures are delivered with a tone 
of authority which admirably accords with the supposition, 
that they who taught them were inspired. No premises are 
laid down from which certain conclusions are drawn ; there is 
no trace of an intellectual process by which the truth of cer- 
tain principles had been ascertained, but every precept is left 
to rest either on its own evidence, or on the acknowledged 
claims of the teacher by whom it is inculcated. And little as 
Christians in general have been disposed to practise the 
morality of their religion, that man must have been very un- 
fortunate in his social intercourse, who has not seen many 
instances in which the principles of Christianity have trained 
the sincere believer to as high a degree of moral excellence 
as human nature could be expected to attain. Some will 
object, that were Christianity divine, its efficacy would be more 
generally felt, and that its oelestial origin would clearly mani- 
fest itself in the lives of the great majority of its professors. 
Not now to inquire into the causes why its moral influence is 
not greater than it is, it will be sufficient to observe, that had 
it been the Divine intention that the human race at large 
should rapidly attain to the perfection of moral excellence, 
they would have been differently constituted to what they are. 
Forgetting the manifest plan of Providence, we demand more 
from Revelation than we had any just reason to expect from 

* I do not mean that, in the cases alluded to, they never make men- 
tion of a future existence. But when they make mention of it, it is 
merely as one branch of an alternative by which they endeavour to 
prove that death is not to be regarded as an evil. And how little they 
were themselves impressed with it, may be inferred with sufficient cer- 
tainty from the stress which they lay on other considerations which 
they conceived were calculated to mitigate the poignancy of grief. 

I 



114 

it, and then are apt to conclude that Christianity cannot be 
divine, because our demands have not been satisfied. But 
what I wished principally to remark in relation to the present 
subject was, the advantage of having a perfect standard of 
morality which is acknowledged to be divine. To say nothing 
of its influence upon individuals, it must have a happy effect 
in modifying the public opinion on all subjects connected with 
morality ; and he who knows the mighty influence which public 
opinion has upon human conduct will not think lightly of any- 
thing by which this powerful engine can be controlled and 
regulated. Will it be said that this high standard of morals 
has not governed public opinion in the degree which might 
have been expected from its divine authority ? I have virtually 
replied to this objection already. Suffice it then to say, that it 
has been the means of effecting a happy change in the man- 
ners and condition of mankind, and that it has a certain opera- 
tion even upon those who know little of its nature, and who 
feel no solicitude to conform their lives to its requisitions. 
But if the perfection of this standard be granted, the question 
may be put with irresistible force in relation to our Lord, 
Whence had this man this knowledge? 

My last observation respects the spirituality of the religious 
worship which is prescribed by Christianity. How prone man- 
kind have ever been to attach forms and ceremonies to religion, 
or rather to place religion in them, their history most fully 
shows. Even Christians, with the Scriptures in their hands, 
and in direct defiance of the genius of their religion, have 
appended numerous frivolities to the simple worship which 
alone can plead the authority of their great Master. He 
merely taught that God, as a Spirit, should be worshipped in 
spirit and in truth. Beyond this he enjoined nothing. But 
who was Jesus Christ as far as he was not a teacher sent from 
God ? A Jew, nursed in the bosom of a religion abounding 
with ceremonies, ceremonies to which he might have been ex- 
pected to feel the same attachment with the rest of his country- 
men. Yet, without questioning the divinity of the Mosaic 
ritual, without casting any reflection on the formalities which 



115 

he dismissed from his more pure and exalted system, he simply 
enjoins that God should be worshipped, and prescribes no for- 
malities with whieh his worship should be accompanied. With 
what hypothesis, but that of divine illumination, such a conduct 
can accord, I am altgether at a loss to conceive. Imposture is, 
I think, confessedly out of the question ; and that would be a 
very singular enthusiasm which should reject everything that 
could kindle the imagination, and which in its operation should 
surpass the ordinary effects of the most sober and enlightened 
reason. Upon the whole, the simplicity of the Christian wor- 
ship is as strong a presumption of the divine origin of the 
religion as can well be imagined, and must surely have its 
weight with every mind to which all presumptive reasoning is 
not addressed in vain. E. 0. 

March, 1821. M. R. vol. xvi. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — The perusal of certain papers in your Kepository, on 
the subject of Miracles, has led me to transmit to you one or 
two remarks, which, though not directly applicable to the 
observations of your correspondents, may not be altogether use- 
less. 

In inquiring into the truth of the miracles recorded in the 
New Testament, we ought to consider them as they are there 
represented, not as events without an author and without an 
object, but as events which are expressly referred to a Divine 
agency, and which were intended to answer a certain purpose. 
The resurrection of a man from the dead, regarded as an in- 
sulated event from which no conclusion could be drawn, and by 
which no object was effected, would require strong evidence 
indeed to render it credible. But the resurrection of a man as 
a pledge of the future existence of mankind, and as an event 
which was to lay the foundation of a theology which should 
change (and which has changed) the religion of the world, is 

12 



116 

very differently circumstanced. It is also to be considered, 
that if God should please to interfere in a supernatural manner 
in the government of the world, such interference would he 
miraculous, and must he supported by miracles as its proof. 
The question, then, respecting the probability or improbability 
of the Christian miracles resolves itself into the question, 
whether it be probable or improbable that God should step aside 
from the usual plan of his administration in such a manner and 
for such an object as is stated in the Christian Scriptures; 
and he who feels assured that such an interposition can be con- 
firmed by no testimony, may of course save himself the trouble 
of inquiring into the evidence of the facts by which it is sup- 
ported. But he who has not arrived at this assurance has 
nothing to do but to examine as impartially as he can the evi- 
dence which is laid before him, and to consider whether it is in 
itself worthy of credit. He will act unphilosophically if, at 
every step, he recurs to the antecedent improbability of mira- 
cles, (of which we are very incompetent judges,) in order to 
throw a suspicion upon evidence which appears to be convinc- 
ing and satisfactory. He should consider the testimony not so 
much relatively as absolutely ; and for this plain reason, be- 
cause he has no balance in which he can weigh the evidence of 
testimony against an antecedent improbability, so as to ascer- 
tain precisely when the latter is surmounted by the former.* 
In the case of a fact which we deem to be improbable, we are 

* I will here take the liberty to refer to an observation which I for- 
merly made on this subject. "In many cases man cannot wait to 
calculate between the strength of the evidence and the improbability 
of the fact ; and, in some cases, could he wait for ever, he would not 
know how to manage the calculation. And, conscious of his infirmity, 
he chooses, in such cases, rather to examine the validity of the testi- 
mony, of which he can judge with tolerable exactness, than to fatigue 
his faculties with endeavouring to balance the evidence which is laid 
before him against improbabilities, the force of which he cannot 
estimate. And in the case of Christianity, if he conceives himself to 
be an incompetent judge of the antecedent credibility of a divine reve- 
lation, his business is to inquire into the evidence with as much impar- 
tiality as he can, and to abide by the result of such inquiry." 



117 

scrupulous, and ought to be scrupulous, as to the validity of 
the testimony on which it rests ; hut we never pretend to apply 
a scale by which we can estimate improbability on the one hand, 
and the force of testimony on the other, in order to decide 
whether the fact is to be received. And in innumerable cases a 
high degree of supposed improbability is so completely over- 
come by the power of testimony, that it forms no deduction 
whatever from the confidence with which a fact is believed. 
Nothing is more common than to hear that such or such thing 
might have been thought impossible, but that, nevertheless, it 
is true. And the miracles of the New Testament ought to be 
inquired into in the same manner in which we inquire into the 
truth of any fact which we demand should be supported by clear 
and solid evidence. If the notion of such a divine interposi- 
tion as is recorded in the Christian Scriptures, carries its own 
refutation along with it, we need inquire no further. But if 
not, we ought to examine its evidence with strictness and im- 
partiality, and rest in the result of such examination. ~When 
I say that we ought to do this, I do not now mean morally, but 
philosophically. It is in this way that we judge of other facts, 
and if we refuse to judge of miracles on the same principle, we 
shall be in danger of rejecting what, to say the least, may be 
true, and what, if true, must be most interesting and important. 

E. 0. 

Nov., 1821. M. R. vol. xvi. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — One of the most plausible objections to the arguments 
for the being of a God is that which is suggested by Mr. 
Hume, namely, that we have no experience in the origin of 
worlds, and therefore cannot safely conclude, because ships, 
cities, &c, are made by human art, that the universe must 
have had an intelligent Author. This objection I propose to 
consider. 



118 

The universe exhibits in innumerable instances an adaptation 
of means to ends, or what, for the sake of brevity, I shall 
sometimes call contrivance, not meaning thereby to assume the 
matter in dispute. And this adaptation of means to ends 
seems to be as truly prospective as anything which we call con- 
trivance in the works of art. The eye appears to have been as> 
manifestly formed for seeing, as the telescope for assisting the 
vision of the eye. The universe, then, is justly comprehended 
in the general description of works which indicate a fitness of 
means to ends : and if I may not, in the case of the universe, 
call this fitness intentional, I must maintain that it is strictly 
analogous to the effects of intention in the works of art. As 
far as relates to the appearance of design, the works of art 
have no advantage over the works of nature. The question, 
then, is, why I should not apply to the latter the reasoning 
which I apply without hesitation, and, as it seems, without 
error, to the former. Is it not reasonable to maintain, as a 
universal truth, that such an adaptation of means to ends as 
was never known to be fortuitous must be referred to an in- 
telligent Author ? But I have had no experience in the origin 
of worlds. This is true ; nor is this experience needed. I 
have seen, in cases innumerable, the connection between in- 
tellect in a designing cause, and the marks of contrivance in 
the works which intellect has effected ; and unless the human 
mind must be denied the privilege of reasoning from the 
clearest analogies, I may safely infer that this connection must 
be universal. Contrivance is contrivance, wherever it be found ; 
and the connection between cause and effect is not more certain 
than the connection between an effect which indicates con- 
trivance, and an intelligent or designing cause. We gain our 
knowledge of both these connections in precisely the same 
manner, or rather they are virtually the same, the latter being 
only a specific modification of the former. But Mr. Hume 
says, that all that we can pretend to know concerning the 
connection of cause and effect is constant conjunction. That 
conjunction is all that we perceive is true; and a more harm- 
less truth was never made known to the world. For until some 



JN9 

disciple of Mr. Hume shall assign a better reason for constant 
conjunction than that the things thus conjoined are necessarily 
connected, the humau mind will go on to reason from effect to 
cause, as it did before Mr. Hume's discovery saw the light. 
Could Mr. Hume's observation disjoin what we see to be con- 
joined, it would do something; but the fact remains exactly as 
it was, and where we see that an effect is, there we cannot help 
concluding that a cause has been. And this is sufficient for 
all purposes of reasoning. And if any one shall choose to be- 
lieve that cause and effect are always conjoined but never con- 
nected ; for example, that, though a ball, when struck by a 
cricket-bat, is invariably put in motion, yet, for any necessity 
that operates, it might invariably remain at rest: he may, in- 
deed, enjoy the satisfaction of not thinking with the vulgar, but 
assuredly he will not have the credit of thinking with the wise. 
But Mr. Hume further observes, that " all reasoning from the 
relation of causes and effects is founded on a certain instinct 
of our nature, and may be fallacious and deceitful." If this 
proposition is intended merely to intimate a possibility that 
the reasoning in question may be fallacious, it amounts to no 
more than this, that this reasoning does not rise to absolute or 
mathematical demonstration. But if it is intended to imply 
that all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects pro- 
bably is fallacious, it may be satisfactorily replied, that it does 
not follow because a thing possibly may be, that, therefore, it 
probably is. Moreover, if the observation were to be thus 
interpreted, it would imply, that the contrary conclusions to 
those which mankind have hitherto drawn from the relation of 
cause and effect would be more likely to be just; an extrava- 
gance to which no soberminded man can assent for a moment. 
In innumerable instances we rest with as much confidence upon 
reasonings drawn from this source as upon the evidence of the 
senses or upon mathematical proof. And this, however it 
comes to pass, we cannot help doing. But to spend another 
moment upon Mr. Hume's proposition : were the reasoning 
from the relation of causes and effects founded upon instinct, 
this, I conceive, would be a presumption that it would not be 



120. 

fallacious. It is, however, founded on no such thing. It is 
founded on experience, on which Mr. Hume can place suffi- 
cient dependence when it suits his purpose. And the same 
experience which has taught us to "believe that every effect must 
have a cause^ has also taught us to look for a designing cause 
where there is an indication of contrivance in the effect. And 
hence we infer thus much with sufficient certainty, that if the 
universe is an effect at all, it must he referred to an intelligent 
cause. But, it seems, our experience does not reach far enough 
to justify the conclusion, that the universe, because it exhibits 
an adaptation of means to ends, must have had an intelligent 
Author. We want the only experience which the case demands 
— an experience in the origin of worlds. Were this principle 
carried to its full extent it would follow, that when I see a work 
of art, which is altogether new to me, I must not confidently 
conclude that it had a maker. 1 know, indeed, that men exist, 
and though all reasoning from the relation of causes and 
effects may be fallacious, I think T know that the human 
intellect is adequate to the production of those effects which we 
call the works of art. But as my experience cannot reach to a 
novel case, unless I may venture to call in the axiom, that 
similar effects must be referred to similar causes, I must draw 
my conclusion with diffidence and hesitation. But, as Mr. 
Hume observes, I have no experience of the origin of worlds. 
And if I had, what would be its precise value ? " All reason- 
ing from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious 
and deceitful." But the argument from experience, which Mr. 
Hume says is wanting, would rest upon the presumption, that 
similar effects proceed from similar causes, in which presump- 
tion Mr. Hume ought to have maintained that in all cases 
there may be no force. Indeed, if all reasoning from the rela- 
tion of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful, were 
a world constructed before my eyes, the possibility of doubt, as 
to its origin, would not be precluded ! In opposition, however, 
to these extravagancies of scepticism, I maintain that expe- 
rience affords a sufficiently certain ground of reasoning, and I 
further maintain, that the experience which we have had of the 






121 

connection between contrivance and a contriver, abundantly 
justifies the conclusion, that the universe must have had a de- 
signing cause. To reject this conclusion is to set aside, with- 
out necessity,* one of the strongest associations of the human 
mind, and to reason upon a principle, if a principle it can be 
called, which would subvert the foundation of all reasoning. 
If similar effects are not to be referred to similar causes, all 
ratiocination is at an end. It is in vain to urge that there is a 
difference between the works of nature and the works of art. 
As far as respects the adaptation of means to ends, and on this 
alone the argument rests, there is no difference, except that this 
adaptation, in the former, is far more curious and exquisite 
than in the latter. Were any one still to say that the expe- 

* I said without necessity, because no difficulty attending the hypo- 
thesis of Theism can possibly be greater than the difficulty of con- 
ceiving that such an adaptation of means to ends, as is equivalent to 
contrivance, should exist without the operation of intelligence. In- 
deed, ideas are more closely associated in the human mind than those 
of contrivance and a contriver. In contemplating the works of art, as 
connected with intelligence, we not only recognise the general relation 
of cause and effect, but are, moreover, led to acknowledge that the 
work effected corresponds to an archetype in the mind of the artist. 
And hence we seem satisfactorily to infer, that everything which indi- 
cates contrivance answers to a certain model which previously existed 
in the mind of some intelligent agent. And shall the works of nature, 
with all their various and exquisite adaptation of means to ends, be 
regarded as answering to no model, as corresponding to no archetype 1 
There is one point of difference, it is true, between the works of nature 
and the works of art, which is, that the latter are put together by the 
application of mechanical powers, whereas the former are many of 
them evidently produced by the action of certain laws, which are called 
the laws of nature. But this circumstance of difference by no means 
counterbalances the circumstances of resemblance, and, therefore, does 
not avail to set aside the analogy. And what are the laws of nature 
but a certain mode of operation 1 Does the law in any case design and 
anticipate the effect ? It may not be altogether foreign to the argu- 
ment to observe further, that the laws of nature, together with all real 
existences, must be, in themselves considered, the objects of know- 
ledge. And yet from the hypothesis of the Atheist, it will follow that 
no being exists by whom these laws are understood. 



122 

rience of which I have been speaking is no certain guide in a 
case to which it does not itself extend, I should think it suffi- 
cient to reply, that it is the only guide which we have, and that 
it is absurd to relinquish this guide in order to wander in a 
field of vain conjecture, without a ray of probability to direct 
us. One thing we know, which is, that intellect can adjust 
means to ends, and produce effects which indicate contrivance; 
but that anything else can produce these effects, we not only 
do not know, but have not even the slightest reason to believe. 
But men sometimes argue as if it were the perfection of human 
wisdom to follow the weaker probability instead of the stronger, 
or to set probability altogether at defiance, because it falls 
short of strict and mathematical demonstration.* 

From the view which has been now taken of Mr. Hume's 
objection to the being of a God, it appears that the reasoning 
which ascribes the universe to an intelligent Author, rests upon 
precisely the same foundation as that which attributes what is 
denominated an effect to that which is denominated a cause. 
Contrivance is the thing to be accounted for, and that reason- 
ing, founded on experience, which has led us to conceive that 
every effect must have a cause, has led us to demand an intelli- 
gent cause for every effect which indicates such an adaptation 
of means to ends, as could not, in our apprehension, be the re- 
sult of chance or accident. And against this reasoning I do 
not see what can be urged, except that it does not amount to 
such a demonstration as would exclude all possibility of doubt. 
If the argument does not amount to the highest probability, I 
do not know what probability is. And Mr. Hume's reason- 

* If any one should say that probability is not a reasonable ground 
of confidence, I should only desire him to carry this principle as far as 
it will go, and to act upon it. I need not point out what consequences 
would follow. But shall that evidence, upon which mankind do not 
scruple to act in ordinary concerns, be considered as unsatisfactory 
only in concerns of the highest importance 1 The practice of demand- 
ing absolute demonstration where it is not to be had, and where it is 
not needed, has done much mischief. It has given rise to an unrea- 
sonable scepticism on the one hand, and to an absurd appeal to common 
sense on the other. 



123 

ings only show that this probability is not absolute and incon- 
trovertible proof. That this may appear more clearly, I will 
deduce from Mr. Hume's observations the only conclusions 
which would be formidable to the hypothesis of Theism, and 
leave the reader to judge whether these conclusions are legiti- 
mate. Between cause and effect we perceive only conjunction ; 
therefore the probability is, that cause and effect are not con- 
nected ! All our reasonings from the relation of causes and 
effects may be fallacious ; therefore the probability is, that they 
are fallacious! We have no experience in the origin of 
worlds ; therefore it is probable that the universe, which shows 
throughout an adaptation of means to ends, is not the work of 
an intelligent Author ! If these are just conclusions, Mr. 
Hume's reasonings carry with them more weight than has been 
hitherto attributed to them. But, in spite of Mr. Hume's sub- 
tleties, mankind will continue to reason with confidence from 
the relation of cause and effect. They will also assume to 
themselves the privilege of generalising their ideas, and from 
similarity in different effects will infer similarity in their causes. 
And unless it shall be shown by some solid argument, that an 
organised universe is not an effect, they will think that they 
cannot, err in ascribing it to an intelligent though invisible 
Cause. 

But it may, perhaps, be said, that we may as well rest in a 
self-existent universe as ascend beyond it to a self-existent God. 
Were the universe a mass of matter, without any indication of 
design, it might, for anything that I am able to allege, be self- 
existent. But the marks of design, which it everywhere 
exhibits, stamp upon it the character of an effect which could 
be produced only by a designing cause. Between a harmonized 
universe and the idea of self- existence there is a repugnance, a 
repugnance founded on the experience which we have had of the 
connection between contrivance and a contriver, between effects- 
which indicate an adaptation of means to ends, and an intel- 
ligent agent by whom this adaptation was devised. But between 
the notion of intelligence and self- existence there is no repug- 
nance, and for anything that either experience or reason sug- 



124 

gests to the contrary, intellect may exist uncreated. Something 
uncreated there must be ; but as analogy forbids us to suppose 
that this something is an organized system, which seems to 
testify the operation of an intelligent contriver; it consequently 
leads us to conclude that this something is that incomprehensi- 
ble Being whom we call God. I will conclude with the senti- 
ment of the poet, in which even an Atheist will not refuse to 
join, 

" And if a God there is, that God how great ! " 

E. 0. 

Feb., 1822. M. R. vol. xvii. 



Sir, — In my last (p. 65) I committed a trifling error in 
quoting the words of Mr. Hume. Instead of writing, " all 
reasoning from the relation of causes and effects," &c, I should 
have written, " all reasoning from the relation of cause and 
effect," &c. 

I will avail myself of this opportunity to say another word 
on the nature of this relation. The question is, whether the 
constant conjunction of cause and effect implies that there 
exists between them a necessary connection. I contend that it 
does. The conjunction under consideration must either be for- 
tuitous or necessary.* If fortuitous, then every event which 
takes place in the universe must be truly and properly con- 
tingent. How then comes it to pass that causes should not 
often act without being followed by their effects, and that effects 
should not spring up without being preceded by their causes ? 
Moreover, as that which is contingent, or altogether independent 
of previous circumstances, (could it happen at all,) may 

* I am aware that a third hypothesis may be formed, namely, that 
the conjunction between cause and effect is arbitrary, depending on the 
pleasure of the Deity, by whose energy the effect is produced. But as 
this hypothesis would only shift the notion of a cause from one thing 
to another, and would imply a necessary connection between the real 
cause and the effect, it does not require a distinct consideration. 



125 

happen at one time as well as at another, how comes it to 
pass that those events which we term effects uniformly follow 
those which we denominate causes ? Whence is it, for instance, 
that the motion of the cricket-hall always instantly succeeds to 
the impulse of the hat ? Are not the chances against such a 
succession infinite, unless the phenomena which are thus con- 
joined are necessarily connected ? And will not this reasoning 
hold with respect to the innumerable combinations of cause 
and effect which take place throughout the whole of nature ? 
Is it not then infinitely improbable that cause and effect should 
be uniformly conjoined, if they were not necessarily connected ? 
Here, I think, we have the necessary connection of cause and 
effect made out by something like a process of the understand- 
ing. But perhaps some sceptical philosopher may say, that the 
contrary hypothesis, namely, that there is no necessary con- 
nection between cause and effect, does not involve a contra- 
diction, and, therefore, that it may possibly be true. This 
inference is not quite correct. It does not follow because a 
proposition does not involve a contradiction, that therefore it 
may be true. It does indeed follow, that it may be true for any 
thing that we can prove to the contrary ; but our ignorance is 
not an infallible criterion of possibility. Mr. Hume, I think 
says, that this proposition, The sun will not rise to-morrow, 
does not involve a contradiction; from which the intended 
inference doubtless is, that perhaps the sun may not rise to- 
morrow. Nor does it involve a contradiction to say, that the 
sun did not rise yesterday ; so that had I slept through the day, 
I might have had some doubt whether the world was not during 
that period involved in total darkness. But the information of 
my friends would, in this case, have set me right. But who 
could have vouched for the truth of their information ? The 
falsehood of the strongest testimony does not amount to a con- 
tradiction ; consequently (it might be said) the strongest testi- 
mony may be false. But methinks, Sir, I hear you say, Enough 
of these extravagancies ! I say so too, and will take my leave 
of them with observing, that scepticism, when in her most 
incredulous, or what she doubtless considers as her most philo- 



126 

sophic mood, borders on the opposite extreme of puerile cre- 
dulity. E. C. 

P.S. — Your correspondent O.P.Q. (p. 76) is desirous of 
information respecting John xxi. 15. The little which I have 
to communicate he is welcome to, and that little will concern 
the Greek of the passage alone. If the sense were, " Lovest 
thou me more than these ? " the Greek ought to have been, 
aya.7ra; sps ttxeiov rouruv ; I recollect but one passage in which 
txs seems to be used as a contradistinctive, and that is Eur. 
Phoeniss. 447: navo-ai ttovcov [as, koci <te, koci naaav ttoMv, but here 
it is easy to read vravcnxi ttovcov <te Ka/xs holi Traa-av ttoXiv. See 
iEschylus Sept. contra Theb. v. 240. But to return to the 
passage under consideration ; suppose the sense to be, " Lovest 
thou me more than these love me ? " the Greek is correct, and 
may be compared with the following passage of Aristophanes : 
roy Uxoutov ttcxoex® @ £ xi-iovag av^ag, the construction of which is 
precisely similar, and the pronoun is not inserted as the nomi- 
native to Tnzfsxu. 

April, 1822. M. E. vol. xvii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — The communication of your correspondent T.F.B., in 
your last Number (p. 211), brought forcibly to my mind an 
observation which I had made to a friend not a week ago, 
which was, that the Unitarians, while they have endeavoured to 
show the absurdity of the popular doctrine of the atonement, 
have not sufficiently urged upon the public the true interpreta- 
tion of the phraseology on which it is founded. This interpre- 
tation will, I conceive, be found in the Sermons of the late 
Mr. Kenrick. This able and excellent man has satisfactorily 
shown, " that the death or blood of Christ has no efficacy in 
removing moral guilt, but that, whenever it is spoken of as 
procuring the forgiveness of sin, it relates entirely to re- 



127 

storation to a sanctified or privileged state, which, in the 
language of both the Old and New Testament on many 
occasions, is expressed by the forgiveness of sins." — Sermon 
XIV. vol. i. 

Thirty years ago I was led to doubt whether the death of 
Christ and the forgiveness of sin (in the usual sense of this 
expression) were ever associated in the minds of the apostles, 
and Mr. K.'s Sermons have convinced me that my doubts were 
not groundless. To many, I am aware, this declaration will 
appear strange, and will seem to indicate a wish to dispose of a 
plain Scripture doctrine by any expedient. Against strong pre- 
judices it is not easy to reason with effect ; I would, however, 
just suggest to such persons the advantages which attend the 
above-stated hypothesis. In the first place, it is founded upon 
a truly scriptural interpretation of Scripture phraseology. In 
the second place, it gives a view of the consequences of the 
death of Christ which is conformable to fact. In the third 
place, it is free from the difficulties which encumber- every 
scheme of the atonement which the advocates of this doctrine 
have hitherto been able to devise. 

While I have my pen in my hand, I will make a remark or 
two upon an observation which I met with the other day in the 
Quarterly Review, and which the Reviewer considers as very 
admirable and important ; namely, that God is revealed to us 
not as he is absolutely and in himself, but as he is relatively 
to us who are his creatures. I am not deep in these mysteries ; 
but I presume that the observation is intended to intimate, that 
we must not reason from the Divine attributes as made known 
to us in Scripture, to the measures of the Divine administra- 
tion. If such be its object, it might as well have been spared. 
For, in the first place, it is altogether gratuitous. In the next 
place, God cannot be imagined to possess absolutely any attri- 
butes which stand opposed to those which he possesses in rela- 
tion to his creatures. And, consequently, if we know what 
God is in relation to mankind, we can reason with the same 
certainty and confidence respecting the measures of his govern- 
ment, as if we thoroughly understood what he is absolutely and 



128 

in himself. If; for instance, we are assured that God is infi- 
nitely or (as the Beviewer would say) 'perfectly good in relation 
to man, we know just as well what to expect at his hands, as if 
goodness were proved to constitute his moral nature and essence. 
In a word, unless revelation he intended to mislead and deceive, 
God can he nothing absolutely which will not allow him to he, 
in his dealings towards his creatures, what he has declared him- 
self to he. E. C. 
May, 1822. M. R. vol. xvii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — I wrote my short remark upon John xxi. 15 (pp. 287, 
288), not as a biblical scholar, which I am not, but from a 
simple consideration of the Greek in itself considered ; and I 
do not know that I have anything further to say which would 
deserve the attention of your correspondent, except it be to 
remark, that if the Evangelist intended the emphasis to fall 
upon the pronoun, he ought to have written £/*£, in order to 
prevent ambiguity. If the writers of the New Testament 
were not very nice as to the distinction between the enclitic 
and the emphatic form of the pronoun, yet they did not, I 
apprehend, neglect this distinction so as to render their mean- 
ing obscure and uncertain. In our Evangelist we read, ei b 
Hoa-fMog v/xa<; (jlutei, yivooo-KETE on e/j,s Trpcorov v/xcov {as/mcwe. This is 
as it ought to be ; though here the sense could not have been 
mistaken, even had the enclitic been employed. The Greek, 
however, would have been at variance with the writer's mean- 
ing, as the proper interpretation of his words would have been, 
" know that it hated me before you hated me." And I cannot 
help concluding, that when he wrote ayot7ra.<; /xz vrteiov rourcov ; 
his meaning was, "Lovest thou me more than these love me ?" 

E. 0. 

June, 1822. M. R vol. xvii. 



129 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — The communication of your correspondent T. F. B., 
in your last number (p. 211), brought forcibly to my mind an 
observation which I had made to a friend not a week ago, 
which was, that the Unitarians, while they have endeavoured 
to show the absurdity o the popular doctrine of the atone- 
ment, have not sufficiently urged upon the public the true 
interpretation of the phraseology on which it is founded. This 
interpretation will, I conceive, be found in the Sermons of the 
late Mr. Kenrick. This able and excellent man has satisfac- 
torily shown " that the death or blood of Christ has no effi- 
cacy in removing moral guilt, but that, whenever it is spoken 
of as procuring the forgiveness of sin, it relates entirely to 
restoration to a sanctified or privileged state, which in the 
language of both the Old and New Testament on many occa- 
sions is expressed by the forgiveness of sins." — Sermon XIV. 
vol. i. 

Thirty years ago I was led to doubt whether the death of 
Christ and the forgiveness of sin (in the usual sense of this 
expression) were ever associated in the minds of the apostles, 
and Mr. K.'s Sermons have convinced me that my doubts were 
not groundless. To many, I am aware, this declaration will 
appear strange, and will seem to indicate a wish to dispose of 
a plain Scripture doctrine by any expedient. Against strong 
prejudices it is not easy to reason with effect ; I would, how- 
ever, just suggest to such persons the advantages which attend 
the above-stated hypothesis. In the first place, it is founded 
upon a truly scriptural interpretation of Scripture phrase- 
ology. In the second place, it gives a view of the consequences 
of the death of Christ which is conformable to fact. In the 
third place, it is free from the difficulties which encumber 
every scheme of the atonement which the advocates of this 
doctrine have hitherto been able to devise. 

While I have my pen in my hand, I will make a remark or 



130 

two upon an observation which I met with the other day in 
the Quarterly Review, and which the Reviewer considers as 
very admirable and important ; namely, that God is revealed 
to us not as he is absolutely and in himself, but as he is 
relatively to us who are his creatures. I am not deep in these 
mysteries ; but I presume that the observation is intended to 
intimate, that we must not reason from the Divine attributes 
as made known to us in Scripture, to the measures of the 
Divine administration. If such be its object, it might as well 
have been spared. For, in the first place, it is altogether 
gratuitous. In the next place, God cannot be imagined to 
possess absolutely any attributes which stand opposed to those 
which he possesses in relation to his creatures. And, con- 
sequently, if we know what God is in relation to mankind, we 
can reason with the same certainty and confidence respecting 
the measures of his government, as if we thoroughly under- 
stood what he is absolutely and in himself. If, for instance, 
we are assured that God is infinitely or (as the Reviewer would 
say) perfectly good in relation to man, we know just as well 
what to expect at his hands, as if goodness were proved to 
constitute his moral nature and essence. In a word, unless 
revelation be intended to mislead and deceive, God can be 
nothing absolutely which will not allow him to be, in his deal- 
ings towards his creatures, what he has declared himself to be. 

E. C. 
April, 1822. M. E. vol. xvii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — In the paper with which the "Christian Reformer" 
for the present year is introduced, it is observed, that in the 
present day " high points of doctrine are only here and there 
asserted," and that "the majority of congregations calling 
themselves orthodox are contented with the name without the 
reality of ancient orthodoxy." In this representation, which I 



131 

have no doubt is just, I find, as in many other things, an evil 
blended with a good. That the improved state of theological 
knowledge should have led the nominal followers of Calvin to 
moderate their doctrine, so that the human heart should not 
shrink from it with horror (in which case, however, it is Cal- 
vinism no longer), must afford satisfaction to every sincere 
Christian, the true Calvinist alone excepted. This state of 
things may safely be regarded as an omen of still better days, 
and portends an important change of opinion which will be 
experienced at no very distant period. Nor will any one who 
is acquainted with human nature be surprised that the progress 
of religious inquiry should, in a certain stage of it, exhibit the 
phenomenon above described. Though here and there an indi- 
vidual has possessed mental energy enough to pass at once 
from Calvinism to the simple doctrine of the Unitarian, this is 
too much to expect from the public mind, which always moves 
slowly, and is obstinately tenacious of ancient prejudices. 
But, as I intimated above, the good of which I have" been 
speaking is not unmixed with evil. That an unscriptural 
system, which, if presented in its real colours, could not now 
maintain its ground, should be so softened and palliated as to 
be admitted under a certain modification, when otherwise it 
would repel belief, is a circumstance which is calculated to 
prolong the dominion of error, and consequently to retard the 
progress of truth. And the mischief is the greater because 
the system (if a system it can be called) which is sometimes 
substituted for the genuine doctrine of Calvin, assumes no 
fixed and definite character. A creed which is distinctly laid 
down, and so far clearly understood, submits itself to exami- 
nation, so that its truth or falsehood may, by impartial inquiry, 
be easily ascertained. But a doctrine (or rather a phraseology) 
which wears an ambiguous and indeterminate form, and, avail- 
ing itself of popular prejudices, addresses itself to the ear 
rather than to the understanding, eludes instead of inviting 
inquiry, and retains possession of the feelings, while it makes 
no distinct impression on the mind. When the preacher tells 
his hearers, in so many words, that the blood of Christ has 

k % 



132 

saved the elect from the vindictive justice of the Father, the 
thoughtful mind may start at the declaration, and may he dis- 
posed to ask in what part of the sacred volume this doctrine is 
to be found. But when, instead of being thus explicit, the 
orator contents himself with merely haranguing on the great 
scheme of redemption without explaining what it is, every man 
is left at liberty to accommodate the description to his precon- 
ceived opinions; and as few hearers are so captious as to 
quarrel with their instructors for treating them with words 
instead of ideas, all may agree to admire that which none can 
justly be said to comprehend. Here I cannot help noticing, 
as a thing much to be lamented, that preachers who entertain 
what are called moderate views in religion, should sometimes 
continue to use a language which they know will be misappre- 
hended by those who hear them. They may say in their 
defence that the language which they employ is chiefly the 
language of Scripture. But this in my judgment makes the 
case still worse. He who uses scriptural phraseology to which 
he is aware that ideas which he deems unscriptural will be 
attached, wilfully converts the oracles of truth into the means 
of confirming prejudice and error. If he must encourage the 
belief of opinions which he does not himself admit, let him 
adopt language of his own, that the mistaken views of men 
may rest on the basis of human authority. This authority 
many might dare to dispute, but what is considered as the 
authority of the Word of God, is to the serious-minded Chris- 
tian overwhelming and irresistible. And thus when erroneous 
opinions which have originated in the misinterpretation of 
Scripture phraseology are cherished by the perpetual applica- 
tion of this phraseology, the evil scarcely admits a remedy. 
Some Christian teachers endeavour to reconcile their con- 
sciences to this abuse of scriptural language by pleading, that 
were they to speak their whole mind they should injure their 
usefulness. It is not mine to pronounce a harsh judgment 
upon their conduct, but I must be allowed to say, that mis- 
taken indeed must be those views of usefulness which shall 
lead a teacher of Christianity intentionally to refrain from 



133 

declaring the whole counsel of God. If there is a class of 
men upon earth in whom simplicity and plain-dealing are 
more eminently important, and more peculiarly becoming than 
in all other men, they are the ministers of the gospel of 
Christ. 

I will conclude this desultory letter by replying to an objec- 
tion which has sometimes been brought against Unitarian 
preachers. It has been said, that when treating of certain 
topics, they are sparing in the use of scriptural language, as 
though they were secretly conscious that their doctrine is but 
feebly supported by the authority of revelation. The fact may 
be admitted, but the inference is false; they have not the 
slightest suspicion that their doctrine is unscriptural, but they 
know that in a mixed congregation there as yet may remain 
many in whose minds unscriptural notions have been asso* 
ciated with scriptural phraseology ; and rather than use a Ian* 
guage which, if they did not perpetually explain it when used, 
would be liable to misconception, they may reasonably prefer 
to express what they believe to be the truths of the gospel in 
terms which cannot be misunderstood. Moreover, there is a 
kind of language in the New Testament, which, in the age of 
the writers, was perfectly natural, and therefore perfectly pro- 
per; but which, if the general views of the Unitarian are just, 
it is now rather the business of the Christian teacher to explain 
than to adopt. Of this kind are the sacrifioial allusions which 
the apostles make use of in relation to the death of Christ — » 
allusions which it was scarcely possible for them not to employ ; 
but which, if employed in the present day, unless illustrated 
by a just interpretation, must infallibly lead to error. I will 
only add, that if in the study of the New Testament a due 
attention had always been paid to the times and circumstances 
of the writers, the tenets of Calvinism would never have been 
heard of — tenets which ought not to have found an advocate in 
the world after sufficient time was allowed for the circulation 
of Dr. Taylor s " Key to the Apostolic Writings," a work in 
which these tenets are refuted as fully and unanswerably as 



134 

any error ever was refuted in any branch of science or of 
knowledge. E. 0. 

April, 1823. M. E. vol. xviii. 

P.S. When I wrote the paper of which your correspondent 
G. B. W. does me the honour to speak so favourably (p. 160 
of your last number), I was aware of the passage 1 John, ii. 
12 — a passage which I think that your correspondent has ex- 
plained satisfactorily enough. Had the expression for Christ's 
sake been a scriptural expression, the phrase ha to ovopa awrov 
might reasonably have been interpreted so as to bear the same 
meaning. But as the case now stands, the language of John 
is to us somewhat ambiguous. Had I been asked what I con- 
ceived to be the meaning of the passage in which it is found, 
I should, perhaps, have replied, that the general import of it 
might be expressed as follows :— " I write unto you, little chil- 
dren, because by your profession of the Christian faith you 
are redeemed from heathenism and idolatry, and introduced 
into a state of moral and religious privilege." That this 
change of moral condition is what is meant by the forgiveness 
of sins, as spoken of in connection with the death of Christ, 
I feel more and more convinced. I should, however, like to 
see the subject fully discussed by men (and many such men 
there are) who are better qualified for such a discussion than 
myself. From the habit of my mind, and the nature of my 
occupation and pursuits, I can only throw out hints, leaving 
to others everything like minute examination and inquiry. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — After the declaration which I have made of my in- 
ability to enter into long discussions, your worthy correspond- 
ent, Mr. Jevans, will not be surprised that I decline giving 



135 

a formal reply to his communication in your last number 
(pp. 294-297). That I may not, however, be wholly silent, I 
will, with your permission, acquaint him and your readers how 
I came to adopt the opinion in confirmation of which I referred 
to Mr. Kenrick's Sermons. When a young man, I read with 
great interest Dr. Taylor's " Key to the Apostolic Writings." 
I there found it proved incontestably, that the Gentiles were 
called sinners because they did not enjoy the privileges of the 
Jewish covenant. While strongly impressed with this idea, I 
was accidentally led to reflect on the well-known passage, 
" Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the 
world;" and my mind was forcibly struck with the thought, 
that the true interpretation of this passage must be, that by 
the death of Christ a way would be opened by which the 
Gentile world might be translated from what was deemed an 
unholy to a holy state, by which they, who before were sinners, 
might become saints. In the justice of this interpretation I 
was afterwards confirmed by reading, with some attention, the 
first and second chapters of the Epistle to the Ephesians, in 
which the apostle describes more fully than elsewhere the 
benefits which have resulted from the death of Christ, who is 
there represented as having broken down the middle wall of 
partition between the Jews and Gentiles, and " having recon- 
ciled both unto God in one body by the cross." Nor did I 
find anything in these chapters which was unfavourable to the 
sense which I had annexed to the passage above quoted. I 
hence inferred that when the pardon of sin was spoken of in 
connection with the death of Christ, the thing intended was 
an introduction to a new state of moral and religious privilege. 
And here I take my leave of the subject by again referring 
your readers to Mr. Kenrick's Sermons, and, I add with plea- 
sure, to Mr. Belsham's Exposition of the Epistles of Paul. 

E. C. 
June, 1823. M. R. vol. xviii. 



136 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Your learned correspondent, Dr. Jones, has stated in 
your last number (pp. 531-533), that he considers <x[A7raK\sff as 
the true reading in Orestes, 3 1 6, and has moreover remarked, 
that " Porson's note shows that he mistook the meaning and 
construction of the passage." The Doctor, I know, will ex- 
cuse me if I say that were I to adopt Mr. Porson's reading, I 
should also adopt his interpretation ; and that for more reasons 
than one. But the reading itself is false. If ever our illus- 
trious countryman altered the text of his author unnecessarily 
(which he certainly did very seldom), he has done it in this 
verse and its fellow in the antistrophe, having admitted into 
them three conjectures, which answer no other end than to 
break the uniformity of the chorus, by intermixing trochaic 
penthimemers with a series of dochmiacs. This observation is 
extorted from me by the truth of the case; and if any one 
shall imagine that it is intended to cast any slight on the skill 
of Mr. Porson, he does not know the veneration in which I 
hold this prince of critics. E. C. 

October, 1823. M. K vol. xviii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — A note in pp. 36, 37, of Mr. Kentish's excellent 
Sermon delivered at Bristol, has drawn forth from their con- 
cealment a few remarks on a passage in Dr. Paley's " Natural 
Theology " which I wrote some time ago, and had almost for- 
gotten. Towards the conclusion of the chapter on the Unity 
of the Deity we read as follows : " Certain, however, it is, that 
the whole argument for the Divine unity goes no further than 
to an unity of counsel." This observation was evidently in- 



137 

tended to guard against a conclusion which might otherwise 
have been drawn from the chapter in which it is found. What 
that conclusion is, admits of but little doubt. But could the 
Archdeacon's work fall into the hands of a man who had never 
heard of three persons in one God, the above remark would 
perplex him to some purpose. In reading the work up to this 
very observation, he would find that the author's object was to 
prove the existence of a mind by which the universe was con- 
trived and executed; and nothing would be further from his 
thoughts than the suspicion that more minds than one were 
concerned in the design. When, moreover, he should recollect 
the chapter on the personality of the Deity, and the remark- 
able words with which it concludes, "Design must have had 
a designer ; that designer must have been a person ; that per- 
son is God ; " and should also advert a second time to the title 
of the chapter in which the above remark is found, namely, on 
the Unity of the Deity, what would be his surprise on being 
told that nothing more was meant by this unity than a unity 
of counsel ! A unity of counsel ! he would say ; between 
whom and what? Between God and himself? Or between 
one God, and certain other gods possessing the same essence 
and the same attributes ? The first interpretation he would 
reject as meaning nothing, and the second he would consider 
as set aside by the combined force of the two chapters on the 
personality and the unity of the Deity, in which it seemed to 
be proved that God is one intelligent agent or person. 

" The whole argument for the Divine unity goes no further 
than to an unity of counsel." If by unity of counsel we are 
to understand, according to the natural meaning of the words, 
an agreement of purpose between more minds than one, it may 
be justly observed, that nature gives evidence of no such thing. 
Nor, indeed, is it possible that mere uniformity of design 
should suggest the notion of more than one designing mind. 
To say then that the argument for the Divine unity goes no 
further than to an unity of counsel, is to say, that it goes no 
further than that to which it neither does nor can go. In one 
sense, indeed, of the word counsel, Dr. Paley's observation is 



138 

true enough ; since uniformity of design, in itself considered, 
proves only unity of will or purpose. But when it is allowed 
that nature points to one Creator alone,* and Dr. Paley's rea- 
sonings have proved that Creator to he a person, nothing 
seems more clear than that, according to the evidence of nature, 
God is one great and undivided Mind. But this is a conclti- 
siou which Dr. Paley seems to have heen unwilling to admit. 
And, if I understand him rightly, to guard against this con- 
clusion he has emphatically said, " Certain, however, it is, 
that the whole argument for the Divine unity goes no further 
than to an unity of counsel." In other words, the ivhole 
argument for the Divine unity hy no means proves that God 
is one ; or, as Dr. Paley would probably have interpreted his 
own remark, by no means disproves a plurality of persons in 
the Godhead. But would it not have been more just to say, 
that though uniformity of design does not in itself demon- 
strate that not more than one mind was concerned in the work 
of creation, yet when we come to consider the attributes which 
we must ascribe to a self- existent Being, we see sufficient rea- 
son to conclude that God is one undivided and indivisible 
intelligence ? But without this species of reasoning, Dr. 
Paley's remarks in his incomparable chapter on the personality 
of the Deity, are quite sufficient to establish this conclusion. 
He observes that, " in whatever mind resides, there is a per- 
son." And what he meant by the term person, is manifest 
from the definition which he afterwards gives of the Deity as a 
" perceiving, intelligent, designing Being." But as wherever 
mind resides there is a person, if there is more than one mind, 
and consequently more than one person in the Deity, then, 
according to Dr. Paley, God consists of more than one intel- 
ligent and designing Being, which few will choose to acknow- 
ledge. 

Should any one say that I have taken advantage of the use 
which Dr. Paley has made of the term person, I answer, that 
when he denned God to be a person, and also an intelligent 
Being, he spoke the language of reason and common sense; 

* « Natural Theology," p. 483. 



139 

and if there is a theological hypothesis with which this lan- 
guage is at variance, let those look to it whom it may concern. 
I cannot dismiss the subject without expressing my convic- 
tion that no Trinitarian, when reading the Natural Theology 
of Paley, ever conceived of God as consisting of more than 
one person ; nor do I believe that the mind of the writer was 
ever fixed on more than one person, except it was when he 
penned the sentence which I have been considering. Indeed, 
I question not but that Trinitarians universally, except when 
their minds are engaged on their particular doctrine, or when 
they are contemplating what they call the scheme of redemp- 
tion, annex the same idea to the term God which the Unitarian 
annexes to it, that of one great Intelligence which first created, 
and now governs and pervades the universe. On the other 
hand, when they reflect on the divinity of Christ as distinct 
from that of the Father, I have no doubt but that, if they were 
to analyse their ideas, they would find that they conceive of 
two Gods as distinct in their attributes as in the offices which 
their system allots to them. Of the Holy Spirit as a separate 
person, I am persuaded that the idea seldom presents itself 
at all. E. C. 

M. R. vol. xviii. 






TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — My attention having lately been directed more than 
usual to the superstitions of Pagan Idolatry, I have been led 
into a train of reflection which, if it may at all contribute to 
illustrate the evidences of Christianity, will not be regarded as 
unprofitable. The question which arose in my mind was this, 
whether there be reason to think that without a divine interpo- 
sition these superstitions could have been banished from the 
world, and a purer religion substituted in their place. In con- 
sidering this question, the natural inquiry is, by what means, 
exclusive of Divine interference, such a revolution must have 



140 

been effected, if effected at all. And the only means on which 
the imagination can fix are these, that men of superior talents, 
who should have seen the folly of the popular worship, would 
have endeavoured to enlighten the more intelligent of their 
countrymen, and that as knowledge descends from the wise to 
the ignorant, the illumination would at length have reached 
the lower orders of society, till none should have been left to 
believe what men of sense had universally rejected. And when 
the absurd theology which had been received by inheritance 
had been shown to be as groundless as it was irrational, it may 
be supposed that juster views of religion would easily have 
found their way into minds no longer occupied by prejudices 
which might prevent their reception. But he who knows any- 
thing of human nature, he who is aware of the force of reli- 
gious prejudice, and who also considers how little of the 
knowledge which enlightens the more intelligent members of 
a community ever makes its way to the vulgar, will see reason 
to doubt whether superstitions so deeply rooted as those of 
ancient Paganism could have been eradicated by the means 
supposed. To have effected such a work must have required a 
long succession of intelligent and reflecting men, who should 
have employed their labour upon the undertaking, and who 
should not have suffered themselves to be discouraged by the 
opposition which they would have encountered, or by the slow 
progress of the reformation which they were endeavouring to 
effect : for that its progress must have been slow, we may 
safely infer from the pertinacity with which the most gross 
corruptions of Christianity have been retained for ages, and 
are still retained, by the great majority of its professors. And 
one thing appears certain, that unless a theology, which should 
have taken strong hold of the feelings, had been substituted 
for that which had been displaced, the supposed subversion of 
idolatry would have been followed by a period of general 
scepticism and irreligion. But where was this theology to be 
found, or whence was it to be sought? The boasted philo- 
sophy of the ancients supplies no system which could have 
been brought home to the minds of men with sufficient autho- 



141 

rity to supply the place of opinions rendered venerable by 
their antiquity, and confirmed by everything that can strengthen 
the impression of that which men deem sacred. Indeed, the 
philosophers scarcely differed more from the vulgar in their 
opinions than from each other, and had they all agreed, their 
arguments were too subtle, and their conclusions too uncertain, 
for general acceptance and utility. Nor could they have pos- 
sessed any influence which might have insured the admission 
of their doctrines, while their arguments were not understood. 
Some, perhaps, will say that idolatry having been once dis- 
missed, the religion of nature must of necessity have prevailed, 
or rather that the religion of nature must ultimately, by its 
own evidence, have banished idolatry from the world. Of the 
religion of nature much has been said both by Christians 
and Unbelievers, and if we are to believe what we are some- 
times told concerning it, its truths are emblazoned in the 
heavens in characters which all can read, and which none can 
misunderstand. This religion is said to teach with the utmost 
clearness the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a 
universal providence, and the future existence and immortality 
of man. I believe that the world is wiser than in days of yore, 
and that juster modes of thinking have been adopted in modern 
than what prevailed in ancient times. But I do not believe 
that it is owing to this advancement in wisdom that men of 
talents, not greatly above the common level, can now with a 
single glance of the intellect clearly see the evidence of truths 
which great men of old either altogether rejected, or could 
only dimly discern through a cloud of obscurity and doubt. 
The articles above-stated, as the discoveries of natural religion, 
are the great truths of Christianity ; and they who contend for 
them, as inculcated by nature, have derived their conviction of 
them from Christianity, and from Christianity alone. They 
contemplate the phenomena of the universe by the light of 
revelation, and then rashly imagine that these phenomena 
would present the same aspect were this light withdrawn. 
They mistake opinions, impressed by education, for the clear 
and certain deductions of reason, and think that they believe, 



142 

upon independent evidence, truths which experience seems to 
have shown that revelation alone is competent to teach. Hence 
the grand problem, whether man be destined for immortality is 
solved in a moment, and that on which philosophers of old 
employed so much thought to so little purpose, is proved by 
arguments which, whatever force they have, adapt themselves 
to the feeblest understanding. That some of the ancients 
endeavoured to establish this doctrine is true; but if they 
really believed it, there is sufficient reason to think that their 
faith did not grow out of their reasonings, but that their rea- 
sonings were laboriously sought for to uphold a preconceived 
opinion. And were Christianity proved to be a delusion, 
though a future life might be regarded as a consummation 
devoutly to be wished, I feel fully persuaded that the hope of 
it would in general rather be encouraged as a pleasing dream 
than as the presage of a glorious reality. 

But having now inquired how far it appears probable that a 
revolution similar to that which was caused by the promulga- 
tion of Christianity could have been brought about by the 
researches of philosophy, and the gradual diffusion of know- 
ledge, I proceed to say a word on the means by which this 
revolution was in fact effected. But I shall first consider the 
hypothesis of the unbeliever, I mean the hypothesis which the 
unbeliever must admit. According to this hypothesis, then, a 
few unlettered Jews, believing, or pretending to believe, in the 
resurrection of a crucified Master, while no such event had 
taken place, and in a series of miracles which were never 
wrought, conceived the extraordinary design of converting the 
heathen world to a religion which stood diametrically opposed 
to the prevailing superstitions, and which could flourish only 
by their total abolition. And these impostors or fanatics (call 
them which you please) had the temerity to rest their whole 
cause upon an appeal to facts which they maintained to be 
notorious, which facts they either themselves invented or 
believed without the shadow of a proof. Had we lived at the 
time when this extravagant project was devised, and had we, 
like modern Unbelievers, rejected all notion of miraculous 



143 

interposition, and consequently not admitted the truth of the 
facts which were brought forward in behalf of the new reli- 
gion, what should we have thought of these men, and what 
expectations should we have formed as to the success of their 
undertaking ? Should we not have confidently predicted, had 
we taken the trouble to predict anything, that a few short years 
would bury the mad scheme, together with its mad projectors, 
in everlasting oblivion ? Would a momentary suspicion have 
darted into our minds, that it might so happen that these 
spiritual Quixotes would change the religion of the world, and 
that the final event of their wild enterprise would be the over- 
throw of a worship which had stood for ages, supported by the 
civil power, and dignified by all the pomp and splendour which 
could captivate the imaginations and blind the understandings 
of its votaries ? But in the exact proportion in which such a 
result appears improbable, does the credibility of a divine 
interposition rise in the judgment of impartial reason. But 
mankind, it will be said, have always been credulous, and have 
in all ages shown themselves the willing dupes of knaves and 
enthusiasts. Be it so. But did ever any portion of a com- 
munity submit, for the gratification of credulity, to part with 
early prejudices, and to undergo a total revolution of religious 
opinion? The followers of Joanna Southcott seem to have 
been ambitious of showing how far credulity can go. But if 
Joanna had commenced with endeavouring to overthrow the 
Christian faith, I have not credulity enough to believe that she 
would have robbed the Man of Nazareth of a single disciple. 

But let us now suppose the truth of the New-Testament 
history, and we immediately have a clear and satisfactory solu- 
tion of a phenomenon which otherwise must for ever remain 
inexplicable. The world before the Christian sera was over- 
spread with the dreary shade of idolatry and superstition; 
the glimmering light of reason was far too feeble to dissipate 
the gloom; when it pleased the great Disposer of all events to 
interfere for the merciful purpose of redeeming his benighted 
offspring from a darkness which hid the Creator from their 
view, and left them to wander without God and without hope 



144 

in the labyrinths of ignorance and vice. Here was a dignus 
vindice nodus, and the hand of God may be traced in the 
grand result. A worship which its votaries believed would 
stand for ever has fallen, to rise no more, and only exists in 
the page of history to show to what a state of mental degrada- 
tion the creatures of reason have been reduced. The belief of 
one God, and the confident* expectation of a life to come, 
accompanied with the admission of a morality from which 
nothing ought to be taken, and to which nothing can be added, 
have prevailed for centuries in regions where, but for Chris- 
tianity, Idolatry might still have maintained her temples, and 
called for her immoral rites and senseless oblations. And 
whatever may have been the corruptions with which Chris- 
tianity has been disgraced, and its practical influence impeded, 
the impartial study of its records must ultimately restore it to 
its primitive purity, and present it to the world, as it proceeded 
from the hands of its Founder, "worthy of all acceptation." 

E. C. 

Jan. 1824. M. R. vol. xix. 

* If man is not designed to live again, to expect a divine revelation 
would be absurd. The light of Nature may serve well enough to con- 
duct a mortal being to the grave. But if man is destined for immor- 
tality, it might safely be presumed, that one great object of revelation 
would be to acquaint him with this destination, and that wherever 
revelation should be received, an assurance of human immortality 
would be felt. And such has been the fact. An Unbeliever might per- 
haps object, that the great majority of mankind, being altogether in- 
competent to judge of the evidences of revelation, must admit a future 
life upon authority alone. I allow it, and let the most be made of the 
concession. It is not the evidence of a doctrine, but the belief of it, 
which is practically useful. And if the objector would be kind enough 
to consider how many opinions he is himself obliged to take upon 
trust, he would find the force of his objection not a little diminished. 
It is the appointment of nature, and an appointment which revelation 
could not be expected to set aside, that every man should in many 
cases trust to the knowledge of other men, and use it as his own. And 
it would be lamentable, indeed, if the majority of the species, to whom 
the means of mental cultivation are in a great measure denied, might 
not be permitted to enjoy the benefit of truths, the evidence of which 
they are unable to appreciate. 



145 

P.S. I think myself bound to thank Dr. Jones for the civi- 
lity with which he has replied to my little observation respect- 
ing Musgrave's conjecture on the Orestes of Euripides (xviii. 
696). But, perhaps, I ought in justice to myself to state, 
that the Doctor has altogether overlooked the ground of my 
observation. Whether the conjecture be true or false must be 
determined by metrical considerations ; and by these consider- 
ations it is decisively refuted. This, I conceive, will be ques- 
tioned by no one who has studied what has been written in 
Germany on the Greek Metres since the time of Mr. Porson. 
With respect to the expression atdsf a/LCTraXteo-Qs, it may be 
compared with the Tr^avra tte^kx of Sophocles, the quorum 
aequora curro of Virgil, and many other passages, in none of 
which do I consider a preposition as understood, having long 
since become a convert to the doctrine of Hermann, laid down 
in his ingenious treatise on Ellipsis and Pleonasm. That 
7raXteiv is used for 7rax\Eo-9ai, in the Electra of Euripides, I 
should have felt confident, even without the authority of Por- 
son, Seidler, and others, and I agree with Brunck, that both 
TrahXEiv and apTrccKXtiv are employed in a neuter sense in the 
Lysistrata of Aristophanes ; but that the Attics, or indeed the 
other Greeks, were acquainted with such verbs as ettcckxco and 
aviTTccxxw, I must be allowed to doubt until some positive evi- 
dence of the fact shall have been produced. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — The propensity of many modern divines to depreciate 
the religion of nature is so frequently manifested, and in a 
way so obvious and glaring, that it can hardly escape the 
notice of any person at all accustomed to theological inquiries. 
I am far from supposing that these gentlemen pursue this 
course from any dishonest motive ; on the contrary, I am per- 
suaded they fancy that they thereby do honour to Christianity ; 



146 

while, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in professing 
my firm conviction, that the religion of nature is the rock 
on which Christianity is founded; and that he who aims at 
supporting the latter by undermining the former, does, in fact, 
though unconsciously, all that one man can do, to destroy 
both. Happily for us all, they are both indestructible. 

This conviction, which has been growing and strengthening 
in my mind for the last forty years, is not in the least degree 
weakened by the letter of your highly respectable correspon- 
dent, the Eev. Mr. Cogan, inserted in your publication of this 
day (pp. 11-14), the leading object of which, according to his 
own statement, is to illustrate the evidences of Christianity; 
but in which he more than insinuates, that what is called the 
religion of nature is of little or no value; that "they who 
contend for the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of 
a universal providence, and the future existence and immor- 
tality of man, as inculcated by nature, have derived their con- 
viction of them from Christianity, and from Christianity 
alone ; " and that "the ancients, who endeavoured to establish 
the doctrine of a future life, did not themselves believe it; 
and if they did, their faith did not grow out of their reason- 
ings, but their reasons were laboriously sought for, to uphold 
a preconceived opinion." What it was, however, other than 
reason which produced this preconceived opinion in their 
minds, Mr. Cogan has omitted to inform us ; and without his 
assistance, I confess myself unable to account for it, otherwise 
than by supposing that it was the effect of the reasonings of 
superior minds on the perfections of God the Creator, and on 
the nature and circumstances of man his creature. That the 
ancients, at least, whatever may be fancied of those of later 
times, did not derive their conviction of the unity and univer- 
sality of the Divine Government, and of a future state of ex- 
istence, from Christianity alone, or from Christianity at all, is 
quite clear, from the fact of their having recorded their opinions 
before Christianity existed ; and it is undeniable that some of 
them expressed their conviction of these truths in nearly as 
plain terms as any Christian can do at this day. What, for 



147 

instance, can be a stronger expression of belief in the being 
and government of One Supreme God, than the following pas- 
sage of Cicero ? " Quid potest esse tarn apertum, tamque 
perspicuum, cum coelum suspiximus, coelestiaque contemplati 
sumus, quam esse aliquod numen praestantissimse mentis, quo 
haec regantur ? " — Be Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. ii. When we 
lift our eyes to the heavens, and contemplate the celestial 
bodies, what can be more clearly evident, than the existence 
of some superior being of consummate wisdom, by whom 
they are governed 1 Or in what words could this illustrious 
man have expressed more plainly his expectation of existence 
after death, than in the following ? " Quid multa ? Sic mihi 
persuasi, sic sentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta 
memoria preeteritorum, futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, 
tantse scientiae, tot inventa, non posse earn naturam, quae 
res eas contineat esse mortalem." — Be Senect. 21. This, in 
short, is my settled conviction, this is my judgment, on 
reviewing the faculties of the mind, its wonderful activity, 
its memory of the past, and foresight of the future, and its 
discoveries and attainments in arts and science, that it is 
impossible that a being to whom such powers belong, can be 
perishable. 

In the course of his attempt to run down and bring into 
contempt the religion of nature, Mr. Oogan, the last man in 
the world to be suspected of any disingenuous intention, 
seems to me to have been betrayed, by the warmth of his zeal, 
into an error not uncommon with disputants, especially those 
who have the misfortune to be engaged in supporting a bad 
cause ; I mean that of misstating and caricaturing the opinions 
of those from whom he differs. He says, " If we are to believe 
what we are sometimes told concerning it [the religion of 
nature], its truths are emblazoned in the heavens in characters 
which all can read, and which none can misunderstand." 
Will Mr. C. be so good as to inform us by whom we are told 
anything so strange and absurd. For myself, I can say, that 
though I have read with great attention, and in many instances 
with great pleasure, the writings of Christian philosophers, 

l 2 



148 

who were believers in the religion of nature, and have also 
occasionally looked into the writings of a few Deists, and con- 
versed with others, it has never happened to me to meet with 
this extravagant position. I have always understood, that 
whatever valuable truths the book of nature may contain, 
though it may be written in characters which are indelible and 
unchangeable, though it may be unincumbered with various 
readings and interpolated texts ; yet that it is so far like the 
New Testament that it cannot be read to advantage, except by 
those who have taken some pains to learn the language in 
which it is written. Indeed, if it were otherwise, it would 
have greatly the advantage of the Bible, which is universally 
admitted to contain numerous passages which set at nought all 
human power of interpretation. Mr. Cogan will, therefore, I 
am sure, oblige many of your readers by informing them who 
they are that have given this extraordinary character of the 
religion of nature. I am sorry to be obliged to call upon him 
to do this, because I am inclined to think he will find it a task 
of some difficulty. 

In the commencement of his letter, the worthy writer states 
the question which arose in his mind to be " whether there is 
reason to think that without a divine interposition, these super- 
stitions [of Pagan idolatry] could have been banished from 
the world, and a purer religion substituted in their place." 
Now, from this language, would it not be perfectly natural to 
conclude, that with a divine interposition, this happy state of 
things has been effected, that superstition has actually been 
banished from the world, and a pure religion established in its 
stead ? Yet strange to tell, he soon after assures us, that 
" little of the knowledge that enlightens the more intelligent 
members of a community ever makes its way to the vulgar," 
and speaks of " the pertinacity with which the most gross cor- 
ruptions of Christianity have been retained for ages, and are 
still retained, by the great majority of its professors ! " He 
might have added, with great truth, though, to be sure, it 
would not have quite suited the object of his letter, that many 
of these gross corruptions have been so gross, as never to have 



149 

been exceeded in absurdity and folly by the popular fictions of 
ancient Greece or Rome. It may be replied that these abomi- 
nable corruptions are not to be charged on the Christian reli- 
gion, of which they are in reality no part, but the dreams of 
ignorant, or the inventions of designing, men. This I most 
readily grant, because it is most certainly true. But, on the 
other hand, I expect it to be granted to me, because it is 
equally true, that the popular superstitions of ancient Greece 
and Rome were no part of the religion of nature, because they 
were contrary to reason, and were accordingly disapproved of, 
by the wisest and best men of the times in which they pre- 
vailed. 

In a note, Mr. Cogan admits without hesitation as true, 
what he imagines may be offered in the shape of an objection 
by an unbeliever, namely, that "the great majority of man- 
kind, being altogether incompetent to judge of the evidences 
of revelation, must admit a future life upon authority alone ; " 
and he adds, " It is not the evidence of a doctrine, but the 
belief of it that is practically useful." This language from 
the pen of a liberal Dissenting minister is surely very singular 
and extraordinary. For any man to receive a doctrine as in- 
fallibly certain and supremely important, a doctrine which is 
to be the foundation of his hope, and the guide of his life, 
not because there is sufficient evidence of its truth, but be- 
cause some person who calls himself his spiritual director, 
tells him it must be believed, does, I confess, appear to me to 
savour more of the credulity of a child, than the wisdom of a 
man. If, however, this complete "prostration of the under- 
standing " be, as Mr. Cogan represents it, a matter of neces- 
sity, or, according to the doctrine of a Right Rev. Bishop, a 
duty, in either case, as it appears to me, Protestantism and 
everything connected with it is at an end; since if so great a 
sacrifice must be made, it is quite obvious that the Church of 
Rome has a much fairer claim to it than any other power 
whatever. 

To that part of Mr. Cogan's letter which is intended to show 
the unreasonableness of rejecting Christianity, I have nothing 



150 

to object. I am an advocate for natural religion, not an 
opposer of Christianity. And I think it important to remark, 
that in my judgment, the most complete conviction of the 
eternal truth and universal authority of natural religion is in 
perfect harmony with an entire belief in the supernatural origin 
and great importance of the Christian revelation. From the 
gracious hand of the Giver of every good and perfect gift, and 
not through the medium of the unhallowed decrees of usurp- 
ing priests, or earthly magistrates, I gratefully and joyfully 
receive both. The latter, I verily believe to be true ; the for- 
mer, I certainly know to be so. W. STURCH. 
Euston Square, Feb. 1, 1824. M. R vol. xix. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — The value of Natural Religion is a subject of great 
interest and importance ; and had I sufficient leisure for the 
discussion, and were conscious that I possessed abilities equal 
to it, I should gladly bear my part in a friendly controversy on 
the subject, not with any wish "to run down and bring into 
contempt the religion of nature," but in order to ascertain, if 
possible, how far the discoveries of this religion reach. But 
as I am not the man for such a task, I shall content myself in 
my intended reply to Mr. Sturch's paper (pp. 110-112), with 
making a few detached remarks on his observations : and this 
I shall do with freedom, but, I trust, without violating the 
respect which is due to his talents and character. 

I have said, that " they who contend for the unity and per- 
fections of God, the doctrine of a universal providence, and 
the future existence and immortality of man as inculcated by 
nature, have derived their conviction of them from Christianity, 
and from Christianity alone." And if Mr. Sturch is disposed 
to believe that they would have had the conviction of their 
truth which they now have, had not their lot been cast in a 
Christian land, I can only say that he has my hearty consent. 



151 

We know how tbey originally came by this conviction, and 
that they could have attained it by any other means we never 
can know. And for myself, I should not think favourably 
either of the understanding or the modesty of the man who 
should venture to say that had he been nursed in the lap of 
idolatry, and encompassed from his cradle with the supersti- 
tions of a Pagan worship, he should have felt any assurance 
of the truths above stated. And but for Christianity this 
might have been the case with all the modem advocates of 
natural religion. 

Again, I said, that "If the ancient philosophers really 
believed in a future life, there is sufficient reason to think that 
their faith did not grow out of their reasonings, but that their 
reasonings were laboriously sought for to uphold a precon- 
ceived opinion." Mr. Sturch complains that I have omitted 
to state on what, except reason, this preconceived opinion was 
founded, and he has kindly endeavoured to supply the defi- 
ciency, and supposes that it might be the effect of the reason- 
ings of superior minds on the perfections [of God the Creator, 
and the circumstances of man his creature. It is a pity that 
these reasonings have not been handed down to posterity. I 
have this moment looked once more into Plato's seven argu- 
ments for the immortality of the soul, contained in his famous 
dialogue on that subject, and I do not find Mr. Sturch's rea- 
sonings among them. And that there had existed men in 
some earlier ages who reasoned as Mr. Sturch would now 
reason, is a supposition much less probable than that the 
opinion in question was the traditionary result of some original 
revelation which had been communicated by God to the human 
race. But whatever may be the justice of this remark, I can- 
not but feel persuaded that the expectation of a future life was 
not generated by such reasonings as those of the ancient phi- 
losophers. 

Cicero has certainly stated the argument for the being of 
a God in an able manner, in his second book, De Natura 
Deorum. But if he felt the force of his own reasoning, as 
Mr. Sturch and I have felt it, it is wonderful that he should 



152 

have written many things which he did write in the remaining 
part of the treatise. And much more must be known concern- 
ing God than his simple existence, to make up the sublime 
views which are given of him in the volume of revelation. 
Thus much I readily concede to the advocates of Natural Reli- 
gion, that the argument for the existence of a God is as con- 
clusive as need be, and that from the predominance of good, 
which appears in his works, it is difficult not to conceive of 
him as benevolent. But when I wish to investigate the Divine 
character further, I do not seem to proceed with certainty, but 
rather to lean upon reasonings which may prove fallacious. 
But Cicero, moreover, has expressed a lively expectation of a 
life to come. Mr. Sturch knows what has been said on the 
other side of the question ; to which I shall only add, that this 
expectation does not appear to have been of any service to 
him when its influence was most needed. And this seems to 
hold true of the ancients in general. 

But my zeal in a bad cause has, it seems, betrayed me into 
an error, which, for my consolation, is a common one, that of 
mistaking and caricaturing the opinions which I do not myself 
admit. I had said, that " If we are to believe what we are 
sometimes told concerning the religion of nature, its truths are 
emblazoned in the heavens in characters which all can read, 
and which none can misunderstand ; " and I am called upon 
to inform your readers who they are who have advanced so 
strange and absurd a position. As Mr. Sturch was not per- 
sonally attacked, I might, perhaps, without impropriety, decline 
answering to the call. Or, I might say in my defence, that I 
merely meant to convey the general impression which had 
been made upon my mind by what I had occasionally read and 
heard on the subject of Natural Religion. But I will rather 
present to your readers a passage which accidentally met my 
eye the other day, and which will serve my purpose tolerably 
well. And I leave others to judge whether my observation 
can be considered as a violent caricature of the sentiments 
which it expresses. "God," says my author, "has spread 
before all the world such legible characters of his works and 



153 

providence, and given all mankind such a sufficient light of 
reason, that they to whom his written word never came, could 
not (whenever they set themselves to search) either doubt of 
the being of a God, or of the obedience due to him." * All, 
then, if they pleased, could read and understand the legible 
characters of which the author speaks. And, for my part, I 
know of no truths which are intelligible to all mankind, but 
those which are too plain to be misunderstood. But the 
author shall proceed. " Since the precepts of Natural Eeli- 
gion are plain and very intelligible to all mankind, and 
seldom come to be controverted, and other revealed truths 
which are conveyed to us by books and languages are liable to 
the natural obscurities and difficulties incident to words, me- 
thinks it would become us to be more careful and diligent in 
observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and impe- 
rious in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the 
latter." If Mr. Locke has here given Natural Keligion " an 
advantage over the Bible," the fault is not mine. Did I con- 
sider myself as having a right to call upon Mr. Sturch for an 
explanation of anything in his letter, I should request him to 
tell me a little concerning ' ' the language " in which the truths 
of Natural Beligion are written; whether, for example, it may 
be learned without a teacher, or whether it will be necessary to 
call in the aid of some person of superior mind to explain 

* Mr. Locke, in this passage, makes no mention of a future life ; but 
as he has said elsewhere, that if there be no hope of a life to come, the 
inference is, let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die, he could not, 
when speaking of obedience to the will of God, have altogether ex- 
cluded the doctrine of a future existence from the discoveries of 
Natural Keligion. Mr. Locke speaks of searching for the truths of 
Natural Keligion, and I never supposed any man to say that they could 
be understood by those who would not take the trouble to learn them. 
But that which is intelligible to all mankind, must be very easy to un- 
derstand. And I fear that had Mr. Locke been closely pressed with 
the question, how the most rude and uncivilised of mankind were to set 
about the search spoken of, he would have been obliged to confess that 
the precepts of Natural Religion, to which he alluded, did not differ 
much from those innate principles which he has so ably exploded. 



154 

what otherwise might be obscure and difficult, and to assist us 
in the interpretation of the volume which it is proposed to 
read; in which case this instructor might show something of 
the spirit of those usurping priests who are so justly the 
object of Mr. Sturch's abhorrence. 

But to proceed with my defence ; I had made it a question, 
whether without a divine interposition the superstitions of 
Paganism could have been banished from the earth, and a 
purer religion substituted in their place. Upon this Mr. 
Sturch asks, " From this language, would it not be perfectly 
natural to conclude, that with a divine interposition, this 
happy state of things has been effected, that superstition has 
actually been banished from the world, and a pure religion 
established in its stead ? " The superstitions of which I was 
speaking have been banished from the earth, and Mr. Sturch 
will not choose to say that Christianity is not in itself a pure 
religion. That it would be corrupted in the hands of man, 
every reflecting mind would have anticipated. The corrup- 
tions, indeed, by which its beauty has been defaced are gross 
enough, but as they are not to be " charged on the religion 
itself," I do not see what reason I had to do more than to 
advert to them as I did. To dwell upon them more at large 
would not indeed have "suited the purpose of my letter" 
so well as it might have suited that of Mr. Sturch's reply. 

I now proceed to an observation at which I am not a little 
surprised. I acknowledged that the great majority of man- 
kind are unable to judge of the evidences of revelation, and 
added, that it is not the evidence of a doctrine, but the belief 
of it, which is practically useful. " This language," says Mr. 
Sturch, "from the pen of a liberal Dissenting minister, is 
surely very singular and extraordinary." For aught I know, 
it may be very singular and very extraordinary ; but of this I 
am very sure, that what it expresses is true. And it is to me 
very extraordinary that any sensible man should call its truth 
in question. Aud had not Mr. Sturch's mind been haunted by 
the unsightly forms of those spiritual directors of whom he 
speaks, he could not surely have confounded two things which 



155 

have no affinity to each other, or have attributed to me a sen- 
timent which he might have known could not be mine. To 
submit to spiritual tyranny is one thing > and to rest in the 
judgment of those whom we consider as wiser than ourselves, 
in cases where we are conscious that our own judgment will 
not avail us, is another thing ; and, much as it may " savour 
of the credulity of a child," is conformable to the constitution 
of nature, and the universal experience of mankind. With 
respect to the insolent demands of men who call upon you to 
prostrate your understanding before the dogmas which they 
choose to erect into articles of faith, I should certainly urge it 
upon the most illiterate Christian strenuously to resist them, 
believing it to be infinitely better that he should think for him- 
self as well as he can, than that any man should assume the 
right of thinking for him. But I still maintain, that there are 
multitudes in every Christian country who are altogether in- 
capable of deciding upon the truth or falsehood of the Chris- 
tian religion. But if Mr. Sturch, who is himself a believer, 
would point out any principles which would enable them to 
determine the question, he would effectually refute me, and 
confer a benefit upon them. But it seems, if my remark is 
just, " Protestantism and everything connected with it is at an 
end." This, did I believe it, I should be sorry for. But truth 
is truth, whatever becomes of consequences. There is, how- 
ever, no ground of apprehension. As it has been judiciously 
observed, " The right of private judgment is unquestionable, 
but the ability to exercise that right is quite another thing." 
Nor is it at all necessary in order to refute the arrogant claims 
of the Church of Borne, to maintain that every Christian, 
whatever have been his means of improvement, is competent to 
judge of the evidences of revelation. 

Mr. Sturch has the good fortune to possess two indestruc- 
tible and divine religions, one of which he believes to be true, 
the other (Natural Keligion) he certainly knows to be so. In 
this, Mr. Sturch, who does not seem to have distinguished very 
accurately between faith and knowledge, differs somewhat from 
that zealous champion of Natural Keligion, the author of 



156 

" Apeleutherus," who, if I rightly recollect, when speaking of 
an important article of this religion, says, that certainty is 
entirely out of the question. Were I called upon to decide 
between Mr. Sturch and this anonymous author, I should pro- 
nounce judgment in favour of the latter, and should give it as 
my opinion that Mr. Sturch, in a moment of inadvertency, has 
mistaken a strong persuasion for certain knowledge. 

E. C. 

March, 1824. M. K. vol. xix. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — In my last (p. 137) I quoted a passage from Mr. 
Locke; and as it is always useful to point out the errors 
and inconsistencies of great men, that others may not be 
misled by them, I wish, with your leave, to say another word 
or two on the sentiment which is there expressed. Mr. Locke 
maintains that all mankind without the aid of revelation 
could have attained an undoubting conviction of the being of 
a God, and a knowledge of the obedience which is due to him. 
When Mr. Locke expressed this opinion, he either could not 
have carefully considered what he meant by all mankind, or 
could not have had in his mind what he afterwards wrote 
on the existence of a God, which he regards as the most 
certain of all truths. Of this truth he gives a demonstration, 
which no doubt he thought to be the most clear and simple. 
This demonstration, however, he acknowledges to be complex, 
when he says that " he believes nobody can avoid the cogency 
of it, who will but as carefully attend to it as to any other 
demonstration of so many parts." Of these parts, the first 
indeed is a proposition of which no man can doubt, but 
the rest consist of abstract and metaphysical reasoning. If 
your readers will turn to it (vol. ii. p. 239 et seq.), and then 
ask themselves whether the discovery of this demonstration is 
within the reach of a Hottentot or Indian savage, they will, I 



157 

conceive, agree with me that even that truth which lies at the 
foundation of all religion, whether natural or revealed, is not so 
intelligible to all mankind as Mr. Locke has represented it ; 
unless, indeed, they should fortunately hit upon some shorter 
and easier method of proof. But if the first principle of 
religion is involved in obscurity, as to multitudes of the human 
race, what shall we say of the whole system which is to 
be deduced from it ? But Mr. Locke, as appears from what 
he says elsewhere, was misled by the opinion that it is inconsis- 
tent with the wisdom and goodness of God, not to furnish all 
mankind with the means of knowing the great principles 
of religion. But surely we may leave in the hands of a mer- 
ciful Creator those to whom these opportunities have been 
denied. If I have pointed out an error in Mr. Locke, I have 
done nothing but what this great and good man would have 
wished to be done ; and, perhaps, nothing but what the light 
which he himself shed over the world of intellect has enabled 
me to do. 

One word more, and I have done. If the advocates of 
Natural Religion would content themselves with saying, that 
its principles may be discovered by men of thought and 
reflection, and by their means be diffused among mankind in 
general, they would not run into palpable absurdity ; but when 
they maintain that the truths of this religion, that is, the 
truths of which this religion is usually said to consist, are 
intelligible to every human being who will give himself the 
trouble to inquire into them (which implies that every human 
being is capable of conducting such an inquiry), they lay 
down a position which is not to be surpassed in extravagance 
by the wildest vagaries of the human mind — a position, which 
it would be the extreme of folly wilfully to misstate, and 
which it would be no easy task to caricature. 

E. C. 

April, 1824. M. R. vol. xix. 



158 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — To my remarks (p. 110), perhaps rather too uncere- 
moniously expressed, on the Rev. Mr. Cogan's paper on the 
Evidences of Christianity, that gentleman has replied, in your 
publication of this day, in a spirit of mildness and candour, 
which does him the highest honour, and which would greatly 
tend to increase, if that were possible, the respect with which 
his character is regarded by all who know him. I shall endea- 
vour to follow his example in the few observations I have to 
make on his reply. 

Mr. Cogan appears to treat with great scorn the supposition, 
that men unacquainted with the Christian revelation may 
believe in the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a 
universal Provideuce, and the future existence and immortality 
of man. He declares that he should not think favourably 
either of the understanding or the modesty of the man who 
should venture to say so; and he says, "If Mr. Sturch is dis- 
posed to believe that they would have had the conviction of 
their truth which they now have, had not their lot been cast in 
a Christian land, I can only say, that he has my hearty con- 
sent." Now, sir, Mr. Cogan, who is much better acquainted 
with antiquity than I can be supposed to be, well knows, that 
all these doctrines have been believed before the Christian 
revelation had any existence. He knows, too, that the belief 
of a Deity and a future life, though always more or less dis- 
figured and debased by superstition and absurdity, has been 
very general, I might say universal, in all ages. He knows 
that these doctrines were believed by the heathen inhabitants 
of this island, in their rude and savage state ; and it is for Mr. 
Cogan to show, which I think he will find it difficult to do, 
that they would not have been generally believed to this day, 
whether Christianity had been introduced or not. For my own 
part, I see no reason whatever to doubt that they ivould ; and, 
probably, in a much improved state, bearing some proportion 



159 

to the civilisation of the country. But if by the words, "con- 
viction of their truth which they now have" Mr. Cogan 
means the same clear, full, rational and consistent informa- 
tion on these subjects, that we derive from the Christian revela- 
tion, I beg leave to assure him that no such supposition ever 
entered into my mind. For although I have no doubt what- 
ever that the light of nature opens to mankind in general the 
prospect of futurity, yet I believe that even to the strongest 
eyes it must appear somewhat indistinct and imperfect ; and I 
therefore rejoice in that splendid and glorious light which the 
Christian revelation throws over the scene, and for which I can 
never be sufficiently thankful. 

Mr. Cogan seems desirous of declining the task of pointing 
out to us in whose writings it is that the truths of Natural 
Religion are spoken of as " emblazoned in the heavens in 
characters which all can read, and none can misunder- 
stand!' The only passage he quotes is from Locke, and he 
thinks it will answer his purpose tolerably well ; but, I con- 
fess, I think quite otherwise, inasmuch as I can discover in it 
nothing more than the plain, simple position, that the light of 
nature is sufficient to convince those who " set themselves to 
search," that there is a God to whom obedience is due; a 
position which, I presume, Mr. Cogan will not venture to deny, 
after having, in this very letter, on which I am remarking, told 
us that he " readily concedes to the advocates for Natural Reli- 
gion, that the argument for the being of a God is as conclu- 
sive as need be, and that from the predominance of good 
which appears in his works, it is difficult not to conceive of 
him as benevolent!' By the word God, I presume, he means 
a Creator and Governor of the world; and if this Creator and 
Governor is also a kind and benevolent Benefactor, Mr. Cogan 
will, doubtless, admit the conclusion to be very natural, that 
obedience is due to him. In a note on this quotation, Mr. 
Cogan goes on to say, "Mr. Locke speaks of searching for 
the truths of Natural Religion ; and I never supposed any man 
to say, that they could be understood by those who would not 
take the trouble to learn them. But that which is intelli- 



160 

gible to all mankind, must be very easy to understand? 
Now, from this position, I must beg leave to withhold my 
assent. By all mankind, I suppose, we do not mean every 
individual without exception. We do not intend, for instance, 
tc include idiots ; but we mean mankind in general. Now, I 
think, I know many things which mankind in general are very 
capable of learning and understanding, if they will take the 
trouble to do so, which yet cannot be said to be very easy. 
It can hardly be doubted, I suppose, that at least nine out of 
ten of mankind, if taken at a proper age, may be taught the 
chief rules of arithmetic; though these are so far from being 
very easy, that they certainly are far more difficult to under- 
stand than the leading principles of morals. Indeed, the very 
phrases, " take the trouble" and " set themselves to search" 
plainly show that all is not perfectly easy, but that there are 
some difficulties to be overcome by persevering labour ; and, 
I will add, by all the assistance that the learner can obtain. 
For I will not hesitate a moment to satisfy Mr. Cogan's 
curiosity, by answering in the affirmative the question which 
he suggests, but modestly doubts whether he has any right to 
put to me, concerning the propriety of calling in, as often as it 
may be needful, the aid of some person of superior mind, to 
explain whatever may be obscure or difficult. I would, how- 
ever, advise Mr. Cogan not to distress himself with fears, lest 
the instructor should show something of the spirit of the 
usurping priest, of which I think there is little danger; for to 
repeat what I have elsewhere said, there is " this unspeakable 
advantage in favour of Natural Religion ; that whoever under- 
takes to inculcate its pure and salutary maxims is on a footing 
of perfect equality with his fellow-men." He can assume no 
dictatorial authority, nor exact from them any implicit obedience. 
As he cannot have the shadow of pretence for " dominion over 
their faith," he must content himself with being the <( helper of 
their joy." In short, it appears to me that the quotations from 
Locke are extremely unfortunate, and not in any degree rele- 
vant to Mr. Cogan's purpose ; and as he has not produced any 
other authority to justify the use of the language to which I 



161 

objected, I must consider his omitting to do so, as a tacit 
admission, that if it was not the language of misstatement 
and caricature, it was, to say the least, a little too strong. 

I proceed now to remark on the surprise which Mr. Cogan 
expresses to my objection to his notion of the value of belief 
without evidence. He tells us he is very sure that it is true ; 
and he maintains "that there are multitudes in every Christian 
country who are altogether incapable of deciding on the truth 
or falsehood of the Christian religion." Now, if he means 
that there are multitudes who are incapable of deciding with 
certainty on the external evidence of Christianity, that is, of the 
truth of every miracle related in the New Testament, or in any 
writer of the earliest Christian age, I not only admit the truth 
of the position, but I go a great deal further, — I believe that 
there is not one man upon the face of the earth who is compe- 
tent to the decision. But if his meaning be, that men in 
general have no adequate means of judging whether the 
important truths inculcated in the New Testament are worthy 
to be received and acted upon, I must be allowed to differ from 
him in to to. For being fully persuaded that Cicero was right 
in vindicating the authority of Eight Reason in his book " De 
Republica ; " — that St. Paul was right in asserting the universal 
obligation of the Law of Nature, in his Epistle to the Romans ; 
— that Bishop Sherlock was right in maintaining that " the 
religion of the Gospel is the true original religion of Reason 
and Nature ;" — that Locke was right when he said that " God 
had discovered to men the Unity and Majesty of his Eternal 
Godhead, and the truths of Natural Religion, by the light of 
Reason ; — that the learned and excellent Lardner was right in 
affirming " that St. Paul was not wont to deny and contest, but 
to improve the natural notions which men had of Religion ; " — 
that the Reverend Robert Robinson was right in saying, "a 
conformity between the dictates of Nature and the precepts of 
Revelation, is the best proof of the divinity of the latter;" — 
and that Archdeacon Paley, and a thousand others, have been 
right in asserting the authority of both natural and super- 
natural revelation ; and having myself read the New Testa- 

M 



162 

ment with care, and found it to consist principally of con- 
firmation and illustration of Natural Religion, which, I am 
persuaded, men in general, being properly educated, are capable 
of understanding and justly appreciating, — I deem it a libel on 
human nature to assert that mankind are incapable of judging 
for themselves, and that they must and ought to depend for 
their religious ideas on any dictatorial governor, whether eccle- 
siastical or civil. 

Mr. Cogan, adverting to my profession of attachment both 
to Natural Religion and to Christianity, the latter of which I 
have said " / verily believe to be true ; the former I certainly 
know to be so " — imagines that he has discovered some differ- 
ence of opinion on this subject between me and the author of 
a book, entitled " Apeleutherus ; " who, in speaking of a par- 
ticular article of religious belief, says that certainty is 
entirely out of the question. And, as it is well known to 
Mr. Cogan, and to my friends in general, that the author of 
that book and myself are in reality one and the same person, I 
must, of course, be sorry and ashamed, if there should be 
found to be any material difference between us. But I hope 
that a few words of explanation will show that the supposed 
difference is rather in appearance than in reality; and will 
satisfy both Mr. Cogan, and another of your correspondents, 
whose signature is B., that they have both misunderstood my 
meaning. When I spoke of Natural Keligion as certainly 
true, I should have thought it quite obvious that I was consi- 
dering its general or abstract character, and not inquiring into 
the particulars of which it might be supposed to consist. And, 
undoubtedly, as a general position, it may be safely affirmed, 
that whatever can be proved to be a principle of Natural 
Religion must be true ; because the witnesses of this religion 
— the heavens, which declare the glory of God — the firmament, 
which showeth his handiwork — day unto day uttereth speech 
— night unto night showeth knowledge — cannot for a moment 
be imagined to bear false testimony. But with respect to the 
supposed particulars of this religion the case is different. In 
considering them the question arises, — What is the testimony 



163 

that these witnesses give, and to what extent does it go ? And 
in some cases, the answer to this question may not be so clear 
and satisfactory as we could wish; probability may be the 
utmost that we can obtain — certainty, in such cases, may 
be entirely out of the question. With regard to Supernatural 
Religion, I have no hesitation in affirming that it is always, in 
some degree, dependent upon things which are, in their own 
nature, fallacious; and, therefore, whether it be considered 
in the abstract or in the detail of any particular revelation, 
certainty must be entirely out of the question. It may still, 
however, possess a high degree of probability, and be entitled 
to be " verily believed." If, therefore, Mr. Locke, in the pas- 
sages quoted by Mr. Cogan, has really given Natural Religion 
" an advantage over the Bible," it was no great " fault," and 
Mr. Cogan need not be very anxious to clear himself from the 
suspicion of being the accomplice of that illustrious man. 

Notwithstanding my declaration of attachment both to 
natural and supernatural revelation, with, however, an undis- 
guised preference of the authority of the former, I cannot 
admit the congratulatory statement of Mr. Cogan, that I have 
" the good fortune to possess two religions." On the contrary, 
I am decidedly of opinion that there never was or can be more 
than one true and acceptable religion; winch, as it has been 
well observed by my late learned and valuable friend, the Rev. 
Charles Bulkeley, " being originally founded in the perfections 
of God, and the nature of man, must of necessity, in every 
period of time, and under every particular dispensation of it, 
be fundamentally and essentially the same." 

I now take leave of this controversy, regretting that it has 
been my painful duty to appear in opposition to the opinions 
of a gentleman whose personal character I so highly esteem ; 
and, thanking you, sir, for permitting me to occupy so much 
space in the pages of your valuable Miscellany. 

WILLIAM STURCH. 

April 1st, 1824. M. R. vol. xix. 



M % 



104 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — My acknowledgments are due to Mr. Sturch for the 
handsome manner in which he has spoken of the temper with 
which I replied to his animadversions (p. 220). His last paper 
will furnish matter for an observation or two which I wish to 
make, not from the love of controversy nor the desire of victory, 
but for the sake of truth, in a matter of some moment. 

Mr. Sturch acknowledges that Christianity has cast a glo- 
rious light on the future hopes of man. But if I rightly under- 
stand Mr. Sturch 's views, he considers Christianity as borrow- 
ing its principal evidence from its conformity to the Keligion 
of Nature. Now, as far as this is the case, Christianity can- 
not render any truth more clear than the Religion of Nature 
had previously rendered it. Christianity, then, must possess a 
clear and satisfactory evidence altogether distinct from that 
which it derives from its conformity to Natural Religion ; and 
if this evidence does not amount to certainty, it must amount 
to something that to practical purposes will serve as well. 

By all mankind, Mr. Sturch means mankind in general. 
Mr. Locke meant something more. He did not, it is true, 
include idiots in this expression ; but he, doubtless, meant all 
who possess the common faculties of human nature. And I 
must repeat, that those truths, which are intelligible to all 
mankind, must be too plain to be misunderstood. So that 
the quotation from Mr. Locke, though not the most appropriate 
that might have been selected, was not altogether irrelevant to 
my purpose. 

I suspected that it might be necessary to call in the aid of 
some spiritual guide to interpret the Religion of Nature, and 
that its truths are not quite so clear as they are sometimes 
represented. And I am confirmed in the opinion that some 
obscurity hangs over this religion, when I recollect that different 
commentators annex different interpretations to the language 
in which it is written. To instance in the doctrine of a future 



165 

life : Dr. Clarke professes to demonstrate this doctrine chiefly 
from the inequality of the Divine dispensations in relation to 
the virtuous and the vicious. This demonstration Mr. Sturch 
altogether rejects; and, if my memory does not deceive me, 
maintains what Dr. Clarke considers as altogether untenable, 
that virtue is in every case its own reward. Another maybe 
as little satisfied with Mr. Sturch's reasonings, as Mr. Sturch is 
with the reasonings of Dr. Clarke. And a third may reject as 
inefficient and inconclusive the reasonings of both Dr. Clarke 
and Mr. Sturch. So that it does, indeed, appear that though 
the Eeligion of Nature is certainly true, "in its general and 
abstract character," yet " with regard to the supposed particulars 
of this religion the case is different," and that " certainty may 
he entirely out of the question!' Here I am led to observe, 
that he who certainly knows that what nature teaches must be 
true, but does not certainly know what it is that nature does 
teach, knows no more than what is known to every other man. 
Every man is aware that " the heavens which declare the glory 
of God cannot be imagined to bear false testimony." But as 
Mr. Sturch observes, " the question arises, what is the testimony 
that they give, and to what extent does it go ? " And to this 
question different answers will be returned, which may perplex, 
the inquirer quite as much as " interpolated texts and various 
readings." But, it seems, while certainty may be out of the 
question with respect to the truths of Natural Eeligion, it must 
always be out of the question with regard to the truths of 
revelation. But why so? If Christianity is allowed to be 
true, then, as it confirms the Eeligion of Nature, and "is 
fundamentally the same with this religion," it must partake 
of the same certainty, which is indeed no certainty at all, if 
Natural Eeligion is only certain as to its authority, and this 
certainty cannot be transferred to the principles which it incul- 
cates.* But Christianity, moreover, has its separate and inde- 

* Mr. Sturch observes, that " whatever can be proved to be a prin- 
ciple of Natural Eeligion must be true? But as some difficulty attends 
this proof, and Mr. Sturch has not enabled us to distinguish between 
those truths which Nature teaches with certainty, and those in which 



166 

pendent evidence. And the value of this evidence appears from 
the fact, that it is this by which Christianity has thrown that 
" splendid and glorious light over the prospect of futurity," for 
which Mr. Sturch very properly says that he can never be suf- 
ficiently thankful. But supernatural religion is " always in 
some degree dependent upon things which are in their own 
nature fallacious." Here Mr. Sturch probably alludes, in part, 
to historical testimony, of which his views are somewhat sin- 
gular, and which he is disposed to distrust in exact proportion 
to the importance of the conclusions which are to be drawn 
from it. And hence, perhaps, he not only allows with me that 
multitudes are incapable of deciding on the external evidence 
of Christianity, but maintains, that not one man upon the face 
of the earth is competent to the decision— a decision which, it 
seems, involves the necessity of determining on the truth of 
every miracle related in the New Testament. However, that 
these miracles, collectively and singly, are worthy of belief, I 
am happy to pronounce, upon the authority of Mr. Sturch him- 
self, who in Apeleutherus expresses himself in words to this 
effect — that the doctrine of Jesus and his Apostles is so far 
beyond their natural means of knowledge as to constitute a 
miracle, and a miracle which renders all the rest credible. If 
this be so, I need give myself little uneasiness about those 
passages of Scripture which " defy all human power of inter- 
pretation." But though the external evidence of Christianity 
is so difficult to decide upon, yet " men in general, being pro- 
perly educated," are capable of judging how far its truths are 
worthy to be received, by their conformity to the principles of 
Natural Beligion. This is so far well. But what are they to 
do who have not been " properly educated," or who have not 
been educated at all ? I am afraid that they must be con- 
tented to believe upon authority, that is, to take upon trust the 
opinions which prevail in the communities to which they be- 
long. However, I have the satisfaction to feel assured, that 
their incapacity of judging for themselves does not confer upon 

'probability is the utmost that we can obtain, I am at liberty to suppose 
that some little uncertainty is attached to most of them, if not to all. 



1.67 

any man, or body of men, a right to judge for them; so that 
the interests of Protestantism are still secure. 

Upon the whole, from the descriptions which are given of the 
Religion of Nature, T find it utterly impossible to ascertain 
what is its true character and value. It is sometimes said to be 
*' intelligible to every human being who is willing to open his 
eyes and fix them attentively on its luminous and instructive 
lessons;" sometimes its principles require that men should 
be "properly educated" in order to understand them. Its 
authority is higher than that of revelation, but the informa- 
tion which it gives is not so clear, full, rational, and con- 
sistent. It is certainly true in the abstract, but falls short of 
certainty in its supposed particulars, which is something like 
being certain and uncertain at the same time. It is the main 
support of Christianity, and in return (which indeed is equita- 
ble enough) it receives from Christianity a splendid and glo- 
rious light which it does not itself possess, and consequently 
cannot diffuse. All that here appears clear and intelligible is, 
that of the two religions, if I may still be allowed to call them 
two, Christianity is, as I always suspected, by far the more 
valuable and important. But I am impatient to take my leave 
of the controversy, which I do without any diminution of the 
respect which I have been long accustomed to feel for the cha- 
racter and talents of my opponent. And if he shall appear 
here and there to have reasoned inconsistently, of which I do 
not make myself the judge, the reader will, I doubt not, attri- 
bute it, with me, to the difficulty of maintaining the divine 
origin of Christianity, together with the superior authority of 
Natural Religion. E. C. 

May 24, 1824. M. E. vol. xis. 

[The above article concludes the controversy between Mr. 
Cogan and Mr. Sturch upon the subject of Natural Religion. 
The reader will see that it was carried on with spirit on both 
sides ; and I think it right to state, that it did not in the least 
degree interrupt the friendship which existed between them, for 
many years.] 



168 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Lately, when I was on a visit in the country, I laid my 
hands on the Evangelical Magazine, and noticed the passage on 
which your correspondent E. B. has animadverted with just 
severity, p. 409. When I read the passage I said, This is in 
course, and gives me no concern. But I am sorry to find that 
a learned and estimable man, the Bishop of St. David's, should 
have chosen to pronounce in the House of Lords that Unitarians 
are not Christians. Whether the Bishop means that they are 
unbelievers in disguise, or that, though they fancy themselves 
Christians, they are not really such, I neither know nor wish to 
be informed. But as I would willingly suppose that the Bishop 
does not profess to search the secrets of the heart, I shall con- 
sider his declaration as meaning, that though Unitarians believe 
what they profess to believe, still they are not entitled to the 
appellation of Christians. What then is the definition of the 
term Christian ? I should propose the following : a Christian 
is one who admits the divine mission of Christ, and consequently 
acknowledges his religion as the rule of faith and practice. 
And I should add, that he who successfully endeavours to act 
up to the moral precepts of this religion, in the expectation of 
a life to come, is a real and a good Christian. This definition 
would not satisfy the Bishop of St. David's ; nor, I presume, 
would the Bishop's definition satisfy the Catholic. But the 
Bishop, no doubt, would say that the Unitarian rejects the 
essential doctrines of Christianity. But who is authorised to 
determine what are and what are not its essential doctrines ? 
Until this question is settled, it may seem reasonable to con- 
clude that those doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity 
which are inculcated in the New Testament with such perspi- 
cuity and force, that they have been admitted, in every age, 
though with various combinations of error, by all who have 
borne the Christian name. The doctrines for which the Bishop 
is so zealous are doubtless essential to the system which he con- 



169 

siders as Christianity, but I should marvel if his Lordship, with 
the aid of all who think with him, could prove them to he 
essential to the great practical object of the Christian faith, 
that is, to living soberly, righteously, and godly in this present 
world, in the expectation of " that blessed hope, and the glorious 
appearing of the great God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ." 
Not awed by the Bishop's skill in Greek, I repeat the words, 
"and of our Saviour Jesus Christ;" which version is not in- 
consistent with the terms of the original, as the Greeks not 
unfrequently pass from one subject to another without repeating 
the article before the second. Of this some curious examples 
may be found in Thucydides. I know the canon by which it 
has been attempted to prove the divinity of Christ from the 
passage now cited. But in the application of the canon it is 
assumed, that the expression, "the great God," can be an attri- 
butive of the subject, Jesus Christ. But if this can be, how 
comes it to pass that we never meet with the simple expression 
our God Jesus Christ in the New Testament? an expression 
which was used when the divinity of our Lord was at length 
believed. Jesus Christ is sometimes called our Saviour, but his 
usual designation is that of " our Lord;" a designation which 
occurs about 100 times in the epistolary part of the New Tes- 
tament. But in no one instance is he simply called our God. 
But, perhaps, some one may say, is not the passage in question 
rendered ambiguous by the omission of the article ? Ambiguous 
to whom ? I will venture to say that it was ambiguous to no 
one who read the epistle in the age in which it was penned. 
But granting it to be ambiguous, which version has a just 
right to be preferred, that which makes Jesus Christ the same 
with the great Supreme, or that which distinguishes him from his 
Father and our Father, his God and our God ; that which makes 
the passage speak a language consistent with the tenor of the 
sacred volume from beginning to end, or that which imports 
into it an inexplicable mystery which has no support whatever 
except from two or three passages of dubious construction ? 
Yet for explaining these passages in such a manner as to render 
them conformable to innumerable clear and express declara- 



170 

lions of Scripture, Unitarians are reproached as unlearned, and 
pronounced not to be Christians ! 

I believe the Bishop of St. David's to be a Christian, and 
though in my judgment a mistaken, yet a conscientious Christian. 
But allow me to define the essentials of the Christian faith, 
and let me imbibe a little of his Lordship's spirit, and borrow 
his Lordship's mode of reasoning, and I shall be able to show 
that he has no just claim to this appellation. Christianity, I 
should say, teaches that God is one undivided essence or 
person ; but this fundamental doctrine the Bishop does not 
believe ; therefore the Bishop is no Christian. 

" Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam ! " 

E. C. 
Sept. 24, 1824. M. R. vol. xix. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Having in my last (pp. 531 — 533) alluded to a 
grammatical canon which has been applied to prove the divi- 
nity of Christ, I will now, with your leave, state the canon, 
as given in the " Classical Journal," No. XVI., and make an 
observation or two upon it. " When two or more attributives 
joined by a copulative or copulatives are assumed of the same 
person or thing, before the first attributive the article is inserted, 
before the remaining ones it is omitted" That this canon 
holds true in general I have no doubt. But it is manifest that 
it is applicable only when the noun which has the article can 
be an attributive of the subject which is to follow. And it is 
worthy of observation, that the epistolary writers of the New 
Testament do not commonly use the article with an attributive 
standing before the name of Jesus Christ, when such attri- 
butive is introduced by a conjunction, the word ®£oj having 
preceded. Before ®eo$, in such case, I contend, that they 



171 

employ the article or not, as the occasion may require. Such 
passages as the following are numerous, awo ©sou Traroog rifxcov, 
nai Kupiou Iyktqu Xgicrrou, and in all these passages Kugiog is the 
same to us as b Kvgiog; and before ©sog the article is not 
wanted. Should it be said that the article is omitted before 
Kvgiog because it is omitted before ©sog, I answer that this rea- 
son, simply considered, is not sufficient, as might easily be 
shown.* In the Epistle of James i. 1, we read, lanu(3og ©sou 
nai Kugiou Iwou X^icrrou SouXog. Here the article before ©sog is 
omitted as unnecessary; hence Paul also writes, H<xu\og $ou\og 
©sou. 2 Thess. i. 12, we read tcara tyiv x a % iV rou ® £0y hfmv, 
nai Kupiou lyaou XqicnQu. Here the article is inserted, because 
b ©sog ri/Auv is more correct than ©sog tipav. In the first Epistle 
to Timothy v. 21, we find b^ia/xa^rupo/xai evcottiqv tou ©sou ttai 
Kufioo Iyio-ou Xfio-Tov. Here again the article is inserted, because 
evcottiov tov ©sou is the usual expression. But the apostle, it 
seems, in these instances ought to have inserted the article 
before Kupiou, if he did not intend that Jesus Christ should be 
considered as both God and Lord. But what if in the view of 
the apostle he could not be thus considered ? And certainly 
his habitual practice of speaking of God and our Lord Jesus 
Christ in the same sentence, as distinct from each other, con- 
stitutes a point of difference between these passages and those 
cases to which the canon is justly applied. In illustration of 
the canon, the following words of iEschines have been quoted : 
o auKo<pav7yg hoci TrsfiEoyog Awaoo-Qevyis. But who sees not, from 
the observations which have now been made, that this passage 
is not analogous to the controverted passages in the New Tes- 
ment, except inform, and that their coincidence in this respect 
may justly be considered as accidental ? We read b Kugiog 
y\(jlo)v Koci acomp Iy\aoug Xgio-Tog ; and here the canon holds good. 
But Ku^iog y/xcov not only is an attributive, but a perpetual 
attributive of Jesus Christ ; whereas ©Eog and Kugiog lr\o-oug 
Xpiarog are perpetually distinguished from each other. It is 
easy to lay hold of a rule, and to apply it to cases which 

* The following passage is worthy of notice : e| ov kcii aa>Tr)pa aireicde- 
XOjJLeda Kvpiov Ir]<rovv Kpiarov. Philipp. iii. 20. 



172 

appear similar, without considering in what they differ, but this 
has never yet been deemed the part of sound criticism; nor will 
any vigilant critic suffer himself to accept an imperfect for a 
perfect analogy. 

In a word, the canon in question will prove nothing until 
the divinity of Christ shall have been established by other evi- 
dence, and when this shall have been done, I shall say of the 
canon, valeat quantum valere potest. But were I a Trinitarian, 
I should wonder that Jesus Christ should never be called our 
God, except with another appellation. I do not question the 
sincerity of those who endeavour to support the divinity of 
Christ by this canon, but I am persuaded that they would 
gladly exchange all the passages to which it has been applied 
for one such expression as the following, 6 ®eog vipm Ino-ovg 
Xgi?ro$. E. C. 

Nov. 1, 1824. M. E. vol. xix. 

P.S. When I said that the epistolary writers of the New 
Testament do not commonly use the article with an attributive 
standing before the name of Jesus Christ, &c, I had in mind 
the following passage, 2 Tim. iv. 1, Aia/jLagTUfopai ouv eyu evu- 
ttiov tou ©sou Hai tou Kugtou lno~ou XgicrTou, and I did not 
know whether there might not be one or two passages similar 
to this. But I believe that there are not ; and I find that tou 
Kupiou is excluded from the text of Griesbach. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — I have read Dr. Channing's last sermon with great 
pleasure and interest. A glowing fervour of feeling, controlled 
by a vigorous understanding, breathes in every page. But I 
am sorry that he should have thought it necessary to cast 
certain reflections upon the English Unitarians, and upon that 
eminently great and good man Dr. Priestley. To these reflec- 



173 

tions I should probably have replied, had not this been already- 
done by abler hands. But there is one observation relative to 
Dr. P. on which I cannot forbear to make a remark. Dr. 
Priestley is represented as " distinguished more for rapidity 
than for profoundness of thought." To this I reply, without 
hesitation, that if to think justly is to think profoundly ; that 
if in every matter of controversy to see where the question 
hinges, and to separate that which is extraneous from 
that which is essential ; that if to penetrate into the abstruser 
mysteries of metaphysical science, and to make that clear to 
many which before perplexed the few ; that if to dive into the 
recesses of the human mind, and thence to draw forth negative 
reasonings to array against what had passed for positive proofs; 
that if all this indicates profoundness of thought, Dr. Priestley 
was the profoundest thinker of his age. But what is it, after 
all, that not unfrequently passes for profoundness of thought ? 
Laborious research, which promises much, and accomplishes 
nothing. Instances might be produced of writers who have 
been thought profound, who have seldom arrived at a just con- 
clusion, who have only lost themselves in the depth of their 
own conceptions, and bewildered those who have admired their 
profundity. It is said, indeed, that truth lies hid in a well ; 
and, as though misled by this adage, we sometimes overlook it 
when before our eyes, and then take vast pains to draw it from 
its deep retirement. And when we have fatigued ourselves 
with a tedious and fruitless search, we either reward our labour 
by embracing a shadow for the substance, or charge our own 
blindness on the supposed obscurity of the thing pursued. In 
fact, it is not so much profundity of thought which is necessary 
for the discovery of truth, as a quickness of perception to see 
what kind and degree of evidence are required, and a compre- 
hension of mind which can balance arguments against objec- 
tions, and ascertain on which side the scale preponderates. 
But to return to Dr. Priestley. Dr. Priestley, then, was a man 
in whom acuteness and comprehension of intellect were com- 
bined in a pre-eminent degree. In the grasp of his under- 
standing and the extent of his views, he far indeed surpassed 



174 

every contemporary writer of whom I have any knowledge. 
And in accordance at once with the greatness of his concep- 
tions and the singleness of his soul, he writes with a simplicity 
which has seldom been paralleled, and never surpassed. Bent 
on some great object, he never stops to set off a single idea to 
the best advantage, but as though secure as to the general 
validity of his reasonings, he leaves the naked truth to make 
its own impression. From a magnanimity of thought pecu- 
liarly his own, he overlooks inferior objections which might be 
brought against the views which he defends, or those which he 
attacks, and never descends to those subtleties which have 
secured a more general admiration to writers whose talents 
have borne no comparison to his. In one respect, I confess, 
Dr. Priestley was not a profound thinker; — he thought with- 
out effort, and enables his reader, for the time being, to think 
without effort also. He often seizes his point at once, and 
gains by a glance resembling intuition what others would have 
endeavoured to establish by the formalities of a long and 
elaborate proof. He is never obscure, and therefore never 
leaves us to wonder at the depth of that knowledge which we 
find ourselves unable to comprehend. But Dr. Priestley some- 
times errs in his judgment. And who does not? But it is 
matter of just astonishment that a man who thought so 
rapidly should have erred so little. And I feel the fullest 
conviction, that he has not erred at all on some of those topics 
on which many English Unitarians, together with Dr. Chan- 
ning, differ from him. Upon the whole, I do not think that 
Dr. Priestley's talents are held in the estimation which they 
deserve by those who are so much indebted to his labours. 
His moral excellence will indeed be acknowledged by all except 
weak men and bigots, " whose praise is censure, and whose 
censure praise." But few seem to me to form a just estimate 
of his intellectual endowments, or to understand how great a 
man he was. 

If I may be allowed to occupy a little more space in your 
pages, I should willingly make an observation or two on cer- 
tain positions of Dr. Channing's, which are found in the same 



175 

note with his remarks on Dr. Priestley. Dr. Channing gives 
it as his opinion, that "reason teaches that the supernatural 
must occupy either a large space or none at all, in the Divine 
administration." From what premises this conclusion follows, 
I am at a loss to discover. Reason seems rather to teach, that 
under the administration of an infinitely wise Being, who has 
confessedly instituted a system of general laws, supernatural 
interposition need not be frequent, and fact in this case seems 
to confirm what reason dictates. But Dr. Channing further 
remarks, that " it may be said of men, in whom the intellect 
acts alone, or in whom it is disjoined in a great degree from 
imagination, taste, and refined moral sentiment, and from the 
perception and feeling of the great, the good, and the lovely, 
that although they claim for themselves peculiarly the character 
of rational, they are among the last to discover the rational 
in religion,!' I hope that I am not too old to learn, since I 
feel that I am willing to be taught ; but this is a lesson which 
I fear that I shall find it difficult to apprehend, having always 
thought that the great impediment to the discovery of religious 
truth has been, that in the pursuit of it intellect does not act 
alone. And hence I have explained what otherwise would 
have appeared inexplicable, how it comes to pass that men of 
sense and reflection can resist the evidence of truths which 
appear to me to admit of as clear and easy demonstration as 
any proposition in Euclid. I have heard, indeed, that carnal 
reason cannot judge of spiritual things. This, however, I have 
always considered as the refuge of absurdity, as the evasion of 
men who have felt a galling conviction that they were engaged 
in the defence of an irrational system. But I did not expect 
to hear that reason without some foreign aid cannot discover 
the rational in religion. But according to Dr. Channing, 
imagination, taste, and refined moral sentiment, must be called 
in to assist the decisions of the intellect, and to guard it 
against the errors into which, when acting alone, it will be 
prone to fall. How it may be on the other side of the At- 
lantic, I cannot tell, but on our side of the water there are 
men not deficient in understanding, who profess to see in 



176 

Calvinism the perfection of moral harmony and beauty. Now 
as Calvinism certainly does not make its appeal to the intellect 
alone, I presume that these gentlemen must find it to accord 
with their imagination, taste, and moral sentiment, and perhaps 
(strange as it might appear to me) they may derive an argu- 
ment in its favour from their " perception and feeling of the 
great, the good, and the lovely." It will be in vain to reply, 
that their taste, imagination, and moral sentiment must be 
miserably perverted ; they doubtless think otherwise, and un- 
less the appeal be made to reason, and to reason alone, it will 
be impossible to prove that they do not think justly. But 
Dr. Channing has moreover observed, that "that system of 
faith alone is rational which accords with man's whole nature, 
and especially with his moral nature, and with those high 
spiritual faculties and sensibilities which adapt and direct the 
mind to God, and to a nobler existence than the present." 
But the question is, whether the views which, in Dr. Chan- 
nine's ojrinion, accord best with man's moral nature, are or 
are not the views of Scripture. I am ready enough to allow 
that a system of divine truth must in reality be adapted to the 
moral nature of man; but there is a better judge of that adap- 
tation than either Dr. Channing or myself — I mean the great 
Author of Revelation, who, though He has doubtless done all 
that it was right to do for the moral improvement of mankind, 
may not have done all that our imaginations might have an- 
ticipated, or all that our " sensibilities" may crave. But, to 
return to the remark which I chiefly proposed to consider, I 
would observe, that imagination, taste, and moral sentiment, 
unless they are under the guidance of reason, will rather 
impede than promote the discovery of truth, as in this case 
taste will be false, imagination delusive, and moral sentiment 
incorrect. Taste, imagination, and moral seutiment, are terms 
which are grateful to the ear from the pleasing ideas with 
which they are connected, but the things intended by these 
terms differ in different individuals according to the countless 
variety of influences and associations to which they have been 
exposed ; and unless Dr. Channing can point out a method by 



177 

which they may be rectified to the standard of pure reason and 
abstract truth, they must, if listened to, in innumerable in- 
stances lead to error. Dr. Channing's reasoning seems to pro- 
ceed upon the supposition that, while the naked intellect will 
pronounce one judgment, taste, imagination, and moral senti- 
ment will pronounce another. Which ought to yield in the 
conflict, I cannot for a moment doubt. But if Dr. Channing 
means (which perhaps he does mean), that where true taste, a 
correct imagination, and just moral sentiment, are combined, 
they will imperceptibly guide the judgment, and save it from 
the chilling, errors into which it might otherwise fall, — in this 
case, it is true, no conflict will be experienced, and our in- 
quiries may proceed with a smooth and uninterrupted current ; 
but the misfortune is, that it is difficult to say when taste is 
true, when imagination is correct, and when moral sentiment 
is just; and this must be decided by reason, if decided at all. 
In few words, unless we mean to open a door for enthusiasm, 
we must admit that in the study of revealed truth, as of all 
other truth, reason is the sovereign authority to which every- 
thing else must bow. Nor need we wish to call in any prin- 
ciple whatever to assist the "naked intellect" in the study of 
religious truth, since the views which the sacred volume will 
unfold to the understanding alone are of the most sublime 
and elevating character, and, if cordially received, are abun- 
dantly sufficient to work upon the best affections of our moral 
nature, and to " make us wise unto salvation." That imagi- 
nation, taste, and moral sentiment may be of great use in illus- 
trating and enforcing these views, I am very ready to grant. 
Of this, indeed, Dr. Channing is himself an eminent proof. 
And I wish from my heart that there were many Unitarian 
preachers like him, save and except in the prejudices which he 
has taken up against the English Unitarians, and against a 
man who, by a rare combination of intellectual and moral 
excellence, may justly be regarded as one of the brightest 
ornaments of human kind. 

E. C. 

Jan. 1825. M. E. vol. xs. 



178 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir,— When I have said the little which I have to say upon 
a subject, I cannot easily, amidst the pressure of my occupa- 
tions, turn my attention to it a second time ; but as silence in 
some cases is liable to be misinterpreted, I think it proper to 
say a word or two in reply to the observations of your corre- 
spondent 12, p. 75. 

In the Second Epistle of Peter i. 1, some manuscripts, in- 
stead of Qeou, read Kugiou ; so that this passage, allowing the 
genuineness of the Epistle, cannot be confidently appealed to 
on the question. Your correspondent is right in considering 
the Common Version as incorrect. I should, without hesitation, 
render the passage as it is rendered in the Improved Version, 
and should extend to the word 2wt>i^ the remark which I made 
in relation to the word Ky^oj, nor do I see any sufficient reason 
why it should not be thus extended. Indeed, when I made the 
remark, I conceived that if there were good reason to believe 
that the canon did not hold good with respect to b ®sog h^cov 
kcu Kugiog Incroug X$iarog, it could not hold good with respect to 
6 Qsog hfj-cov xai o-utyi^ \y\aovg X^icrrog. But your correspondent 
asks, " If o Kvgiog YifAcov hcci crcoryg Incroug X^iarog is correctly 
rendered l our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,' why should not 
6 ©teg Yif/.uv kcci acoTyg Inaovg Xgitxrog be rendered ' our God and 
Saviour Jesus Christ ? " To this question my former commu- 
nication will give what, I think, may be considered as an 
answer; and if your correspondent will do me the favour to 
read it again, if I mistake not, he will perceive that, though the 
grammatical construction of the two passages is the same, yet 
when the general language of the apostolic writers is considered, 
there is a circumstance of difference between them which jus- 
tifies an adherence to the canon in the former instance, and the 
neglect of it in the latter. It may moreover be observed, that 
when a writer can suspect no danger of being misunderstood, 
he may unconsciously fall into a construction which he would 



179 

otherwise have avoided. I have reasoned, as your correspondent 
will perceive, upon the supposition that Peter was the author of 
the Epistle, and that he wrote Qsou, not Kugiou. 

Since I wrote my former paper, I have read Appendix, No. 
III., to Dr. Carpenter's third edition of Unitarianism the Doc- 
trine of the Gospel; to which I would refer those of your 
readers who wish to see a full and judicious discussion of the 
subject. E. 0. 

Feb. 1825. M. R. vol. xx. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — As I do not wish to see the cause of Unitarianism 
aided by a single erroneous interpretation of Scripture (any 
more than by the " disingenuous artifices " * of any Unitarian 
preachers), I was not sorry to find that the Keviewer of Dr. 
Spry's Two Sermons in your last Number, in treating of 
Hebrews i. 2, has rejected the interpretation of Grotius, which, 
however, as the interpretation of so great a man, Valckenaer 
justly thinks ought to be modestly refuted. It is an interpre- 
tation to which I never could subscribe, as I do not remember 
in the course of my reading to have met with a passage in which 
ha with the genitive must necessarily be rendered propter, 
though I think I have seen one or two in which it might be 
rendered indifferently by propter or per. In the passage pro 

* The Bishop of Chester has lately affirmed that several Presbyterian 
congregations have been " deluded into Unitarianism by the most dis- 
ingenuous artifices on the part of some of their preachers." I wish 
that his lordship, of whom I have been accustomed to think too 
favourably to suppose that he has thrown out a random charge with- 
out imagining that he has facts to support it, had thought it worth his 
while to inform us what these artifices have been, and by whom they 
have been employed. At present the imputation is too vague to be 
refuted, and, as it falls on no one individually, may be supposed to be 
applicable to many. 

N 2 



180 

duced by the Keviewer from Thucydides, lib. v. § 53, ha does 
not govern rou Bu/^arog, but mv E<r7rga%iv, which follows. In lib. 
vi. § 57, I have always thought that h ovtte^ which is the read- 
ing of several manuscripts, ought to be restored. It is at length 
adopted in the useful edition of Haack, and will, I doubt not, 
be retained in the edition publishing by Poppo. Of Josephus 
I can say nothing positively. I think that he uses a$ixv£i<r9ai 
ha xoyav, which I suspect to be one of the expressions referred 
to by the Reviewer. This expression, meaning to hold a con- 
versation, is analogous to h' exBgctg a<piKVEi<rQai and many others 
in the best Greek authors. It is used by Euripides in the 
Medea. Vide desideratissimi Elmsleii notam ad v. 842. But 
whatever may be the justice of these remarks, one thing I well 
know, that my venerable friend Mr. Belsham, with whose 
ardour in the pursuit of religious knowledge, and scrupulous 
care to derive his faith from the Scriptures alone, I have 
been acquainted for more than forty years, values truth infinitely 
more than any interpretation of Grotius, or of any other man. 

E. 0. 

July, 1825. M. E. vol. xx. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Allow me to suggest to your respectable correspon- 
dent T. F. B. (p. 536), that yiyveaQai, or the Ionic yiveo-Qai, is 
used by Herodotus in the sense of stvat. Vide Wesseling, ad 
lib. vii. ch. xi. In ch. lii. of this book we read ruv av fxoc^rvg 
yivEai. Aristophanes, PI. v. 431, uses yiyveo-Qai in the same 
sense; ouhouv uttoKoittov croi to (3aga9gov yiyvsTai. I subjoin an 
observation of Valckenaer. This incomparable scholar, in com- 
menting on Heb. i. 4, writes as follows: — yivscrQai frequenter 
jponitur pro sivai, frequenter et abundat. Nostro tamen loco 
virtute non caret , significans fact us. Thus much in defence 
of Socinus. With the interpretation of the Proem of John's 



181 

Gospel I do not meddle, being contented with the conviction 
which I feel, that the orthodox interpretation is inadmissible. 

In reading the excellent communication of Clericus Canta- 
hrigiensis (pp. 552-557), I was somewhat amused to find that 
Dr. Coplestone attributes the admission of the Necessarian 
system in part to the pride of the human mind in refusing to 
believe that the foreknowledge of God may coexist with the 
contingency of events. What obstinate perverseness, not to 
believe that an event can be certain and uncertain at the 
same time ! But this pride of the human intellect is, in many 
cases, a provoking quality. It has an unlucky propensity to 
call things by their right names, and will not swallow a con- 
tradiction, though recommended under the guise of an "appa- 
rent incongruity." Theologians, in particular, find it a trouble- 
some thing to deal with. Even though they call it hard 
names, and vilify it with the appellation of carnal reason, or 
imperiously demand of it to humble itself before their mys- 
terious dogmas, it remains inflexible. It will pry into ^secrets 
which it is assured are above its comprehension, and pertina- 
ciously refuses to admit that two propositions which are dia- 
metrically opposed to each other can both be true. When will 
men of sense and learning cease to deceive themselves and 
mislead others by the sophistry of words ? When will they 
remember, or reason as though they remembered, that things 
will remain the same by whatever names they may be called ? 
When will theologians, especially, be sensible that, unless they 
can refute the charge of maintaining absurd and contradictory 
propositions, to call their doctrines mysteries, is only to add 
evasion to the disgrace of defeat? It would be more mag- 
nanimous boldly to affirm, that what appears a contradiction 
to the limited understanding of man, may, nevertheless, be 
true. E. 0. 

Oct. 1825. M. R vol. xx. 



182 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — In the haste with which I made my remark on the 
vert) yiyveo-Qai, in my last (p. 605), I omitted to observe that, in 
the passage quoted from Herodotus, yivsai can neither "be ren- 
dered by fis nor by f actus es, the sense excluding the former, 
and the tense of the verb the latter, of these renderings. I also 
neglected to submit to the consideration of your ingenious cor- 
respondent an example or two of ysvEo-Qai used as the aorist of 
Eivai. The following instances will show that a transition or 
change of state is not always implied by this word, Tbucy- 
clides, lib. iv. ch. xciv. YiXoi — out e tote Tragncrav, oute EyEvovro 
ev ty\ ttoXei. Lib. ii. ch. xcvii. EysvETO r\ aqxv w Otyucrcov, /xs- 
yEQog, etti ty]V Sahaacrav xaQwouva, h. t. *. Herodotus, lib. ii. 
ch. cxxxiv. Outco nat Aio-607ro$ ladftovog sysvsTo. Thus it ap- 
pears that JEsop also was the slave of Jadmon. Pausanias, 
lib. i. ch. xvi. "ZeXeuxov $e (SacriXEcov ev rag /xatoo-ra 7TEi9o/xai nai 
aXXcog y£VEo~9ai hnaiov uai Trpog to Beiov evq-e$y\. The Scholiast 
on the Vespee of Aristophanes, v. 581. Ai<ruwo$ Tpayahag 
EyEVETo v7roH$iTY\g yEXoicofag. On this instance I need make no 
remark. I may now, I think, compare xai b "koyog o-ap% syEvsTo 
(as interpreted by Socinus), with the following passage of 
the Septuagint. Proverbs iv. 3, uiog ya$ eyevofAnv xayco Trargi 
uTrwoog, uai <xya7rco{A,svog ev tt^oo-cotto) fxy\T^og. 

The fact seems to be this : The verb yiyvso-Qai is used of a 
state commencing, and Eivai of a state which exists. But this 
distinction was sometimes overlooked even in the present tense, 
as particularly by Herodotus ; and as things are what they have 
become, the primary meaning of yiyvso-Qai was often dropped 
in the aorist, and the want of a proper form of an aorist to the 
verb sivai was supplied by ysvsaOai, as in Latin, fui (from the 
Greek, <pua gigno) was used as the aorist of sum. If any one 
contends that the primitive signification of the verb ought to 
be taken into account in these instances, he seems to me to 
overlook the analogy of language, and to embrace in his con- 



183 

ception what never suggests itself to the mind of the reader. I 
will only add, that I now distrust the example produced in my 
last from Aristophanes. E. C. 

Oct. 1825. M. E. vol. xx. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — Having, since I wrote my last (p. M6), received two 
friendly letters from a respectable contributor to the Keposi- 
tory on the verb yiyveo-Qai, I have been led to think upon the 
subject more than I had ever clone before. The result of my 
thoughts I will now communicate in as few words as I can. 

I had said that ysvEaQai was used as the aorist to Eivai, and, 
upon looking into Buttman's Greek Grammar, I find that this 
able grammarian has stated that ysyova and sysvo/Anv are used 
as the preterites of this verb. That this is true with respect 
to the infinitive mood is certain, there being no possible way 
of expressing the sense of fuisse in Greek but by yzvzo-Qai and 
ysyovsvai. But I will confine myself chiefly to ysvEo-Qai. If 
ysvEd-Qai, then, is often equivalent to fuisse, would it not be 
strange if zytvoymv could never signify fui ? But of this use 
there are many and unquestionable examples. I will only add 
two to those which have been already produced. Philostrati 
Heroica, p. 32, in the edition of Boissonade : — E* pev TEga- 
tw^ij syEVovro ekeivoi >iai %u/j,(3E&Xvfj.£V0t Sngioig ovk oi$a t An im- 
mensi Mi (Gig antes) fuerint, et serpentibus cincti, non novi. 
Theocriti Scholiastes ad Id. vii. ver. 8 : BPA2IAA* bi ygapovrEs 
foa rov d\ a/JtagTavouo-i. RyEvsro yag B^aori^ag Aaxav to ysvog, 6 
de B$a<nha$ Kyog. But, it may be said, how came it to pass 
that the primary meaning of yiyvsaQai should be obscured or 
lost in the aorist ? I ask, in reply, how came it to pass that 
the Greek <pvu should lose its primary signification in the 
Latin fui ? But is it not common for words by a certain in- 
flection of meaning to be applied to cases to which in their 



184 

primitive sense they were inapplicable? And do not the pre- 
terites of certain verbs differ materially in signification from 
the present tenses of these verbs ? Every scholar knows that 
KTaaQai is to acquire, and that KSKTyo-Qai is to jjossess. This 
is not extraordinary. But hsktyio-Qczi is sometimes so used as 
to exclude the sense of acquisition. Vide Euripidis Orest., v. 
1202. Analogy, then, would lead us to conclude that if 
sye vofxnv was once used for fui, its original meaning would, in 
some instances, he lost sight of altogether. I will now endea- 
vour to point out the ratio of the fact for which I have been 
contending. When we speak of that which was or has been, 
we evidently do not speak of a permanent and necessary ex- 
istence, but of something which must have begun to be, of 
something, which, in some way or other, must have become 
what it has been or was. The verb eivai, therefore, may not 
improperly borrow its preterites from a word which compre- 
hends the significations of nasci, oriri, fieri. Certain it is 
that neither eivai nor esse have preterites of their own. And 
the reason of this, perhaps, may be, that they denote existence 
simply ; and hence they are applicable to that which exists 
necessarily and permanently. But even though my metaphy- 
sics should be false, the fact will remain the same. 

While writing this last sentence, I was struck with the use 
of the term existence in our language. To exist, if we con- 
sult the derivation of the word, is to come into being, and yet 
who hesitates to speak of the existence of God ? This may 
teach us not to reason too confidently from the primary mean- 
ing of a word as to what may be its ultimate use. But here a 
wide field of inquiry opens itself, into which I will not enter. 
I will only add, that some critics have said, that existo in 
Latin is sometimes equivalent to sum. E. 0. 

Dec. 1825. M. R. vol. xx. 



1'85 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — In looking over my last communication (xx. 729), 
I find that I have committed an error in transcribing the Latin 
version of the passage quoted from Philostratus. Instead of 
writing serpentibus concreti, I have written serpentibus cincti. 
I can account for this mistake only by supposing that Virgil's 
cinctam serpentibzis Hydram was indistinctly present to my 
mind. Had I thought of the Greek at the time, or recollected 
that the Giants (to speak with Apollodorus) £<%ov t«j fiaosig 
(poxidas tyaxovTcov, association would not have got the better of 
my eyesight. A curious instance of the power of association 
is produced by a late eminent critic in the Classical Journal, 
No. XVII. p. 49. "A letter," says he, "is inserted in the 
Gentleman's Magazine for 1798 (p. 839), with the following 
title: An Original Letter from Dr. Thomas Moore, of Nor- 
wich. This letter is signed Tho. Browne, and appears to have 
been written by the celebrated Sir Thomas Browne. There is 
no resemblance between Browne and Moore, but the transition 
from Sir Thomas Browne to Sir Thomas More is extremely 
easy." 

On the Homeric ysvro spoken of by Dr. Jones, p. 727, see 
Heyne's Homer, vol. v. p. 421. E. 0. 

Jan. 1826. M. R. vol. xxi. 



TO THE EDITOR OE THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir, — I have read with pleasure the ingenious remarks of 
T. E. B. in your last Number (p. 20). I think that I have in 
in effect already replied to them in my communication for 
December last (xx. 729), particularly by the quotations from 
Philostratus and the Scholiast on Theocritus, I will only add 



186 

one or two brief remarks. The loord has been flesh would in 
Greek be expressed by ysyove. It is true that the aorist in 
Greek is often used for the preterpluperfect ; but this use is 
confined to cases where the meaning of the tense cannot be 
uncertain. The same observation may be made respecting the 
perfect, or rather the aorist, in the Latin language. Your cor- 
respondent's rendering of Ai<rco7rog la^ovog eysvero, would seem 
to imply that .ZEsop was born free, but afterwards came into a 
state of servitude. But of this Herodotus evidently knew 
nothing. To sum up the whole in a few words — my doctrine 
is, that in certain cases the primary meaning of ytyvsaBai had 
as little force in the aorist yevEo-Qai, as the meaning of the Greek 
<pvc» had in the Latin fuisse. But whether the primary mean- 
ing of yiyvtaBai was lost in the aorist or not, if yevEa-Qai was 
used as an aorist of sivat, which your correspondent grants that 
it frequently was, all that I have contended for is, in fact, con- 
ceded. As to the distinction which my ingenious opponent 
makes between the imperfect and the aorist, it is not founded 
on any principle with which I happen to be acquainted. 

With respect to the import of the term mystery (see p. 3), 
I should have no objection to apply this term to certain truths 
which surpass the comprehension of the human intellect, had 
it not been so egregiously abused. Your correspondent is well 
aware that words operate as a charm, and the word mystery 
has been perpetually employed as a charm to silence reasoning 
and to disguise absurdity. A proposition is submitted to my 
consideration, couched in terms which either mean nothing or 
destroy each other ; and when this has been demonstrated, the 
advocate of the proposition tells me that his doctrine is a mys- 
tery which I must not expect to understand. But I ask, what 
is it which I must not expect to understand ? I understand 
most clearly that his proposition, if it means anything, is self- 
destructive and contradictory, and the only mystery to me is 
that he should not understand the same. But he urges that the 
subject to which his doctrine relates is too sublime for the 
limited faculties of the human mind. Be it so; but my con- 
cern at present is with an individual proposition upon the false- 



187 

hood of which I feel myself competent to pronounce. But my 
adversary still tells me that I am not competent to pronounce 
upon the falsehood of that which relates to a mysterious sub- 
ject; and by the magic of a word he would willingly close my 
eyes as effectually as he has closed his own. Mystery has been 
made the last refuge of baffled argument, and the term has been 
employed to awe the human mind into a blind submission to 
dogmas at which reason stands aghast, and to which Scripture 
gives no countenance. Your intelligent correspondent will now 
see on what my dislike of the term mystery is founded, and I 
feel persuaded that we cannot materially disagree. E. 0. 
Feb. 1826. M. R. vol. xxi. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. 

Sir,— I perceive that in my last (p. 85)1 have inconsiderately 
drawn an erroneous inference from T. F. B.'s rendering of a 
passage quoted from Herodotus, which I wish to acknowledge, 
in justice both to your ingenious correspondent and to myself. 

Your American critic has now a second time turned my at- 
tention to the canon respecting the Greek article. My view of 
the subject may be briefly expressed as follows : The canon re- 
lates to two or more nouns denoting attributes of one and the 
same subject. But God and our Lord Jesus Christ are perpe- 
tually distinguished from each other. Kugiog lyo-ov; Xpiarog is 
used again and again for the Lord Jesus Christ when the word 
&£og precedes ; and when b ®sog precedes, it will be found that 
the article was required by the usage of the Greek language. 
These circumstances form a clear line of distinction between 
those cases in which the canon holds good, and those to which 
certain Trinitarian divines have wished to apply it. E. C, 

March, 1826. M. K. vol. xxi. 



188 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER. 

Sir, — It has sometimes occurred to me that something might 
be written with advantage on the use and abuse of analogical 
reasoning. But as I have neither inclination nor ability for 
long discussions, I can only throw out a hint or two, upon 
which men of greater talent may enlarge, if they think proper. 

Analogical reasoning is a species of argumentation by which 
the understanding may be easily misled, as it carries with it the 
show of ingenuity and research, and by captivating the imagi- 
nation may pervert the judgment. At the same time, when 
properly employed, it is of admirable utility, as in cases where 
the production of a similar instance affords the very evidence 
which is required. There are some propositions which it would 
be scarcely possible to defend except by analogy. A parallel 
case is the only thiug which can fully satisfy the mind, and 
when this is found, a difficulty which before might appear in- 
surmountable, ceases to be felt. But in the use of analogical 
reasoning, great care should be taken that the things compared 
should, as far as relates to the point in question, be truly similar. 
And where a general resemblance is made to stand for strict 
similitude, there analogy is misemployed, and the person to 
whom this reasoning is addressed, unless he can call in the aid 
of a discriminating judgment, will infallibly be deceived. In 
matters of criticism, it is demanded by accurate scholars that 
the analogies which are brought forward should be perfect in 
every circumstance which is essential to a just comparison ; and 
if the same severity be not employed in moral reasoning, the 
cause of truth cannot fail to suffer. But the least caution is 
often employed where the greatest is required ; and many, no 
doubt, would laugh to scorn the man who should reason on the 
most trifling subjects in the way in which they themselves reason 
on matters of the highest importance. 

But the justice of the above observations will best appear by 






189 

an instance or two of the proper and improper use of analogical 
reasoning. 

Suppose it to be urged, and urged it has been, against Chris- 
tianity, that this religion cannot proceed from God, because it 
is not communicated to the whole human race. This objection, 
if expressed in its proper form, amounts to the following pro- 
position — that God will not bestow an important blessing on 
some of his offspring which He withholds from others. And 
this proposition, which seems specious enough in itself, can 
only be refuted by the evidence of fact. Here, then, analogy 
not only may but must be employed, or the objection remains 
unanswered and unanswerable. But, happily for tlie cause of 
revelation, it is a characteristic of the Divine government that 
privileges are allotted in different measures to different indivi- 
duals, and that which is granted to some is denied to others. 
This holds true, even of blessings which are most important to 
the true enjoyment of life, as health, knowledge, and the means 
of intellectual and moral cultivation. Analogy, then, furnishes 
a reply to the objection, which is satisfactory and com- 
plete. 

Again, it has been objected to Christianity that it produces 
but little effect on the conduct of its professors, and that it has 
even been the cause of evils of no ordinary magnitude. This 
objection, when reduced to its principle, affirms, that what God 
bestows cannot be abused. But this proposition analogy most 
fully and clearly refutes. Eeason is allowed to be the gift of 
God, and man, as such, is complimented with the appellation 
of a rational creature. But in how few does reason discharge 
its proper office ! How few really live that life which reason 
dictates ! And how often is this faculty employed to gain the 
most unworthy ends, and to effect the basest purposes ! Indeed, 
everything which God gives may be and is more or less mis- 
applied. And were Christianity incapable of being abused or 
neglected, this peculiarity might induce a suspicion that nature 
and revelation had not the same author. 

But it is time to pass on to one or two examples of the mis- 
application of analogical reasouing. 



190 

Were it urged in behalf of that decree which is supposed to 
have destined, or to have left, the greater part of the human 
race to suffer eternally for the sin of Adam, that children do, 
in fact, suffer in this world for the folly or the vices of their 
parents, it could not he denied that there is an analogy between 
the two cases. But the analogy is imperfect and defective. 
Between these two appointments there are important circum- 
stances of difference which are more than sufficient to coun- 
terbalance their general resemblance. By the former, inter- 
minable misery is entailed as a punishment upon those who had 
no share in the guilt contracted. By the latter, temporal in- 
conveniences are sustained by the child in consequence of his 
parent's misconduct. By the extravagance of a father his son. 
may be reduced to poverty. But thousands live in poverty 
whose fathers were never extravagant. In consequence of the 
excesses of a father a child may be born with a feeble frame 
and delicate constitution. But there are many whose frame is 
feeble and constitution delicate, whose fathers were chargeable 
with no excesses. And whoever shall be able to vindicate the 
appointment of Providence in the latter case, will not be at a 
loss how to vindicate it in the former. Indeed, from that ar- 
rangement, which has provided that the consequences of a 
man's conduct should extend to those with whom he is closely 
connected, mankind may learn, and do learn, lessons of prudence 
and virtue. But what useful lesson is to be learned from the 
decretum horrendum of Calvin, it would puzzle the ablest theo- 
logian to explain. 

Again, analogy has been called in to illustrate the doctrine 
of the Atonement and the mediation of Jesus Christ. A 
schoolmaster, it is said, may grant his scholars some indulgence, 
or remit the punishment due to an offender, if one of his pupils 
will consent to write an extraordinary exercise. But to make 
the case parallel, this said exercise should furnish the ground 
upon which favours should be granted, or punishment remitted, 
in every case in which indulgence is shown or an offence for- 
given. The remission of punishment, for instance, whenever 
it is remitted, must be referred, as to its procuring cause, to the 



191 

exercise of A B, which was composed for this kind and ge- 
nerous purpose. 

Bishop Butler, in his " Analogy," furnishes another instance 
of false reasoning applied to this subject. In defence of what 
he terms the satisfaction of Christ, he says, that " when in the 
daily course of Providence it is appointed that innocent people 
should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the 
very same objection as the instance we are now considering." 
He also remarks, that " vicarious punishment is a providential 
appointment of every day's experience." If the expression 
vicarious punishment is to be understood according to its 
proper and obvious meaning, vicarious punishment is a thing 
altogether unknown in the plan of Providence and the economy 
of the human life. And if nothing more be meant by the 
expression than that the innocent are liable to suffer in conse- 
quence of the faults of others, it may be replied, that this 
appointment, of which a very satisfactory explanation may be 
given, bears no resemblance to a judicial decree by which an 
innocent person should suffer that the guilty might escape. 

But analogy has nowhere been more egregiously misapplied 
than in defence of what have been termed mysteries in religion. 
We are compelled to believe certain truths in relation to things, 
of which we know not the nature or mode of operation. And 
this fact has been urged in behalf of propositions which are 
either absolutely unintelligible or demonstrably false. It has 
been said, that as we are obliged to believe what we cannot 
comprehend, we shall be guilty of temerity if we reject those 
sacred mysteries which from their very sublimity must ever be 
incomprehensible to man. In this reasoning, incomprehensibi- 
lity is made a generic term, which includes two distinct cases, 
that of conclusions which reason is compelled to admit on 
subjects which, considered in their full extent, lie beyond its 
grasp ; and that of propositions, the terms of which are either 
obscure or contradict each other. To confound these cases 
may suit the purpose of the theological disputant, but the judi- 
cious inquirer after truth will take good care to separate them. 
He will believe that there is a God, though he knows not how 



192 

this great Being exists ; but he will not on this account be a 
whit more disposed to believe that the Father is God, and that 
the Son is God, and that the Holy Ghost is God, and yet that 
there are not three Gods but one God.* E. C. 

Jan. 1827. C. R, K S. vol. i. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER. 

Sir, — As it is much the fashion to speak of the doctrine of 
the Atonement as a vital, fundamental, cardinal doctrine 
of Christianity, I wish to inquire a little into the doctrine to 
which such an importance is attached. As maintained by 
those who hold the above language, the doctrine, I apprehend, 
is this, that God the Son, dwelling in the man Christ Jesus, 
made an infinite satisfaction for sin to the justice of God 
the Father. I ask, then, is this doctrine expressly taught in the 
Christian Scriptures ? Can it be conveyed to the mind in Scrip- 
ture language ? Is it not manifestly a human interpretation of 
a phraseology which is found in the Christian records ? Is there 
a single passage in the New Testament which expresses any 
thing tantamount to this vital doctrine ? And yet, as the 
reader will observe, it is capable of being distinctly laid down 
in the compass of one short sentence. If this is a funda- 
mental principle of the Christian religion, it were to be wished 
that the apostles had understood it as well, and defined it as 
clearly, as the orthodox of modern times. How much contro- 
versy might have been spared if they had not left this vital 
doctrine to be collected by inference from expressions to which 

* When it is said that there are three persons in one God, the charge 
of verbal contradiction is avoided. But when the terms of the propo- 
sition come to be explained, if it do not resolve itself into mere Uni- 
tarianism, it presents us with three Gods in one God. That this should 
not have been perceived by men of understanding and reflection, 
affords a striking proof of a truth which has not yet received the con- 
sideration that it deserves — I mean, the power of words to blind the 
understanding. 



193 

various other interpretations may be given ! When will the 
practice cease of establishing gratuitous, not to say absurd, 
theories on the language of Scripture, and then dignifying 
them with the appellations of vital and fundamental doc- 
trines of the Gospel ? But the orthodox Christian, no doubt, 
will ask, what is the meaning of those passages of Scripture in 
which the death of Christ is spoken of in connection with the 
forgiveness of sin ? Were I to give him my interpretation of 
them, he would not accept it. It is, however, sufficient to 
reply, that whatever be their true interpretation, his interpreta- 
tion cannot but be false, as it involves assumption upon as- 
sumption. To say nothing of the doctrine of three persons in 
one God, it assumes what is manifestly not true, that the sin 
of a finite being' deserves an infinite punishment ; it assumes 
what can never be proved, that infinite justice is something 
altogether distinct from infinite benevolence ; it assumes, in 
contradiction to the whole analogy of judicial inflictions, that 
justice can be as well satisfied by the sufferings of the innocent 
as by the punishment of the guilty ; and unless, for the sake 
of consistency, it be maintained that the divinity suffered, it 
assumes that an infinite value may be attributed to the suffer- 
ings of a man. 

It will be no wonder if the advocates of such a doctrine 
should also be advocates for the prostration of the under- 
standing to the mysteries of the Gospel. But when it is 
demanded of me to prostrate my understanding to the myste- 
ries of the Gospel, I am at a loss to understand what the 
demand implies. Am I to believe, that I do not see that to 
be an absurdity or contradiction which I do see to be such ? 
Or am I to believe, that what I do see to be a contradiction or 
an absurdity may not be such in reality, and ought, therefore, 
to be received ? One thing, however, is certain, namely, that 
this demand involves an acknowledgment that the doctrines 
contended for are irreconcilable to reason. Let them be 
shown not to be irrational, and the prostration of the under- 
standing will have no place. I will not dwell upon the conse- 
quences which have followed from this prostration of the 

o 



194 

understanding in religion, but will simply state, that as the 
evidences of Christianity amount only to the highest moral 
probability, it will be impossible, while Christianity is encum- 
bered with doctrines which are irreconcilable to reason, to 
argue successfully with the unbeliever. Prove to him that on 
the ground of its external evidence the Christian faith cannot 
rationally be rejected, his answer is at hand. He will reply, 
that, perplexing as the case may be, it cannot be more 
irrational to reject than to admit a faith which appears to con- 
tradict the clear and certain conclusions of the human mind. 
The advocate of mystery, indeed, will say that the doctrines 
for which he contends are neither self- contradictory nor absurd. 
But of this the unbeliever will not allow him to be the judge. 

But I ask, with what justice this doctrine can be called 
a fundamental doctrine of Christianity ? Does it enforce a 
single moral obligation ? Does the disbelief of it withdraw 
any motive to virtuous conduct ? Is it by an appeal to this 
doctrine that we are urged to live soberly, righteously, and 
godly in the world ? Or is not the grand consideration to us, 
what we shall suffer for sin if not repented of and forsaken, 
rather than by what medium it will be pardoned, when forgiven ? 
I do not, however, say that the doctrine is not capable of any 
application. It is often applied to the injury, if not to the 
subversion, of practical religion. Men who have lived the most 
irreligious and immoral lives are exhorted in their dying 
moments to fly to the atoning blood of Christ for a passport to 
the joys of heaven. But this, it may be said, is an abuse of 
the doctrine. Be it so. I should be glad to be told what are 
its uses. It shows in an awful manner the evil of sin. And 
in a manner equally awful it distorts the character of God, and 
represents the Father of mercies as a being whom it is impos- 
sible to love. It is not, however, matter of admiration that 
they who verily believe this doctrine should consider it as 
a fundamental principle of their religion. If the under- 
standing does not feel its absurdity, the imagination will 
be strongly impressed with its mysterious grandeur. The 
stern justice of the First person of the Trinity, contrasted 



195 

with the benignity of the Second, who condescends to do that 
without which myriads of helpless beings must have been 
doomed to everlasting torments, presents a subject of contem- 
plation, which he who can unsuspectingly admit the doctrine, 
will not fail to regard with wonder and with awe. And to such 
a man, Christianity, when stripped of this stupendous ma- 
chinery, will appear to have lost its essence and its interest. 
Thus, doubtless, the pious Catholic considers the Protestant as 
having robbed Christianity of its chief excellence and glory, 
while professing to reform the errors of the Church of Rome. 
But some zealot may now ask, if the atonement is not a vital 
doctrine of the Gospel, what is ? I answer, the solemn 
assurance that " all who are in their graves shall hear the voice 
of the Son of Man and shall come forth, they who have done 
good, to the resurrection of life, and they who have done evil, 
to the resurrection of condemnation." * This is indeed a 
doctrine of revelation, a doctrine in which every man is most 
deeply interested; a doctrine which applies to the "grand 
springs of human action, hope, and fear, and which, when 
regarded as the sanction of the moral precepts of Christianity, 
leaves us nothing further to desire as a motive to a pious, 
benevolent, and holy life. A divine rule of life, supported by 
the doctrine of future retribution, established also on divine 
authority, contains everything .that can beneficially influence 
human conduct, and train the heart of man to virtue. If 

* " Had Jesus Christ delivered no other declaration than the follow- 
ing : — ' The hour is coming in which all that are in the grave shall hear 
his voice, and shall come forth ; they that have done good unto the 
resurrection of life, and they that have done evil to the resurrection of 
damnation,' he had pronounced a message of inestimable importance, 
and well worthy of that splendid apparatus of prophecy and miracles with 
which his mission was introduced and attested ; a message in which the 
wisest of mankind would rejoice to find an answer to their doubts and 
rest to their inquiries. It is idle to say that a future state had been 
discovered already ; it had been discovered as the Copernican system 
was ; it was one guess among many. He alone discovers who proves, 
and no man can prove this point, but the teacher who testifies by 
miracles that his doctrine comes from God." — Paley. 

2 



196 

I mistake not, however, there are Christian divines who, in 
their zeal for their peculiar doctrines, will not hesitate to say, 
that Jesus Christ came for no very important purpose if the 
object of his mission was merely to teach morality, and " to 
bring life and immortality to light." 

E. C. 
March, 1828. C. R., N. S., vol. ii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER. 

Sir, — If you think that your readers are not altogether 
weary of the Trinitarian controversy, the following remarks 
upon it, written some years ago, are at your service, in which I 
have confined myself to the simple proposition that there exists 
in the Godhead a trinity of persons. With those who maintain 
that the Deity exists in three distinctions, or sustains three 
characters, I considered myself as having no concern, as their 
hypotheses are manifestly in substance Unitarian. 

In this proposition, then, that God consists of three persons, 
it is plain that the term Person and the term God are not 
intended to be synonymous, nor would any sober Trinitarian 
choose to assert that there are three Gods in one God. Even 
the author of the Athanasian Creed does not choose to affirm 
this. He says indeed, that the Father is God, and the Son is 
God, and the Holy Ghost is God ; but he immediately subjoins 
(would you have thought it, reader?) that there are not 
three Gods, but one God. It appears, then, that neither of the 
three persons of which the Godhead consists is strictly and 
properly God. And, indeed, could it be predicated of each 
individually that he is truly and properly God, then, as God 
consists of three persons, the Father, being God, must consist 
of three persons, the Son in like manner must consist of three 
persons, and the Holy Ghost of three persons; and each 
of these persons must consist of three other persons, and so 



197 

on ad infinitum. The Trinitarian may dispute the inference, 
and may say that his proposition expressly limits the Divine 
essence to three persons ; but unless he uses the term God in 
a qualified sense, when he speaks of God the Father, God the 
Son, and God the Holy Ghost, the above reasoning stands 
against him in all its force. In what sense, then, does he 
use the term ? 

But let the meaning of the term God be for a moment con- 
sidered. This term is universally used to signify an intelligent 
Being, possessed of what are called the attributes of Deity. Is, 
then, the Father such a being, and is the same to be affirmed 
of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ? We have, then, three 
Gods as distinctly defined as language can define them ; and 
to say that these three are one, is only to say that one and 
three are identical. If, on the other hand, the Father is 
not an intelligent Being, and the Son and the Holy Ghost are in 
like manner neither of them intelligent beings, then, each of them 
being God, it follows, that something which is not an intelligent 
being may possess the attributes of Deity. What that some- 
thing is, let him explain who can. Will the Trinitarian still 
say that he does not use the term person to signify an agent or 
being ? I will not urge in reply, that this is the only intelli- 
gible sense of the term, nor will I ask the vain question, 
in what sense the term is intended to be used ; but will rather 
remark, that whatever the term person denotes, if it does not 
denote an intelligent being, the doctrine of the Trinity is 
neither more nor less than Unitarianism wrapt up in a cloud 
of unmeaning phraseology. If God is acknowledged to be 
one Being (and the Trinitarian does not choose to say that He 
is three), the proposition of the Unitarian is virtually admitted. 
To say that this one Being subsists under three persons, is to 
advance a proposition which means just nothing until the 
sense of the term person shall be defined ; and to call one of 
these persons the Father, and another the Son, and to allot to 
them offices which nothing but an intelligent agent can dis- 
charge, is only to show that unless the term person is used to 
denote such an agent, it is egregiously misapplied. Nothing 



198 

more surely need be said on the subject, until the meaning of 
the term person shall be distinctly specified. And there will 
be no temerity in predicting that whenever this shall be done, 
the proposition of the Trinitarian will either resolve itself into 
Unitarianism, or prove itself to be demonstrably false. One 
plain question, however, shall be asked in the meantime. Are 
the three persons of the Trinity to be considered as each pos- 
sessing a separate and individual consciousness ? If so, the 
three divine persons are, to all intents and purposes, three 
Gods. If they do not respectively possess a consciousness of 
their own, then either the consciousness of the Father is the 
consciousness of the Son, and the consciousness also of the 
Holy Ghost, and in this case the three persons are strictly 
identical, or the Divine consciousness must be possessed 
exclusively by one of the three persons of the Trinity; in 
which case the other two are neither persons, nor anything 
else which the human imagination can conceive. 

Will the Trinitarian say, that though human language does 
not furnish terms which may express his doctrine with sufficient 
clearness and precision,* the doctrine itself may still be true ? 
I ask, what doctrine ? The proposition which he has usually 
maintained, when the terms of it come to be considered, either 
melts away into simple Unitarianism, or resolves itself into two 
propositions which contradict each other, and by which, there- 
fore, nothing is conveyed. But the Trinitarian will still urge, 

* Some have intimated that they are not bound distinctly to define 
or comprehend the terms in which they shall express so sublime and 
mysterious a doctrine. No doubt, if a man chooses, for his own 
amusement, to use words without ideas, he has an unquestionable 
right so to do. But if he comes forward to explain to his fellow- 
christians in what sense a fundamental doctrine of revelation is to be 
understood, and especially if he demands that an assent should be 
given to his explanation, he may assuredly be called upon to define his 
terms. And if he refuse to do this, he has no reason to complain if 
others will not admit that which he does not himself profess to under- 
stand. He may choose to satisfy himself with a persuasion that a 
proposition which is expressed in terms that convey no definite mean- 
ing may be true in some sense or other; but the intelligent inquirer 
will ask, in what sense ? 



199 

that as his doctrine respects the mode of the Divine existence, 
the human mind cannot expect to fathom it. I might still ask, 
what doctrine? But waving this question, I observe that 
though the mode of the Divine existence is incomprehensible 
by man, it does not follow hence that every proposition which 
shall be advanced concerning it may be true, or that no propo- 
sition can be laid down respecting it which the human intellect 
can with certainty pronounce to be false. In fact, a proposi- 
tion, the terms of which contradict each other cannot be true, 
whatever be the subject to which it relates. As I formerly 
remarked on the subject of Mystery, there is a great difference 
between not seeing how a thing can be, and seeing why it can- 
not be. And this is a difference which has been generally 
overlooked. I once heard a preacher of distinguished talents 
remark, that as there are mysteries in nature, as, for instance, 
we do not know by what energy a blade of grass is made to 
grow, we might antecedently have expected mysteries in the 
dispensation of grace, and may therefore safely admit what 
have been termed the mysteries of the Gospel. I considered 
this as a specimen of that loose mode of applying analogical 
reasoning by which men contrive to deceive themselves and to 
impose upon others. On this subject much might be said, but 
I will content myself with observing, that an analogical argu- 
ment which brings forward a general resemblance between two 
cases, but omits a more important feature of difference between 
them, proves nothing, and less than nothing. 

But perhaps the Trinitarian may now say that Christ is ex- 
pressly called God in the New Testament, and that here the 
controversy, as it respects the divinity of our Lord, must end. 
Admitting the fact, I should rather say, that here the contro- 
versy must begin ; and the question to be considered would be, 
in what sense this appellation might be given to Christ in con- 
sistency with the declaration of an apostle, a declaration con- 
firmed by the tenor of the Christian Scriptures from beginning 
to end, that "to us there is one God, the Father, and one Lord, 
Jesus Christ." 

To these remarks, written, as I have stated above, some years 



.200 

ago, I will add one general argument from Scripture against 
the doctrine which has been here considered: and the argument 
is this, that the language of the New Testament (to say nothing 
of the Old) is manifestly framed not on Trinitarian but on 
Unitarian principles. I do not here mean to take into account 
the passages in which the simple humanity of Christ seems to 
be positively affirmed, nor those in which our Lord asserts the 
limitation of his power and knowledge, which at once negative 
the notion of his divinity, but shall confine myself to the use 
of the term God in the Christian Scriptures. 

According to the doctrine of the Trinity, at least according 
to that view of it which has been the subject of consideration, 
there are three persons in the Godhead ; in other words, God 
subsists in three persons, called the Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost. Neither of these persons then, singly considered, is 
truly and properly God, and the term God, in its genuine and 
full signification, ought to mean a Being in whom these three 
persons are united. But though the term God occurs (as has 
been said) thirteen hundred times in the New Testament, is 
there the slightest evidence that it is used in a single instance 
to denote a Trinity in Unity? Is there not, on the other hand, 
the most full and satisfactory proof that in the Christian Scrip- 
tures the term is employed to convey the notion of one 
person alone ? When God is said to have given his only- 
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not 
perish but have everlasting life, what is intended by the term 
God ? Surely not the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but the 
Father, as distinguished from the Son. When it is said, that 
there is one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ 
Jesus, the meaning cannot be, that the man Christ Jesus is a 
mediator between man and the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, 
but between man and the Father only. It being then certain, 
even from the evidence now produced, that the term God is 
applied to that one person whom we denominate the Father, it 
is reasonable to conclude that whenever the simple term God is 
used, the Father alone is intended. And in this sense, I doubt 
not, it is generally used even by Trinitarians themselves. 



201 

But let it now be allowed that the term God may be applied 
with equal propriety to each of the three persons of the Trinity; 
how, then, comes it to pass that we should nowhere read in the 
Scriptures of God the Son, and of God the Holy Ghost? 
That this is the true language of Trinitarianism, Trinitarians 
themselves have unwittingly afforded us abundant proof. But 
if one main object of the Christian revelation was to disclose 
the doctrine of the Trinity, is it not beyond expression strange, 
that while in the Christian records there is repeated mention of 
God the Father, not a word should be said of God the Son, 
and of God the Holy Ghost, and that we should nowhere read 
of three persons in one God ? Is it not altogether inexplicable 
that the apostles, whose minds must have been full of so sub- 
lime a mystery, should not have taught the deity of the Son 
and of the Holy Ghost in language as clear and unequivocal as 
that in which they have taught the deity of that Being whom 
we call the Father ? Trinitarians, however, are ready enough 
to contend that their doctrine is laid down in the New Testa- 
ment in the clearest and most intelligible terms, and often 
reproach their opponents with wilful and incorrigible blindness 
because they cannot find it there. But I ask, how it comes to 
pass, if their doctrine is explicitly taught in Scripture, that 
they do not rest satisfied with expressing it in scriptural lan- 
guage ? Why do they adopt a phraseology of their own in 
preference to the express words of inspiration ? Why, I might 
further ask, have they not been contented with scriptural doxo- 
logies, but have chosen rather to employ ascriptions of praise 
of which Scripture furnishes no example, and to which it gives 
no countenance ? Surely, by being thus wise above what is 
written, they convict themselves of error. The language of 
Trinitarians, indeed, when compared with the language of 
Scripture, is most manifestly the language of men who have 
fabricated a system for themselves ; and it is language which is 
so far from bearing the impress of divine truth, that if submitted 
to a fair analysis, it will be found either to mean nothing or to 
contradict itself. 

But I will add no mora; nor should I have written thus 



202 

much, had I not wished, for once, to say a word or two on 
a doctrine, the rejection of which forms the distinguishing 
characteristic of that class of Christians to which for more than 
forty years I have professed myself to belong. E. C. 

May, 1829. C. R, N. S. vol. iii. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER. 
Qeos be ov Tipcopeirai co~ti yap f) ripwpia Kaicov avTanoboo-is Ko\a£ei 

p.€VTOl TTpOS TO XP r } (Tl i X0V Kal KOlv V < at l^m TOVS Ko\d£op,€VOVS. 

Sir, — In p. 66 of Bishop Butler's "Analogy," I find the fol- 
lowing words : — " Some men think the sole character of the 
Author of Nature to be that of simple, absolute benevolence. 
And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity 
and justice in Him would be nothing but benevolence conducted 
by wisdom. Now, surely this ought not to be asserted unless it 
can be proved, for we should speak with cautious reverence 
upon such a subject." I quite agree with this able and ex- 
cellent author that we ought to treat the question with cautious 
reverence. But upon the first view of the subject, it is mani- 
fest that not less temerity would be shown by affirming that 
justice and veracity in God are independent of benevolence, 
than by affirming that they are included in it. And that they 
are included in it, several considerations may be brought for- 
ward to show ; while, for the contrary proposition, no probable 
argument can be advanced. I shall confine myself to the 
attribute of justice. If justice, then, in God be not a modi- 
fication of benevolence, it is not analogous to that principle 
which we otherwise denominate justice, and it is in vain for us 
to reason concerning it. Justice in man, or that to which 
alone we give the name of justice, is evidently a branch of 
general benevolence, and even when it assumes its severest 



203 ^ 

form, and is employed in awarding the punishment of guilt, it 
has a view to nothing but utility ; and however it may miss of 
its object from a defect of wisdom, the object itself is always 
what benevolence approves, or rather what benevolence sug- 
gests. If punishment were inflicted with any other view than 
that of doing good either to the offender or to others, we 
should no longer consider justice as the principle which or- 
dained such infliction, but should refer it without hesitation to 
the wantonness of cruelty or the malignity of revenge. To 
say, then, that justice in God may be altogether distinct from 
benevolence, is only to say that justice in God may not be 
justice; and to affirm that it is distinct from benevolence, 
would be to affirm that there is no attribute in the Divine 
Nature to which the term justice can with propriety be applied. 
But it will be said that there is something in moral evil 
which calls for suffering as its consequence, without any regard 
to utility, and that Divine justice is the principle by which this 
suffering is inflicted. On the concluding remark of this pro- 
position, I need scarcely observe, that it is a mere abuse of 
language, to call that justice which is supposed to do what 
justice never does. But the proposition that there is a demerit 
in vice which calls for suffering, even though the suffering 
should be in every sense useless, presents a fair subject of 
inquiry. Do we then perceive anything in vice, considered in 
itself, which makes it necessary that pain should follow it, 
even though this pain should be useless both to the sufferer 
and others ? It is in vain to reply, that, according to the 
constitution of nature, suffering is the consequence of vice, 
and therefore that to suppose the fact to be different from what 
it is, is to suppose an impossibility. That guilt and pain are 
connected by a law of nature, is admitted. But the present 
inquiry is, whether we see any reason, exclusive of utility, why 
they should be thus connected. And I conceive that we do 
not. For the sake of brevity I shall occasionally use the term 
punishment for suffering by which neither the sufferer himself 
nor others would be benefited. Will it, then, be said, that the 
fitness of things requires \\mt punishment should follow guilt? 



» 204 

To speak of the fitness of things, without stating to what that 
fitness relates, is only to employ words instead of ideas, and to 
use a relative term as though it had an absolute sense. And 
granting all that has been said respecting the fitness of things, 
the question may still he asked, do we see that the fitness of 
things demands what it is now supposed to require ? Perhaps 
it may be alleged that the human mind intuitively perceives 
that guilt ought to be followed by punishment. For other 
minds I cannot answer, but I have not this intuitive percep- 
tion. I can, indeed, perceive clearly enough that punishment 
which shall be productive of good, may be inflicted from a 
principle of benevolence, but beyond this I perceive nothing. 
But vice or sin, considered as an offence against the perfect 
law of God, may justly be visited with what has been termed 
vindictive punishment. I answer, that the perfection of the 
Divine law, when considered, as it ought to be, in connection 
with the frailty of man, does not appear to supply a reason 
for the infliction of punishment which should do no good ; 
and that the perfection of the Divine character forbids the 
supposition that such punishment will be inflicted. 

But the honour of the Divine government, it may perhaps be 
said, requires that guilt should be followed by punishment. 
When it shall be shown that the honour of the Divine govern- 
ment consists in something distinct from the good of the crea- 
tion, this proposition will deserve to be considered. In the 
meantime it is sufficient to ask, how the honour of any 
government can be sustained by punishments which should 
have no beneficial influence on the subjects of this govern- 
ment ? But does not the ordinary language of mankind seem 
to be founded on the supposition that guilt deserves punish- 
ment for its own sake ? Do we not say of an atrocious cri- 
minal, a brutal murderer for example, that he deserves to suffer 
something worse than death ? In reply, I observe, that the 
indignation which we feel at certain crimes, though a useful 
principle in our constitution, may mislead our judgment; 
secondly, that the ideas of guilt and punishment are so closely 
associated in our minds that we are apt to overlook the link by 



205 

which the things themselves are connected ; thirdly, that were 
we to analyse our ideas when we use the above language, we 
should find our meaning to be, that while death is the legal 
punishment for lighter offences, the atrocious criminal, if 
punished according to the enormity of his crime, might justly 
experience a severer doom. But let us be convinced that no 
good whatever would follow this severer punishment, and we 
should immediately acknowledge that to inflict it would only be 
to add one evil to another. But, it will be asked, does not every 
man feel that sin deserves punishment for its own sake, and 
independently of any benefit by which the punishment may be 
followed ? To this question I would reply, that where reason is 
silent feeling is a dubious authority. And reason finds no 
connection between guilt and punishment, but what is founded 
upon individual or public advantage. As for the feeling in 
question, the case seems to be this. The ideas of guilt and 
punishment are associated in our minds by various means from 
our earliest years. Hence arises the notion of demerit which 
in consequence of this association is familiar to every man; 
but perhaps not one man in a thousand has considered whence 
this notion is obtained, or what is implied in it. And all 
that a man, whether properly or improperly, can be said to 
feel is a persuasion that the appointment by which punishment 
follows guilt is just and proper. But in what the justice and 
propriety of this appointment consist, reason must inform him 
if he is informed at all. And he who says that guilt merits 
punishment for its own sake, says a great deal more than his 
feelings ever taught him. He has proceeded to argue upon 
what he feels, and has drawn a conclusion which I conceive to 
be erroneous. In a word, the only intelligible view of the con- 
nection between vice and suffering is, that vice is a disease, 
and that suffering is intended to effect its cure or to check its 
contagion. I think it sufficiently appears that punishment 
as far as we are able to judge, has for its object utility alone ; 
and I conceive that I cannot conclude better than by present- 
ing to the English reader the meaning of my motto : " God 



206 



does not inflict vindictive punishment, for this is the returning 
evil for evil ; He chastises, however, for utility, both publicly 
and individually, those whom He chastises." E. 0. 

Jan. 1831. C. R, N. S. vol. v. 



TO THE EDITOR OF THE CHRISTIAN REFORMER. 

Sir, — As the judgment of the Vice- Chancellor in the case 
of Lady Hewley's Trustees lay before me the other day, as 
reported in the Times newspaper, my eye was struck with 
something that looked like Greek, and my attention was im- 
mediately arrested by it. On closer inspection, I found that 
the Vice- Chancellor was animadverting on certain supposed 
errors in the Improved Version of the New Testament. To 
some of his animadversions I shall take the liberty to reply, in 
behalf of the translators, though in one instance I shall differ 
from them. The Vice-Chancellor prefaces his animadversions 
with some observations on giving a creed instead of a trans- 
lation. In my reply to his animadversions, I do not intend to 
have anything to do with creeds ; but if a creed can be con- 
veyed in a false translation, what scholar will affirm that no 
creed has been thus conveyed in the Common Version ? God 
forbid, however, that I should impute to the translators the 
guilt of wilfully perverting the sense of Scripture. The por- 
tion of the translation which the Vice-Chancellor has selected 
for the subject of his remarks is the first chapter of the Epistle 
to the Hebrews. And the Vice-Chancellor finds fault with the 
translators for rendering woXu/AEfcog, in the first verse of the 
chapter, "in several parts," instead of "at sundry times." 
" n.o*vfA.Efa>s" says the Vice-Chancellor, "might signify many 
parts of time or many parts of space." In criticism, the 
question is not what a word might signify, but what, in the 



207 

usage of a language, it does signify. At' ov nat rovg aiuvag 
i-Trowo-tv : '* For whom also he constituted the ages." On this 
version the Vice- Chancellor remarks, that " the translators, 
finding themselves a little pushed hard when they translated 
3i* ov ' for whom/ have recourse to a note, by which it appeared 
that two or three persons had fancied that might he the proper 
translation." One of those who fancied this, and, for aught I 
know, the first, was the incomparable Grotius, whose fancy, it 
is true, is ably refuted by that most profound scholar Valck- 
naer,* who, at the same time, notwithstanding his orthodoxy, 
observes that the interpretation of Grotius is to be refuted 
modestly. The Vice-Chancellor cannot, indeed, be charged 
with any offence against modesty in his remarks on this version. 
His honour pronounces nothing upon it with confidence, except 
that it certainly is not the received translation. "He does 
not think, however, that any Greek scholar would dream that 
such was the offliand construction." His honour might have 
ventured to assume a more decisive tone, for most certainly no 
real Greek scholar, in the present day, would offhand translate 
di ov " for whom." 

I consider this version as indefensible, and I am not the only 
Unitarian who passed that judgment upon it in the Old Series 
of the Monthly Kepository. However, as an apology for the 
authors of the Improved Version, I must remark that the 
authors of the Common Version have in one instance supposed 
ha, with a genitive, to express the final cause. "Who being 
a ray of his brightness, and an image of his perfections." The 
Vice-Chancellor was "perfectly astonished" to find the word 
v7roarao-ig rendered perfections. This version is borrowed from 
Mr. Wakefield, who no doubt considered the vTroo-rao-ig here 
spoken of to be the moral, not the physical essence of the 
Deity. In a former work he had rendered the word substance. 
The translators might have borrowed from the orthodox 
Schleusner, and substituted Divine Majesty for person. Here 

* This great man has been the object of admiration to all the 
scholars in Europe, and was such, not least of all, to the late Professor 
Porson. 



208 

the observation of Dr. Sykes deserves to be considered, namely, 
that the word unoo-rao-is was not used in the days of Paul to 
signify person. 

"And ruling all things by his powerful word." "This," 
namely, "powerful word," for "the word of his power," says 
the Vice- Chancellor, " does not express the literal meaning of 
the Greek, nor did the translators mean that it should." Valc- 
kenaer gives the following version : Nutu suo potentissimo. 
He does not, indeed, agree with Grotius and the authors of the 
Improved Version in his view of the passage ; but as far as the 
• Vice- Chancellor's objection goes, he is with them* and with 
them must share the censure. The Vice-Chancellor does not 
like the translation of 7rv£UfxaTa into winds in the 7th verse, 
and pronounces it to be truly astonishing that such a transla- 
tion as "'flames of lightning' should be given to vrugog <p*oya, 
which could not have that meaning." " Uu^og (pxoya. Sic in 
stylo sublimiori fulmen dicebant Hebrsei, quod Schultensius 
monuit ad Jobum. Sensus itaque dicti est, Qui ex ventis spi- 
rantibus facit angelos suos, quique fulminibus utitur ut 
ministris suis publicis." — Valckenaer. Higher authorities than 
Valckenaer and Schultens could not be produced. Valckenaer's 
version is, indeed, a kind of paraphrase, intended to embody 
the substance of his critical observations, but it stands directly 
opposed to our Common Version, however astonishing this 
might seem to the Vice- Chancellor. 

But the Vice-Chancellor charges it generally on the Uni- 
tarian translators, that they neither gave nor meant to give a 
literal translation, and on this he lays great stress. If this 
charge is just, Valckenaer will befriend them once more, who 
writes as follows : " Sic solent interpretes servi verbum de 
verbo reddere, quo librorum sacrorum magnificentiam non 
parum dedecorarunt." — " Thus servile interpreters are accus- 
tomed to render word for word, by which they have not a little 
debased the magnificence of the sacred books." Surely the 
Vice- Chancellor is singularly unfortunate in coming so often 
into a collision with this great critic. 

I have written these brief remarks not as a theologian, which, 



209 

strictly speaking, I am not ; nor as a Unitarian, which I am ; 
but simply as a lover of Greek, and a lover of justice. I am 
aware that the Improved Version is not faultless ; but let not 
blame fall upon the translators where no blame is due, and where 
critics of the highest order might find matter of commendation. 

The Vice- Chancellor having finished his examination of par- 
ticular passages, pronounces his judgment on the Improved 
Version in these words: "He never remembered to have seen 
any translation which could be considered more unsatisfactory, 
more arbitrary, more fanciful, more silly, and, he was sorry to . 
add, more false than was that book."* How far this judgment 
is warranted by the criticisms which preceded it, I shall leave 
it to others to decide. 

Before I lay down my pen, which, at my age, and with my 
growing aversion to writing, I shall not often resume, I will say 
a few words, probably my last words, on the general subject of 
Unitarianism. It is the fashion with bigots in the present day 
(for bigotry, like other things, has its fashion) to deny that 
Unitarians ought to be denominated Christians. It is in every 
man's power to give us, or to withhold from us, what name he 
pleases ; but I shall quit the world with a conviction that the 
united efforts of all the bigots in Christendom cannot prevent 
the gradual extension of the Unitarian doctrine. The seed is 
sown, and the harvest must in due time follow. Unitarianism 
is not the opinion of an hour, it is not the dream of a fanatic, 
which must pass into oblivion, or be remembered only as a spe- 
cimen of human folly ; it is not a doctrine which requires for 
its reception that the eyes of the understanding should be hood- 

* The reader may contrast with this judgment the liberality of the 
learned Dr. Bennet, Bishop of Cloyne, who, in a letter addressed to 
Mr. Belsham some little time after having received from him a copy of 
the Improved Version, expresses himself as follows. After observing 
that it is not to be expected that our opinions on many disputed and 
doubtful passages should perfectly coincide, he adds, " But it is always 
pleasing to see the sentiments of a respectable scholar, and the in- 
genuity with which he supports them. I repeat, therefore, with truth, 
that you have done me a great favour, and I shall always esteem your 
work a valuable addition to my library/' 

P 



210 

winked, or which invokes the aid of terror to protect its mys- 
teries, but it is a doctrine which recommends itself by its divine 
simplicity, and which accords at once with the voice of nature, 
of reason, and of Scripture. It is a doctrine which is most 
honourable to God, and which looks with a benignant aspect 
upon man. It is a doctrine which (as opposed to Trinitarianism) 
has classed among its advocates several of the most illustrious 
names which have adorned the annals of the world. It is a 
doctrine which has been extricated from the cumbrous mass of 
absurdity under which for ages it had lain buried, by the dili- 
gent and critical study of the Scriptures. An attempt to 
extinguish this doctrine would be as unavailing as an attempt 
to extinguish the sun. The light of Divine truth has burst forth 
after a long and gloomy night, and though at present " the 
darkness comprehendeth it not," it cannot fail gradually to dis- 
perse the mists and clouds which may surround it, and to shine 
more and more unto the perfect day. E. C. 

P.S. In the reply of "A Barrister" to the "Unitarian In- 
dependent" in the Times of Saturday, the 11th inst., I read 
the following paragraph : " But we will apprise the unlearned 
reader, that neither the Independent nor the Unitarian transla- 
tors know anything of Greek, if they fancy that their transla- 
tion of the 7th verse of this chapter is correct; for, to waive 
the objection to lightning, the translation ought to have been, 
' Who maketh his messengers winds, and his ministers flames 
of fire.' Every critical Greek scholar is aware that, whenever 
two nouns or phrases are connected by a verb in this manner, 
making one an epithet to the other, the object has the article, 
and the epithet has not" 

Will the Barrister affirm that Valckenaer knew nothing of 
Greek ? If so, he must be a stranger to the name. Valcke- 
naer has himself stated the principle which guided the Greeks 
as to the use of the article in the case in question, and he has 
observed that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has not 
used the article as it is used by them. Had he thought it 
necessary, he could probably have produced instances to con- 



211 



firm his interpretation. I will venture to produce one for him. 
In the 104th Psalm, verse 3, "who maketh the clouds his 
chariot," the Septuagint has no article before the word trans- 
lated clouds* which certainly appears to he the suhject in the 
sentence, and not the predicate. E. C. 

Jan. 1834. C. R, N. S. vol. i. 

* 'O Tideis vefprj rrju e7n(3acriv avrov. 



APPENDIX. 



The following Letters would not have appeared in this volume, had 
it not been for a wish expressed by several friends who had perused 
them with interest. — R C. 



Dorset Gaol, September 25th, 1800. 
My dear Sir, 

The formality of a letter on such an- untoward 
subject, was not necessary from you, I recollected your 
severe affliction, and sympathised with you : it was sufficient 
to engross your thoughts, and I made myself sure at all times 
of every kind wish, and every correspondent feeling from so 
estimable a friend. 

What commendations I may have ever bestowed upon you, 
were a compliment to my own perception of uncommon 
merit; and whatever my industry may have done for me, 
and persevering zeal, I contemplate the powers of your mind 
with astonishment, and an unaffected conviction of great in- 
feriority in this respect. 

I thank you for the passage in Lilius ; my copy is not here, 
but he is an author whom I have read diligently, and think 
worthy of more respect than he has received. 

Mrs. W. and what of my family are with me, are well, and 
unite in every good wish for Mrs. Cogan, yourself, and chil- 
dren. Believe me, 

My dear sir, 
Your most sincere aud affectionate friend, 

Gilbert Wakefield. 



214 



September 6th, 1821. 
Dear and excellent Mr. Cogan, 

Highly do I value, and carefully shall I pre- 
serve, your learned and friendly letter. I am quite exhausted 
by business and visiting in London, and I mean, as soon as 
possible, to make my escape into the country ; there I shall 
carefully examine the passages which you have communicated 
to me from Herodotus. In the bustle of the town I really 
cannot attend, as I ought to do, to any literary subject; The 
other morning I read two of your sermons, and I was very 
much pleased with them indeed. I thank you, dear sir, again, 
and again, and again, for presenting me with the two precious 
volumes, and most assuredly I shall read some of the Dis- 
courses from my own pulpit, when I shall explicitly do the 
same justice to you which I have done to Dr. Eees. 

Pray come and see me, for I shall give you a hearty wel- 
come, and vexed I am that it is not in my power to wait upon 
you, as I did most sincerely wish. Mr. Cogan, your moral 
and your intellectual excellences have taken firm hold of my 
regard, and my respect; and I have this morning charged one 
of my executors to give you a ring when I am no more. Pre- 
sent my best compliments to Mrs. Cogan. Do not again 
preface, or again conclude, with that formal language of 
" Rev. Sir." I shall set you a very different example, by 
subscribing myself, 

Dear Sir, 
Your very faithful well-wisher and obedient servant, 

S. Parr. 



Extract of a Letter from Dr. Parr to Dr. Abraham Bees. 

Dear Sir, 

* * * * * 

Now for a merry story. Nearly a month ago 
two ecclesiastical dignitaries came from Leamington to hear 






215 

me preach ; they were at the Regent Hotel, where the public 
table is often crowded. They heard me preface a sermon to 
this effect: — "The discourse I am going to deliver to you 
came from the pen of a writer who does not belong to the 
Established Church, but I have the honour to call him my 
friend, and I am sure that his intellectual powers, his literary 
attainments, his candour, his moderation, and his other ex- 
emplary virtues, would make him an ornament to any religious 
community." 

Well, my two hearers, in a public company, expressed their 
astonishment and their indignation that such an eminent 
clergyman as Dr. Parr should bestow such praise upon Dr. 
Rees, who was a Socinian, and preach from a pulpit in the 
Established Church avowedly the sermon of such a heretic. 
Upon this a long and warm discussion arose. 

Now, dear sir, in the first place Dr. Rees is not a Socinian ; 
in the second place, the sermon was not written by Dj. Rees 
but Mr. Cogan ; and in the third place, it did not contain one 
syllable which, under the torture of polemical interpretation, 
related directly or indirectly to any one peculiar tenet of Ho- 
moousians, Sabellians, Patropassians, Macedonians, Arians, 
Apollonarians, Socinians, or modern Unitarians. 

I was much amused with the tale, but I shall continue to 
preach good sense, whether it comes from the pen of Mr. 
Cogan, or Dr. Rees, or Dr. Duchal, or Dr. Jortin, or Bishop 
Sherlock, or Bishop Warburton, or Dr. Clark, — and these are 
the writers whose sermons I am accustomed to deliver ; and I 
now and then sprinkle some holy dew of panegyric upon these 
illustrious worthies. 

I am, dear Sir, 
With the greatest respect and regard, 

Your friend, and obedient humble servant, 

S. Parr. 



216 



Extracts from Letters received by a member of Mr. Cog an 's 
family, shortly after his death, from the Rev. Thos. John- 
stone, of Wakefield, one of Mr. Cogan's earliest and most 
esteemed friends. 

The Memoir of your dear father, in the " Christian Re- 
former," for April, has greatly impressed me. It is calculated 
to interest every reader to whom his name is known, and, to 
the particular friends who have been happy enough to have 
had a personal acquaintance with him (more especially those 
who, in addition to the warmth of friendship, have been in 
eager pursuit of the same classical studies), it must afford 
singular and exquisite satisfaction. I cannot tell you in how 
lively a manner the account which is given of my residence 
with him has impressed me. It is peculiarly expressive of my 
past enjoyment, advantage, and improvement. Separated from 
your beloved father for so many years as I have been, I can 
still vividly recall the period of my companionship with him. 
Never, indeed, could it be effaced from my recollection; and 
the manner in which it has been communicated in the Memoir 
referred to, has brought it so strongly to my recollection, that, 
although now advanced to the age of eighty-seven, I could 
suppose it were only a short space since this enjoyment ex- 
isted. Some scenes, indeed, will so return to my aged fancy, 
if I may so express it, that I could almost imagine that I was 
actually talking to him. One incident especially returns to 
my recollection. We had been separated some little time after 
his removal from the College, and he wrote to me (I thiuk 
from Rothwell, his native place) to meet him, if possible, at 
Cambridge, and enjoy together the performance of " Acis and 
Galatea," which was to take place there, in the Senate House. 
Nothing could exceed our delight. We were both very fami- 
liar with the music, and I was persuaded by a gentleman, who 
was himself a performer, to take a part with him on the violin, 
while my friend was half persuaded to join in the singing, for 
which he was amply prepared, but declined. I shall never 



217 

forget the extreme enjoyment lie manifested throughout the 
whole of the performance. Fond of Greek as he was, music 
had a fascination for him equally remarkable ; and when the 
Memoir speaks of his bursting forth in the middle of the 
night in the concluding part of the trio in "Judas Macca- 
beus," so simply grand and beautiful as it is, my own voice, 
when I read it, involuntarily broke forth in fancied union with 
him in his favourite passage, " That thy power, oh, Jehovah ! 
all nations may know ; " and again, in the other sweet air of 
Handel referred to, and equally familiar to him, " Did I not 
own Jehovah's power, how vain were all I knew." 

Though now with an eye dim with age, with a voice all 
shattered from the same cause, and with a pen which rigid 
fingers can scarcely guide, I could write in fancy for hours to 
record the numerous strains in which we were wont to indulge 
together, to revive our more serious labours, and to throw an 
animated cheerfulness over our existence. But not in music 
alone, or in affording me classical advantages, was he a valued 
friend, but also in aiding my first pulpit services. Many appli- 
cations were made to the college at Daventry for supplies to 
the congregations in the district, some of which fell to his 
share, and on certain occasions he was wont to invite me to go 
with him, and by my taking some part in the devotional exer- 
cises, he wished me to bring my " mind gradually in," as he 
expressed it, for the more full ministerial duty. At that time 
it was not possible, I may observe, to read a written prayer in 
the dissenting chapels then visited; it was, therefore, neces- 
sary to acquire the habit of fluent extempore speaking, or to 
commit the prayer to memory. The former was considered, at 
that time, the most desirable, and considerable efforts were 
made (though not always with success) by some of the Da- 
ventry students for the attainment of this particular part of 
public duty. Extempore speaking was ever rather painful to 
my friend Mr. Cogan, and therefore he was soon glad to avail 
himself of the advantage which the change, in this respect, 
in certain places of our worship afforded. The opportunity 
which he thus granted me, of early acquiring the facility of 

Q 



218 

speaking, gave me an advantage in some religious services, 
particularly on funeral occasions, and in my frequent visits to 
the bed of siokness. In connection with the circumstance of 
my occasionally accompanying my friend in his first ministerial 
duties, I am here led to notice his first acquaintance with his 
cheerful and ever kind partner in life. Weedon was the happy 
spot. We went to supply the small dissenting society in that 
place, and we were domiciled at her father's house. No event 
more auspicious to his happiness than their subsequent union 
could have been accomplished. Of this I witnessed the most 
engaging proofs when, a few years afterwards, I visited your 
dear father and mother at Cheshunt, and also at their last, 
loved habitation at Walthamstoiv. I will not enlarge, or I 
could dwell long upon the intellectual attainments and virtues 
of your venerated father, and also upon my Own personal 
obligations. Thank God, I have had many friends, and I 
would undervalue no one, but assuredly amongst the foremost 
would be your dear departed parent, and, till my memory, 
which is, alas, gradually fading, has passed completely, his 
blessed self, in fond imagination,, will remain with me. Let us, 
my dear friend, apply to the departed the blessed gospel assu- 
rance, the sweet hope of a renewal of affection in that world 
where no advance of time enfeebles the spiritual powers, and 
no mournful interruptions of existence can again take place. 
May it be, that though I was not permitted to renew my ac- 
quaintance with him here, I shall there be blessed with this 
privilege, and of witnessing at the same time his reunion with 
the children of his paternal love. 

I remain, my dear friend, 

Most truly yours, 

Thos. Johnstone. 

Wakefield, April 27. 



A LIST OF PUBLICATIONS, 



REV. E. COGAN. 



AN ADDRESS TO THE DISSENTERS ON CLASSICAL 

LITERATURE. 8vo. . London, 1789. 
A FRAGMENT ON NECESSITY. 8vo. Printed, but not 

published. 

MOSCHI IDYLLIA TRIA, GR^CE, NOTIS ILLUSTRAVIT 

IN USUM STUDIOS^! JUVENTUTIS E. COGAN. 8vo. London, 1795. 
Printed, but afterwards suppressed. 

.REFLECTIONS ON THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTI- 
ANITY. 12mo. London, 1796* *.' 

APPENDIX TO REFLECTIONS ON THE EVIDENCES 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 12mo. 

A SERMON ON THE PURITY AND PERFECTION OF 
CHRISTIAN MORALITY, delivered in the Meeting-House, Cross-Brook 
Street, Cheshunt, April 17th, 1800. 8vo. London, 1800. 

CHRISTIANITY AND ATHEISM COMPARED, in a Dis- 
course delivered at the Meeting-House, Cross-Brook Street, Cheshunt, May 
18th, 1800. 

AN EXAMINATION OF MR. ROBINSON'S REPLY TO 
MR. COGAN ON THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF A BELIEF 
IN A FUTURE STATE. 8vo. London, 1800. 

A SERMON at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, on occa- 
sion of the Death of Isaac Solly, Esq., preached in 1802. 8vo. London. 

A SERMON delivered at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, 
Oct. 29th, 1809, on occasion of the Death of Ebenezer Radcliffe, Esq. 
8vo. London, 1809. 

A SERMON delivered at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, 
December 10th, 1809, on occasion of the Death of Mrs. Hannah Cooke. To 
which is added, AN ADDRESS delivered at her interment in Bunhill Fields, 
Dec. 5th, 1809. 8vo. London, 1810. 

A DISCOURSE on occasion of the Death of J. Relph, Esq., of 

Cheshunt, Herts, delivered in the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, Feb. 

3rd, 1811. 8vo. 
SERMONS, chiefly on Practical Subjects. 2 vols. 8vo. London, 

1817. 
A SERMON delivered at the Old Meeting-House, Walthamstow, 

Aug. 2nd, 1819, on occasion of the death of Elizabeth, daughter of the late 

Isaac Solly, Esq. 8vo. London, 1818, 



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